This paper concerns the ways in which one can/cannot combine extensive quantities. Given a particular theory of extensive measurement, there can be no alternative ways of combining extensive quantities, where ‘alternative’ means that one combining operation can be used instead of another causing only a change in the number assigned to the quantity. As a consequence, rectangular concatenation cannot be an alternative combining operation for length as was suggested by Ellis and agreed by Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky. I argue as well that a theory which imposes such restrictions on the combining operation is more desirable than less stringent rival theories.

The naive misunderstanding among economists of the relationship between economics and philosophy is as profound as it is prevalent. To be sure, economists have concerned themselves with the philosophy of economics only so much as to familiarize themselves with methodology and its application to economic inquiry. Since economics is the oldest and perhaps the most “respectable” of the social sciences its scholars have developed a phobia for anything they might suspect to be even remotely unscientific. Consequently, they have erroneously narrowed their understanding of the nature of economics. This narrowness prevails largely because most economists possess little or no training in general philosophy and especially in the philosophy of science. As a result of this apparent deficiency there exists in the minds of these economists confusion and inability to distinguish between teleology, axiology, and ethics as they do or do not apply to economics.

A number of authors recently have pointed out what they think are enlightening similarities between psychoanalysis and history. In stressing such similarities they are usually trying to justify their own particular characterization of psychoanalysis. I show wherein I think these characterizations go wrong and at the same time try my own hand at clarifying the nature of psychoanalytic propositions.

I consider a problem for functional reductionism based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a. On one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: if b is functionally reduced to a, then a is not functionally reduced to b. Thus we ask, how can a and b be asymmetrically related if they are the same thing? I propose a solution to this tension by distinguishing between ontological levels and levels of description.

The demise of the value-free ideal constitutes a threat to public trust in science. One proposal is that, whenever making value judgments, scientists rely only on democratic values. Because the influence of democratic values on scientific claims and recommendations is legitimate, public trust in science is warranted. I challenge this proposal. Appealing to democratic values will not suffice to secure trust because of at least two obstacles: polarization and marginalization.

This paper proposes a novel view in the the philosophy of race & causation literature known as “causal agnosticism” about race. Causal agnosticism about race implies that it is reasonable to refrain from making judgments about whether race is a cause. The paper’s thesis asserts that certain conditions must be met to infer that something is a cause, according to the fundamental assumptions of causal inference. However, in the case of race, these conditions are often violated. By advocating for causal agnosticism, the paper suggests a more modest approach to understanding the role of race in causal relationships.

Anyone who has worked in Science for forty years can be much surprised to realize how little he now hears about evolution, compared with such former times. At present, evolution seems to be accepted as an axiomatic or universal principle, while the mechanism of it is not much considered, except by a small group of specialists, who work on the subject in greatly limited ways. This is practically a reversal of the former emphasis. The chemist would probably suggest that the change is due to a better realization of the chemical difficulties involved in the mechanics of evolution, and his own change in viewpoint. The chemical difficulties will have increased to an almost incredible degree in this period, and his viewpoint will have changed correspondingly. A glance at some of these changes should illuminate the progress made in both subjects in this period.

While the question of whether selected-effects accounts of function or causal-role accounts of function provide the ‘true’ functional analysis has given way to a general pluralistic consensus, Philip Kitcher has suggested that different functional accounts allow for unification. I argue that Kitcher's attempt to unify the two functional analyses fails because he adopts the environment-centered perspective on selection as a premise. The premise is undermined by the role niche construction is likely to play in the context of evolution. Moreover, I raise the tentative suggestion that niche construction may threaten the applicability, or at least the relevance, of selected-effects ascriptions.

This paper investigates the adequacy of evidential relevance relations proposed by Glymour and others. These accounts incorporate, as a necessary condition, what I call the Positive Instance Condition (PIC): the evidence statement and auxiliary assumptions entail a “positive instance” of the hypothesis. I argue that any account which incorporates PIC as a necessary condition while allowing “bootstrap testing” is doomed to fail. A nonbootstrapping evidential relevance relation of similar form is proposed, and it is argued that, in addition to avoiding published counter examples, this new relation meets two general requirements which, if not met, would undermine the ability of any account that incorporates PIC to accord with our intuitions of evidential relevance.

Comments on Professor Feigl's very comprehensive review of the problem of existential hypotheses may take one of two forms. One may accept the problem in Feigl's own terms and either sympathize or criticize the realistic empiricism to which he subscribes. Or, one may feel that the entire approach is ill-founded, and hence that the distinctions in viewpoints which he draws are comparable to splits in a political party whose basic tenets are incompatible with one's own. This comment takes the second course, and as a commentary can do little more than point out the more serious of the differences which separate Feigl's views from those of the writer.