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Analyzing debunking arguments in moral psychology: Beyond the counterfactual analysis of influence by irrelevant factors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Joanna Demaree-Cotton Open the ORCID record for Joanna Demaree-Cotton [Opens in a new window]
Joanna Demaree-Cotton*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8306. [email protected]
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Abstract

May assumes that if moral beliefs are counterfactually dependent on irrelevant factors, then those moral beliefs are based on defective belief-forming processes. This assumption is false. Whether influence by irrelevant factors is debunking depends on the mechanisms through which this influence occurs. This raises the empirical bar for debunkers and helps May avoid an objection to his Debunker's Dilemma.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e151
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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References

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