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The Converse Consequence Condition and Hempelian Qualitative Confirmation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Pierre Le Morvan*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University

Abstract

In this paper, I offer a proof that a disastrous conclusion (namely, that any observation report confirms any hypothesis) may be derived directly from two principles of qualitative confirmation which Carl Hempel called the “Converse Consequence Condition” and the “Entailment Condition.” I then discuss three strategies which a defender of the Converse Consequence Condition may deploy to save this principle.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244.

Thanks to Karen Jackson, Brent Mundy, the Editor, and an anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments and suggestions.

References

Earman, John and Salmon, Wesley, (1992), “The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses”, in Salmon, Merrilee et al. (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 42100.Google Scholar
Glymour, Clark (1980), Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Hempel, Carl (1965), “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation”, in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: Free Press, 325.Google Scholar
Scheffler, Israel (1963), The Anatomy of Inquiry. New York: Alfred Knopf.Google Scholar