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Endogenous reward is a bridge between social/cognitive and behavioral models of choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2025

George Ainslie Open the ORCID record for George Ainslie [Opens in a new window]
George Ainslie*
Affiliation:
Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville, PA, USA [email protected] www.picoeconomics.org
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Endogenous reward (intrinsic reward at will) is a fiat currency that is occasioned by steps toward any goals which are challenging and/or uncommon enough to prevent its debasement by inflation. A “theory of mental computational processes” should propose what properties let goals grow from appetites for endogenous rewards. Endogenous reward may be the universal selective factor in all modifiable mental processes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 48 , 2025 , e25
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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