The invitation to give a commemorative lecture of such importance evokes feelings of gratitude and pleasure that a body as distinguished as your own should show interest in the work of one's collaborators. This is especially so for us because the field in which we work might seem, to superficial observation, to be remote from practical interests. It has long been our hope that by study of a relatively simple animal we might be able to discover some of the fundamental features of living memory systems, which have not yielded to investigation in mammals or man. Your interest encourages us to think that we may be on the right lines and I hope that in return it may be possible to tell you at least something of the principles that underlie the coding and storing of information in the nervous system. But the brain is a very complicated instrument and the problem is far from solution. The account that I shall give will be grossly over-simplified and will probably seem to present an absurdly static picture of what we all know to be a continually active and dynamic system.

Electronarcosis is the term applied to a sleep-like condition produced by the passage of an electric current through the central nervous system.

Doctors have a deep-rooted sense of professional identity ‘the medical self’. This allows them to do the jobs society expects from them, but also acts as a barrier when seeking care when unwell. This article discusses how the medical self is formed drawing on psychoanalytic, anthropological and psychiatric literature.

The word “depression” has come to be used in psychiatry to denote both a syndrome (or symptom:sign cluster) and one or more of the symptoms commonly occurring in this cluster. This attribution of two meanings to one term has led to considerable confusion. Thus it is often claimed that depression may be present in almost any mental illness. This statement may be true in the sense that the mood of depression may occur in almost any mental illness; but it cannot be true in the sense that the depressive syndrome may enter into almost any mental illness, since the term depressive syndrome has already, at least by implication, been used to denote a particular symptom:sign cluster which differentiates it from all other symptom:sign clusters. To deny this would be to deny the original principles of division.

The first recorded attempt to use carbon dioxide inhalation systematically as a form of psychiatric treatment was by Lovenhart et al. (1929). The subjects were catatonic schizophrenics and such modification as occurred was fleeting in nature.

In 1943 Meduna began to use carbon dioxide inhalation in the treatment of the neuroses and his efforts were described in a series of papers and developed in a monograph (1950). This contains a full description of the physiological and pharmacological effects of carbon dioxide upon nervous function and the technique of administration is described as are also the results in 100 patients. These results are taken as giving some support to a neurophysiological theory of the neuroses based on homeostatic and cybernetic considerations. Efforts were made to minimize the effects of “suggestion” and, although the difficulties are acknowledged, the following passage suggests that the author was reasonably satisfied with his precautions.

Amphetamine-type stimulants are the second most widely used drugs in the world. Over prescription results in diversion for recreational use and the development of dependence. The internet plays a significant role in global misuse of amphetamine-type stimulants, permitting uncontrolled dispensing by online pharmacies and providing information on techniques for illicit manufacture.

Service user contributions to mental health conferences are now routine. How effective they are at promoting dialogue is not clear. We report a difficult exchange following a presentation about coercive treatment, with our individual reflections on what we learnt.

Suggestions are made to improve both the clinical practice and the dialogue.

I value very much the honour of giving the Maudsley Lecture. Henry Maudsley was a pioneer in the study of the physiological basis of mind, and hence of the physiological interpretation of mental disorder. In the preface to his book, The Physiology of Mind (Maudsley, 1876), he said with a blend of optimism and modesty: “The current of psychological thought having set so strongly in physiological channels, it is pretty certain that the reflections which one person has had, however original they may seem to him, some other person has had, has now, or will very soon have.” But half a century was to pass before physiology and psychiatry began to develop techniques which could illuminate the physiological basis of mind, and even now we are only entering the era which Maudsley would have found the fulfilment of his hopes and anticipations. Though intolerant of the idea that metaphysical speculation about mind could take the place of scientific study, he was nevertheless a philosopher, and my aim in this lecture is to try to use a philosophy of perception to interpret the clinical observations of perceptual disorder.

In contrast with the vast literature devoted to the adult type, reports on the form of general paralysis which occurs in childhood or adolescence have been few and far between, and in this country the papers of Mott (I) and Watson (2) form the chief source of our knowledge of its clinical and pathological features.

In 1894 the term “perseveration” was first used in psychiatry by Neisser to indicate abnormally persistent repetition of an activity after the activity should have been completed, such as is shown in the frequent speaking or writing of a word or words in unsuitable places. Thus originally the term was descriptive of a particular and circumscribed symptom to be recognized in the clinic. In 1900 the term was used in psychology by Müller to indicate the tendency which every idea has, after having once occurred, to remount spontaneously into consciousness.

The problem of differentiating, in patients of the pre-senile age group, the degree and quality of intellectual impairment that is due to depression from that which is brought about by some organic, cerebral deterioration is one of some practical importance. It is, in fact, as Henderson and Gillespie (1950) stress, an important point to determine with regard to the prognosis of depressive cases of this age” whether or not there is any complicating organic process causing a failure of memory and efficiency. If such is present then the prognosis must be viewed much more gravely than would otherwise be indicated.”

A review of the history and experimental findings relating to the spiral after-effect can be found elsewhere (5) and will not be repeated here. The reliability of the after-effect, the major role played by the cortex in its production and the evidence already obtained that the after-effect is modifiable in accordance with Eysenck's drug action hypothesis (2) indicated it to be a promising test in the investigation into the effects of meprobamate on perception.

Epilepsy is as old as history. To the ancients it was a sacred disease, each convulsion signifying a visitation of its victim by one of the gods. Hippocrates first seriously attributed epilepsy to material causes, but the light of scientific approach which he momentarily kindled was soon extinguished, and for centuries the mysteries of epilepsy remained shrouded in a cloud of mysticism and religious cult, and if treatment was administered at all it usually consisted of incantations and spirit-exorcising rituals. In the modern era of medicine scientific battle has been joined with this disease in common with all others, and since the epileptic, like most other sufferers, is liable to an exacerbation of his disease in times of mental and physical stress, the present human warfare cannot but render more important than ever successes in the therapeutic field against epilepsy.

In 1933 Sakel described the induction of epileptiform convulsions during hypoglycæmia, using camphor and cardiazol. This was not, to my knowledge, followed up systematically until Georgi's work, which started in 1934.

It is rare for someone at my time of life to be in a position to make really original contributions to knowledge, though it does occasionally happen. More often we feel that we have something to offer that is generally called the “wisdom of experience,” but it is a gift that a younger generation is apt to look at askance. There is, however, one field in which old age has an undisputed prerogative, and that is in being able to recall happenings in which younger people could have had no share. I propose to-day to confine myself to this modest claim and I shall be content if the illustrating of it arouses some interest in you.

Most spontaneous movements are considered to be motor expressions of the feelings and emotions (Stagner, 1948). Many movements of this kind are referred to as “nervous” habits or mannerisms, a description in which this assumption is also implicit. It is surprising, therefore, that so readily available and objective a guide to the affective organization of the personality has been studied relatively little: the difficulties of definition, description and measurement may account for this. Olson (1929), however, devised a useful time-sampling technique for measuring nervous habits, but I know of no investigations in which it has been used to compare the spontaneous movements made by healthy and “nervous” subjects.