Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T01:44:49.225Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Rationalization, controversy, and the entanglement of moral-social cognition: A “critical pessimist” take

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Robin Zheng Open the ORCID record for Robin Zheng [Opens in a new window]
Robin Zheng*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Yale-NUS College, [email protected]://robin-zheng.me
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I raise two worries about the Debunker's and Defeater Dilemmas, respectively, and I argue that moral cognition is inextricable from social cognition, which tends to rationalize deep social inequality. I thus opine that our moral-social capacities fare badly in profoundly unjust social contexts such as our own.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e167
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Calhoun, C. (1989) Responsibility and reproach. Ethics 99(2):389–406.Google Scholar
Graham, J., Haidt, J. & Nosek, B. A. (2009) Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96(5):1029–46.Google Scholar
Hamilton, M. C. (1991) Masculine bias in the attribution of personhood: People = Male, Male = People. Psychology of Women Quarterly 15(3):393–402.Google Scholar
Hetter, K. (2015) J. K. Rowling's reply to critic of gay Dumbledore. CNN, March 25. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/25/entertainment/feat-rowling-dumbledore-gay-tweet/index.html.Google Scholar
Holmes, A. (2012) White until proven black: Imagining race in hunger games. The New Yorker (March 30). Available at: https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/white-until-proven-black-imagining-race-in-hunger-games.Google Scholar
Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R. & Nosek, B. A. (2004) A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. Political Psychology 25(6): 881–919.Google Scholar
Kolers, A. (2016) A moral theory of solidarity. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lerner, M. (1980) Belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. Plenum.Google Scholar
May, J. (2018) Regard for reason in the moral mind. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Merritt, R. D. & Kok, C. J. (1995) Attribution of gender to a gender-unspecified individual: An evaluation of the people = male hypothesis. Sex Roles 33(3–4):145–57.Google Scholar
Ross, L. (1977) The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 10:173–220.Google Scholar
Shaver, K. G. (1970) Defensive attribution: Effects of severity and relevance on the responsibility assigned for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14(2):101–13.Google Scholar
Uhlmann, E. L., Pizarro, D. A., Tannenbaum, D. & Ditto, P. H. (2009) The motivated use of moral principles. Judgment and Decision Making 4(6):476–91.Google Scholar
Vargas, M. (2013a) Building better beings: A theory of moral responsibility. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Young, I. M. (1990) Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar