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Sampling as a resource-rational constraint
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 March 2020
Abstract
Resource rationality is useful for choosing between models with the same cognitive constraints but cannot settle fundamental disagreements about what those constraints are. We argue that sampling is an especially compelling constraint, as optimizing accumulation of evidence or hypotheses minimizes the cost of time, and there are well-established models for doing so which have had tremendous success explaining human behavior.
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Target article
Resource-rational analysis: Understanding human cognition as the optimal use of limited computational resources
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Author response
Advancing rational analysis to the algorithmic level