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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2025
Integrating the predictive processing framework into our understanding of motivation offers promising avenues for theoretical development, while shedding light on the computational processes underlying motivated behavior. Here we decompose expected free energy into intrinsic value (i.e., epistemic affordance) and extrinsic value (i.e., instrumental affordance) to provide insights into how individuals adapt to and interact with their environment.
Target article
A critique of motivation constructs to explain higher-order behavior: We should unpack the black box
Related commentaries (25)
Adopt process-oriented models (if they're more useful)
Almost, but not quite there: Research into the emergence of higher-order motivated behavior should fully embrace the dynamic systems approach
Beyond reductionism: Understanding motivational energization requires higher-order constructs
Connecting theories of personality dynamics and mental computational processes
Definitional devils and detail: On identifying motivation as an animating dynamic
Don't throw motivation out with the black box: The value of a good theory revisited
Endogenous reward is a bridge between social/cognitive and behavioral models of choice
Expectancy value theory's contribution to unpacking the black box of motivation
Exploring novelty to unpack the black-box of motivation
Higher-order motivational constructs as personal-level fictions: A solution in search of a problem
Human motivation is organized hierarchically, from proximal (means) to ultimate (ends)
It's bigger on the inside: mapping the black box of motivation
Mental computational processes have always been an integral part of motivation science
Motivation needs cognition but is not just about cognition
Motivational constructs: Real, causally powerful, not psychologically constructed
Motivational whack-a-mole: Foundational boxes cannot be unpacked
Needed: Clear definition and hierarchical integration of motivation constructs
Postcard from inside the black box
Predictive processing: Shedding light on the computational processes underlying motivated behavior
Resurrecting the “black-box” conundrum
The ins and outs of unpacking the black box: Understanding motivation using a multi-level approach
The role of metacognitive feelings in motivation
The unboxing has already begun: One motivation construct at a time
There's no such thing as a free lunch: A computational perspective on the costs of motivation
When unpacking the black box of motivation invites three forms of reductionism
Author response
Response to the critiques (and encouragements) on our critique of motivation constructs