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Rationalism, optimism, and the moral mind
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2019
Abstract
I welcome many of the conclusions of May's book, but I offer a suggestion – and with it what I take to be a complementary strategy – concerning the core commitments of rationalism across the domains of moral psychology in the hopes of better illuminating why a rationalist picture of the mind can deliver us from pessimism.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019
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Target article
Précis of Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind
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