In order to determine what are the metaphysical presuppositions of science (if any), we have to first define the terms ‘presupposition’ and ‘metaphysics’ or ‘metaphysical’. We shall begin with the former.

Arthur Pap in his article Does Science Have Metaphysical Presuppositions? discusses two senses of the term. A presupposition may be (a) a necessary condition: p presupposes q, dt = p implies q, i.e. not-g implies not-p. (b) a premise or a rule (or a set of rules) of inference used in deriving a belief. Thus in this sense, p presupposes q means that if q were false, then the belief in p would cease to be grounded.

In “Induction and Objectivity” [1], F. John Clendinnen puts forwards a vindication of induction. I wish to argue that the vindication fails. As Clendinnen's argument is complex and presents certain difficulties it is necessary and only fair to quote his summary of it ([1], p. 218).

There is danger in stressing commonalities among methods because the differences matter in fixing the meaning of our claims. Different methods can, and often do, test the same claim. But it takes a strong network of theory and empirical results to ensure that. Failing that, we are likely to fall into inference by pun. We use one set of methods to establish a claim and then draw inferences licensed by a similar-sounding claim that calls for different methods of testing. Our inferences fail, and bridges we build (or policies we set) depending on them fall down.

It is a plausible speculation that conventional choices in outcome measures might influence the results of meta-analyses. We test that speculation by simulating data from trials on antidepressants. We vary real drug effectiveness while modulating conventional values for outcome measures. We had previously shown that one conventional choice used in meta-analyses of antidepressants falls in a narrow range of values that maximize estimates of effectiveness. Our present analysis investigates why this phenomenon occurs. Moreover, our results suggest the superiority of absolute outcome measures over relative measures. This research program can be extended to test numerous other aspects of clinical research.

Jonathan Livengood and Justin Sytsma have published a series of studies on “Actual Causation and Compositionality,” in which they investigate causal attributions of laypeople. We use one of their vignettes to follow up on their research. Our findings cast doubt on their conclusion that ordinary causal attributions tend to violate the compositionality constraint if one looks at cases in which someone is responsible for an effect by way of an intermediary that does not share in the responsibility.

A philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics presupposes a clear understanding of what is asserted by this theory. The aim of this paper is to help clarify one specific theorem of quantum mechanics, namely the so-called uncertainty relations. The surprisingly wide spread belief that these relations generally imply a reciprocal or inversely proportional relationship between the respective uncertainties is shown to be mistaken. Several reasons why this mistaken belief has been embraced are suggested. The conditions under which one could say that the uncertainty relations imply an inversely proportional relationship between uncertainties are specified.

Ramsey's device [2], for eliminating theoretical terms from a theory assumes that the theory has only finitely many axioms. Paul Berent [1], has recently suggested a modification of Ramsey's method that is designed to cover the infinite case. But, his modified method is quite unlike Ramsey's in that it involves an ascent from the original theory to a suitable metatheory. Thus, it is perhaps of some interest to note that there is an extension of Ramsey's method that covers the infinite case and at the same time is much closer in spirit to his original suggestion.

In scientific modeling, continuum idealizations bridge scales but at the cost of fundamentally misrepresenting the microstructure of the system. This engenders a mystery. If continuum idealizations are dispensable in principle, this de-problematizes their representational inaccuracy, since continuum properties reduce to lower-scale properties, but the mystery of how this reduction could be carried out endures. Alternatively, if continuum idealizations are indispensable in principle, this is consistent with their explanatory and predictive success but renders their representational inaccuracy mysterious. I argue for a deflationary solution, enlisting the applied scientific method of upscaling as demonstrated in a case from soil hydrology.

I want to commend the article, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, April, 1948, by Hempel and Oppenheim. However, there are two points in the article that have been treated in a manner incompatible with the general attitude taken by the authors and, I believe, they are mistaken in these two rather essential matters. The first concerns the relationship between emergents and prediction. The second concerns the relationship between “evidence” or sense data and law.

Alasdair MacIntyre's expression of the “profound gratitude we all owe to Althusser for having brought French Marxism back into dialogue with the rest of French philosophy” (as quoted by Elliott in his introduction to the selection under discussion, 1990, xi), important as it may be for a host of reasons, did not try to make Althusser's philosophy particularly attractive to philosophers of science. However, the present selection of essays does precisely this: It is almost ideally designed to mark the beginnings of an effective encounter of this particular brand of “French Marxism” with philosophy of science.

Wesley Salmon provided three classic criteria of adequacy for satisfactory interpretations of probability. A fourth criterion is suggested here. A distinction is drawn between frequency-driven probability models and theory-driven probability models and it is argued that single case accounts of chance are superior to frequency accounts at least for the latter. Finally it is suggested that theories of chance should be required only to be contingently true, a position which is a natural extension of Salmon's ontic account of probabilistic causality and his own later views on propensities.

Suppose that entities composed of two distinct components can be qualitatively ordered in two ways, such that each ordering relation satisfies the axioms of conjoint measurement. Without further assumptions nothing can be said about the relation between the pair of numerical scales constructed for each component. Axioms are stated that relate the two measurement theories, and that are sufficient to establish that the two conjoint scales on each component are linearly related.

In this paper, I offer a proof that a disastrous conclusion (namely, that any observation report confirms any hypothesis) may be derived directly from two principles of qualitative confirmation which Carl Hempel called the “Converse Consequence Condition” and the “Entailment Condition.” I then discuss three strategies which a defender of the Converse Consequence Condition may deploy to save this principle.

The two most antagonistic schools in contemporary Western philosophy are Existentialism and Logical Positivism. They have nothing in common but the name of philosophy, and even that they deny each other. There is some kind of discussion going on between even such distant schools as Pragmatism and neo-Thomism; Existentialists and Logical Positivists have nothing but sarcasms for each other. To philosophers familiar only with the Anglo-Saxon scene Existentialism must appear negligible. In the Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, where philosophy is a much more popular pastime, Existentialism has an unparalleled vogue and Logical Positivism is considered a horrible aberration from the naturally speculative course of philosophy. In South America whose philosophical life we are apt to underrate Logical Positivism seems to be known to almost nobody, whereas Existentialism, mostly in its German and anti-religious shape, has become, quite paradoxically, the rallying point of “Liberalism,” liberalism, in Spanish countries, being above all anti-catholicism. Although, ironically enough, both Logical Positivism and modern Existentialism originated in German speaking countries, the split between the two goes vaguely parallel with, and may have found some ready echo in, the different cultural inheritance of the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races. Hence, the subject of this paper would seem far-fetched to those steeped in their own national tradition. There is, however, a growing consciousness of the “one world” function of philosophy, particularly with regard to Eastern and Western philosophy (Northrop, Burtt, Conger, etc.). Would it not be a prerequisite of this more ambitious enterprise to gain a clear conception about the most radical split in our own contemporary Western philosophy, the split between Logical Positivism and Existentialism? This paper is an attempt to establish a perspective permitting a just evaluation of the two philosophies.

This paper discusses several philosophical problems with the use of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) in psychotherapy outcome research. The problems include: the impermanence problem, the identification problem, and idiographic problems. The paper concludes with an assessment of the overall case for and against the use of RCTs in psychotherapy outcome research.

The debate between Glymour ([2]) and Fine ([1]) hinges in part on a comparison of the width of the incoming wave packet in momentum space with the angles intercepted by the detectors in the Cross-Ramsey experiment. As Fine argues, it follows from the quantum formalism that the initial dispersion will be conserved in Compton scattering, and he allows that the Sum Rule is constrained by the statistical results of quantum mechanics. The Sum Rule may fail, but it will not fail in any way that violates quantum mechanics. Thus most of the time the individual momentum value does not change more than the width of the initial wave packet: usually the value of Qγe at t must equal the value of Qγ at t′ plus the value of Qe at t′ ± Δp/2, where Δp represents the dispersion in momentum for the initial gamma ray. Thus in order to refute Fine's thesis, the detectors must discriminate finely enough to pick out changeovers of individual values within Δp.

Relationist theories of space or space-time based on embedding of a physical relational system A into a corresponding geometrical system B raise problems associated with the degree of uniqueness of the embedding. Such uniqueness problems are familiar in the representational theory of measurement (RTM), and are dealt with by imposing a condition of uniqueness of embeddings up to composition with an “admissible transformation” of the space B. Friedman (1983) presents an alternative treatment of the uniqueness problem for embedding relationist theories, developed independently of RTM. Friedman's approach differs from that of RTM in securing uniqueness by adding new primitives to the physical system A in contrast to the RTM approach which adds new axioms. Friedman's proposal has recently been developed and defended by Catton and Solomon (1988).

This method of solving the uniqueness problem is here argued to be substantially inferior to the RTM method, both in practice and in principle. In practice we find that in none of the concrete examples offered to illustrate the method is the uniqueness problem actually solved in general. Moreover we find that in the most interesting case (addition to the system A of a finite number of relations of finite degree) the method is in principle incapable of success for mathematical reasons. In addition to these technical difficulties there are compelling methodological reasons for preferring the RTM method to the method of adding primitives.