The following reflections are submitted in awareness of an unfortunate situation which currently finds both psychologists and philosophers concerned with the search after criteria for assessing human conduct, yet with either profession suspicious of the contributions to be expected from the other. The objections frequently entertained against psychologizing philosophers are only matched by those entertained against philosophizing psychologists. Yet, if the worst is said, it still remains true that much psychological work, devoted to problems of mental health, maturity or neurosis, makes contact with moral issues. It also is true that such contact has so far not been fruitful to the point of encouraging psychologists or philosophers to expect new illumination from each other. Unless it be groundless, in principle, to look towards psychological findings as potentially relevant for moral theory or vice versa, it would seem that the only cure for poor relations between the two disciplines are better ones rather than none at all. At any rate, it is on the assumption that more successful relations are possible that I shall now comment upon what appears to be both a most influential and unsuccessful attempt by one psychologist to solve an ethical problem. I shall take my departure from B. F. Skinner's recent Science and Human Behavior,∗ especially from his chapters on value and the survival concept.

While the question of whether selected-effects accounts of function or causal-role accounts of function provide the ‘true’ functional analysis has given way to a general pluralistic consensus, Philip Kitcher has suggested that different functional accounts allow for unification. I argue that Kitcher's attempt to unify the two functional analyses fails because he adopts the environment-centered perspective on selection as a premise. The premise is undermined by the role niche construction is likely to play in the context of evolution. Moreover, I raise the tentative suggestion that niche construction may threaten the applicability, or at least the relevance, of selected-effects ascriptions.

Dutch Book Arguments (DBAs) have been invoked to support various alleged requirements of rationality. Some alleged requirements, such as probabilistic coherence and conditionalization, are plausible. Others, such as credal transparency and reflection, may be less so. Anna Mahtani has argued for a new understanding of DBAs that, she claims, allows us to keep the DBAs for the plausible requirements while rejecting those for the implausible ones. I argue that Mahtani’s new account fails, as (a) it does not support highly plausible requirements of rational coherence and (b) it does not succeed in undermining the DBAs for credal transparency or reflection.

In this paper I prove a theorem which is similar to Arrow's famous impossibility theorem. I show that no social welfare function can be both minimally majoritarian and also independent of irrelevant alternatives. My condition of minimal majoritarianism is substantially weaker than simple majority rule.

To overcome sociopsychologism and historical relativism, the growth of science is deduced from the combined effect of postulated invariant controls, in the form of enduring ideals of science, in their interaction with nature. The thus constituted “cybernetics-of-science” concept permits extrapolation from present to future states of science. The ideal scientific theory is the goal or target toward which the scientific process is oriented, by virtue of its invariant controls. The form of the ideal theory can thus be extrapolated, and some speculative hypotheses advanced as to its contents, taking those of the recently emerged constructs of science as basis which best accord with the predicted form of the theory.

Werkmeister's new book, The Basis and Structure of Knowledge is the second major attempt in recent years to defend the idealistic theory of knowledge. The first was Blanshard's Nature of Thought; and it is worth noticing that both authors, in undertaking the defense of a position long in the shadows, are well aware of contemporary developments in logic and technical philosophy. Werkmeister freely acknowledges his debt to Blanshard; yet his work differs in scope from the latter's in at least two ways. Firstly, the more recent book is concerned largely with the epistemological analysis of meaning and truth and hardly at all with what an older generation called “philosophical psychology,” while philosophical psychology fills all of the first and part of the second volume of Blanshard's work. In my opinion, this is all to the good. (That our generation inverts the error and too often indulges in psychological philosophy is another story!) Secondly, Werkmeister presents us with detailed analyses of scientific method, of the structure of scientific theories, and of mathematics, all three areas to which Blanshard pays virtually no attention.

A new semantical antinomy, the antinomy of designation, is introduced into a metalanguage M with respect to a modal object language L. Carnap's device of restricting the principle of interchangeability for L does not suffice to prevent occurrence of this new antinomy. To achieve this result it seems most natural to replace the rules of designation for L by more complicated rules. This replacement suffices to prevent occurrence of the antinomy with respect to L. Moreover, it seems likely that analogous replacement will suffice to prevent occurrence of the antinomy with respect to languages which in means of expression are richer than L.

A model of inductive inquiry is defined within the context of first-order logic. The model conceives of inquiry as a game between Nature and a scientist. To begin the game, a nonlogical vocabulary is agreed upon by the two players, along with a partition of a class of countable structures for that vocabulary. Next, Nature secretly chooses one structure (“the real world”) from some cell of the partition. She then presents the scientist with a sequence of facts about the chosen structure. With each new datum the scientist announces a guess about the cell to which the chosen structure belongs. To succeed in his or her inquiry, the scientist's successive conjectures must be correct all but finitely often, that is, the conjectures must converge in the limit to the correct cell. Different kinds of scientists can be investigated within this framework. At opposite ends of the spectrum are dumb scientists that rely on the strategy of “induction by enumeration,” and smart scientists that rely on an operator of belief revision. We report some results about the scope and limits of these two inductive strategies.

What has belief to do with perception? Some contemporary philosophers have suggested that one's perceiving an object entails one's having a particular perceptual belief, not just some belief or other, about that object. N. R. Hanson, for instance, has illustrated the present view, with respect to visual perception, as follows:

This article begins by distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic contributions of mathematics to scientific representation. This leads to two investigations into how these different sorts of contributions relate to confirmation. I present a way of accommodating both contributions that complicates the traditional assumptions of confirmation theory. In particular, I argue that subjective Bayesianism does best in accounting for extrinsic contributions, while objective Bayesianism is more promising for intrinsic contributions.