We explore the relationship between religiosity and public support for greater government services. We theorize that increases in religiosity and public opinion both reflect demands from citizens in the face of insecurity. We argue that religiosity is comprised of two factors: responses to insecurity; and long-held preferences for religion, or secularity. We show that previous studies that have observed increased religiosity leading to decreased support for government spending have not distinguished among religiosity as driven by secularity versus insecurity. To test our theory, we first estimate a series of simulations, and we then turn to the dynamics of aggregate religiosity and public opinion in the United States over the past fifty years, an environment where long-held preferences for religious goods have remained relatively stable. Consistent with our theory, religiosity and public opinion respond to insecurity; the series are positively correlated, move together through time, and react in similar ways to changes in GDP per capita. Our findings indicate that during times when there is greater insecurity, both religiosity and demand from government increase.

By critically engaging the literature on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, this paper seeks to show how the normative structure of secularism constitutes, enables, and restricts the discursive space in which Islamists can justify political action. It analyzes changes in Tunisian Ennahda's discourse (2011–2016) as an attempt to navigate between standards of recognition imposed on them by the normative power of secularism on the one hand, and what they can convincingly integrate into their own platform on the other hand.

When contentious blasphemy laws are pressed into service in fledgling democracies with illiberal tendencies such as Indonesia, critical questions arise about judicial integrity and the political nature of blasphemy trials. Judicial legitimacy in Indonesia is defined according to international standards and conventions. The focus is on judicial propriety rather than the popularity or majoritarian appeal of court decisions. In May 2017 a watershed moment occurred in Indonesia as the former governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as Ahok) was found guilty of desecrating religion and sentenced to 2 years in prison. Judgments rendered in politicized blasphemy trials such as these fail to meet standards of impartiality, and when discursive transgressions of a blasphemous nature occur there are deep ambiguities of meaning and intent. This paper contends that the revival of blasphemy as a punishable crime relates to political power calculations and electoral opportunities, and offers an analysis of blasphemy in Indonesia through the quasi-historical lens of a discursive crime premised on the fallacy that religious offence threatens public order. Blasphemy trials are further complicated by the fact that religious authorities and Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia have significant influence over judicial processes.

The religion and state project is intended to develop and create a set of measures that systematically gauge government religion policy. Round 2 of the religion and state dataset will include 147 variables for 176 states. This update (1) describes the methodology and reasoning behind the new coding, (2) describes the changes between Round 1 and Round 2, (3) compares the religion and state variables to other religion data collections, and (4) discusses the potential significance of this data collection

This article analyzes the emergence of female Islamist leaders in the Middle East and North Africa, and the glaring contradictions between their feminist views and their roles as political activists for the Islamic State. The two Islamist leaders who form the primary focus of this analysis are Zaynab al-Ghazali (d. 2005) of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Nadia Yassine of Morocco's Justice and Charity Society. Our analysis reveals the existence of “Islamist feminism,” distinguished from broader secular-oriented Islamic feminism, as a logical, albeit unique, extension, and expression of Muslim anti-colonial discourse rooted in the intellectual currents of twentieth century independence movements that still resonate today.

Research consistently emphasizes the importance of religious institutions for influencing political action among Asian Americans. The social capital literature offers two theoretical explanations for why churches increase political activity: bridging capital between different groups and bonding capital among similar groups. The latter argues that individuals who attend racially homogeneous churches are more participatory. This paper expands on these accounts by examining another aspect of bonding. That is, how does similarity in political views among church members affect Asian Americans' political participation? Results from the 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey show that Asian Americans who attend politically homogeneous churches are more likely to vote and participate in conventional activities. The effects of racial homogeneity are limited once taking political homogeneity into consideration. These findings provide evidence that political homophily within religious organizations may facilitate the bonding of social capital between racial/ethnic minorities, and this homophily is indeed salient to democratic participation.

This paper examines grassroots mobilizations in Turkey against the government's policies on religion and education (RE), and the potential effects of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) on their mobilization. Specifically, it follows the ways in which grassroots actors frame their discourses of secularism and freedom of religion in education during a period when the Turkish government is aiming to increase the role of Sunni-Islam in national education, while at the same time refusing to implement ECtHR decisions regarding RE. Drawing on empirical research, it analyzes the role the ECtHR and its case law play in the diverse rights claims and discourses of three different types of mobilizations that is going on in the field of RE: (i) legal mobilization, and right to exemption and freedom from religion, (ii) political mobilization, and new discourses of pluralism and secularism, (iii) monitoring and policy-based mobilization and national and international advocacy for pluralism and equality in education.

What are the boundaries for discussing a candidate's religion? In the 2008 and the 2012 presidential campaigns, the religious beliefs and practices of at least one of the candidates became a subject of intense scrutiny from the media and the public. To ascertain the limits of social discourse for religious out-group, we conducted a survey experiment on the 2012 CCES survey. We find strong evidence that norms of social discourse do not apply to all religions equally. Furthermore, the application of norms differs by political party because Democrats and Republicans express concerns about different religious groups. Overall, there is a large difference for Muslims when it comes to social discourse. Finally, individuals have internalized the norms because most of them are willing to sanction those who violate them, even if the norms on social discourse are not applied equally among American voters.

We validate the classification of 16 “mainline” and 97 “evangelical” Protestant denominations in Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States, 2000 based on Mark Chaves' five-point Biblical “inerrancy” scale. Using Glenmary county data, nearly perfect correlations were derived between the percentage of adherents in “evangelical” denominations and levels three-four on the Chaves scale and between the percentage of adherents in “mainline” denominations and level 1 on the Chaves scale. The distinguishing characteristic of Evangelical or Mainline Protestant denominations, therefore, is Biblical inerrancy or its absence. As a guide for future empirical research, this comprehensive listing of Evangelical and Mainline Protestant denominations should be employed in aggregate studies, especially where county-level analysis is applied to one state or a subset of states.

Can a concept such as dignity, with roots in hierarchy and exclusion, serve as the constitutional basis for advancing egalitarian justice within a democratic political community? This article highlights some concerns, via engagement with the work of Indian constitutional architect and anti-caste champion B.R. Ambedkar. Ambedkar strongly associates dignity with upper-caste status in Hinduism, and with dispositions to haughtiness or arrogance toward lower-status persons. His analysis has implications for recent treatments which frame dignity as a property which is possessed equally by all persons and is suitable for grounding egalitarian justice within political communities. In such accounts, dignity is shown to entail a defensive disposition and indignation against others as potential rights violators. This introduces tensions between the dignitarian foundation and in some cases very expansive social justice aims. Ambedkar offers an alternative conception of innate worth or worthiness, entailing dispositions to openness and inclusiveness, rendered as fraternity, Deweyan social endosmosis, and ultimately the Buddhist maitri. Such an approach avoids some tensions between dignity/indignation and egalitarian aims, while also offering a way to conceptualize human and non-human animal relations that avoids simply reinscribing status hierarchies.

How are the characteristics of state–religion relations defined? The following paper provides a critical response to the competition perspective in studies on secularization, secularism, and mobilized religion. It argues that actors differ in how religion and state should relate to public life, not the extent that they should be integral or separate from each other. This paper substantiates its argument by exploring how in Tunisia––in a context of revolutionary, social and political instability––a variety of positions were articulated regarding the preferred position of Islam in relation to, first, national identity and, second, state authority. This is done in direct reference to one particular contentious issue: State control over mosques in name of ensuring the partisan neutrality of religious spaces in the country. This paper builds on multiple fieldwork visits to Tunisia and specifically Sfax, during which 32 individuals were interviewed. In addition, this paper builds on hundreds of primary and secondary sources.

In recent years, measures have been taken to ban the use of international legal principles in state courts. While these international laws vary in terms of the specific restrictions they place on state legal practices, many of these laws have been aimed implicitly or explicitly at banning Sharia law practices. While dozens of states have attempted to pass anti-Sharia policies, thus far, only eight have been successful. In this article, we apply a policy diffusion framework to help explain the agenda placement and adoption of these measures. We find that both internal state determinants and external regional diffusion factors influence the interstate agenda placement and adoption of anti-Sharia practices. However, the regional effect is negative, meaning that these policies follow an atypical diffusion pattern. This study adds to the growing body of literature that examines the diffusion of controversial morality policies.

There is a lively debate on the relative impacts of Islam, oil wealth, and Middle Eastern institutional legacies regarding democratization and the spread of liberal values. We examine this issue using religious repression. We argue that oil-wealthy rulers use religious monopoly to control dissent. Our results show that oil wealth increases religious repression above the effects of Muslim dominance and a host of sundry controls. The Middle East and North Africa region seems to matter more than Islam. Interestingly, the conditional effect of oil and the Middle East and North Africa region is positive on religious freedom. The data suggest that several Gulf monarchies have more religious freedoms than other Muslim dominant states, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, or even Israel and Jordan. The worst religious repression is among oil producers in Central Asia. The results are robust to a host of intervening factors, different measures of oil wealth, alternative data on religious freedom, and estimating method.

This article analyzes how the Muslim majority has engaged with, and contributed to parallel processes of democratization and European integration in post-Communist Albania. The assessment of Muslims' choices focuses on the Central organization, the Albanian Muslim Community, which is recognized by the state as the only authority in charge of all the administrative and spiritual issues pertinent to the community of Sunni believers, and serves as the main hub of respective religious activities in the country. The analysis of democratization, and Muslims' respective choices, are divided into two different periods, namely democratic transition (1990–1998) and democratic consolidation (1998–2013), each facing democratizing actors, including Muslim groups, with different challenges and issues. We argue that the existence of a useful pool of arguments from the past, the so-called Albanian tradition, has enabled Muslims to contravene controversial foreign influences and recast Islam in line with the democratic and European ideals of the Albanian post-communist polity. This set of historical legacies and arguments explain Muslims' similar positioning toward democracy throughout different stages marked by different institutional restrictions and state policies.

Hezbollah, like other Islamic fundamentalist movements in the region, professes an “Islamic way of life” as an objective to achieve and implement in society, but its actual practices can best be understood as harmonious with—and reflective of—the nature of the capitalist environment in which it operates, despite discourses appealing to the popular classes of society. Religious fundamentalist movements should indeed not been considered as fossilized elements from the past. While they may employ symbols and narratives from earlier periods, fundamentalisms are alive, dynamic, and representative of major contemporary trends. Their emergence must thus be fully situated in the political, economic, and social context of the contemporary period. In this perspective, the article analyzes the political economy of Hezbollah and its support for neoliberal policies.

Despite the continued debate over the relationship between church and state in American politics, our understanding of the sources of attitudes on controversies over religious establishment and religious free exercise is limited. I argue that authoritarianism is an unrecognized but important predictor of mass-level attitudes on church and state. I argue that individuals with higher levels of authoritarianism are more likely to support religious establishment as a means of maintaining social conformity and reinforcing the existing social order. Likewise, those with higher levels of authoritarianism should exhibit reduced support for religious free exercise when minority groups are in question as a means of imposing greater costs on social out-groups. Using data from the 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, I find strong support for my theory. Even after controlling for a variety of alternative explanations, authoritarianism remains an important factor in attitudes toward both religious establishment and religious free exercise.

This paper deals in a qualitative discourse analysis with the role of Islamic organizations in welfare delivery in Germany and the Netherlands. Referring to Jonathan Fox's “secular–religious competition perspective”, the paper argues that similar trends of exclusion of Islamic organizations from public social service delivery can be explained with discourses on Islam in these two countries. The analysis, first, shows that in the national competitions between religious and secular ideologies on the public role of religion, different views are dominant (i.e., the support for the Christian majority in Germany and equal treatment of all religions in the Netherlands) which can be traced back to the respective regimes of religious governance. However, and second, when it comes to Islam in particular, in the Netherlands, the perspective of restricting all religions from public sphere prevails which leads to the rather exclusivist view on Islamic welfare that dominates in Germany, too.

This article examines religious identity and its effect on political participation in the context of the Mennonite Church USA. Traditionally, Mennonite doctrine discouraged political activity because of its “worldly” nature. But it is uncertain if traditional doctrine influences the political behavior of contemporary church members. This article seeks to determine (1) to what extent there is a religious identity among contemporary Mennonites, (2) does this identity discourage support for political participation, and (3) if Mennonite identity discourages political participation, what is the substantive difference in support for political participation between low and high identity Mennonites? The analysis reveals that Mennonite religious identity is widespread in the Mennonite Church USA and high levels of identity decreases support for political activity. Despite this, Mennonites as a whole are fairly supportive of political participation, regardless of their level of identity.

This paper focuses on the historical ties between Protestantism and the nation-state, as well as between Catholicism and supranationalism, to widen the political science debate on different conditions of EU issue voting. Research suggests that the political context in each nation-state shapes the extent to which individual Eurosceptic attitudes influence the decision to vote for Eurosceptic parties. In addition to this, I expect that a nations' religious background responds differently to this relationship. Using data from the 2014 European Parliament elections, I show that citizens from predominantly Protestant countries actually decide for Eurosceptic parties if they hold negative attitudes towards European integration. In contrast, citizens from predominantly Catholic countries may or may not vote for Eurosceptic parties, but their voting decision is not based on individual EU attitudes such as support for European integration, trust in EU institutions or European identity.