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Cognitively bounded rational analyses and the crucial role of theories of subjective utility
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 March 2020
Abstract
We agree that combining rational analysis with cognitive bounds, what we previously introduced as Cognitively Bounded Rational Analysis, is a promising and under-used methodology in psychology. We further situate the framework in the literature, and highlight the important issue of a theory of subjective utility, which is not addressed sufficiently clearly in the framework or related previous work.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020
References
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Target article
Resource-rational analysis: Understanding human cognition as the optimal use of limited computational resources
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Author response
Advancing rational analysis to the algorithmic level