This paper discusses “Russell's hypothesis” that the world sprang into existence five minutes ago. The three most widely accepted “solutions” to the Russell's hypothesis problem are shown to be unsatisfactory.

Two main points of interest are involved in the paper's discussion. First, I show all the widely accepted “solutions” to be unacceptable by using the same device—alternatives to Russell's hypothesis. The device, which has never previously been applied to this problem, is a familiar one in discussions of the problem of induction. (Parallels between these two problems are sketched at the paper's end.) Second, the discussion introduces the new concept of crucial consequences for hypotheses that are otherwise different in only trivial linguistic ways.

The preface by Parsons begins: “This book contains the most substantial philosophical papers I wrote for publication up to 1977, with one new essay added. … The collection is unified by a common point of view underlying the essays and by certain problems that are approached from different angles in different essays. Most are directly concerned with the philosophy of mathematics, and even in those that are not … the connection between the issues discussed and mathematics is never far from the surface … in the Introduction I articulate some elements of my general point of view and point out some connections between the essays.“ The nine previously published papers are unrevised except in some cases for added postscripts and footnotes. Of the essays written for publication before 1977, essay 7, “Quine on the Philosophy of Mathematics,” has not been, in fact, previously published. The eleventh, “Sets and modality,“ is the new essay. A general point of view does indeed show itself in these essays, but it is rigorously subordinated to careful and balanced analyses of the problems discussed. That is why, without sharing all elements of the point of view, I have profited so much from these essays and, seeing them collected together, am so impressed by them.

Crucial to bayesian contributions to the philosophy of science has been a characteristic psychology, according to which investigators harbor degree of confidence assignments that (insofar as the agents are rational) obey the axioms of the probability calculus. The rub is that, if the evidence of introspection is to be trusted, this fruitful psychology is false: actual investigators harbor no such assignments. The orthodox bayesian response has been to argue that the evidence of introspection is not to be trusted here; it is to investigators' dispositions—not to their felt convictions—that the psychology is meant to be (and succeeds in being) faithful. I argue that this response, in both its orthodox and convex-set bayesian forms, should be rejected—as should the regulative ideals that make the response seem so attractive. I offer a different variant of bayesianism, designed to give the evidence of introspection its due and thus realize (as I claim the other forms of bayesianism cannot) the prescriptive mission of the bayesian project.

I will argue that Kochen-Specker arguments do not provide an algebraic proof for quantum contextuality since, for the argument to be effective, (1) operators must be uniquely associated with measurements and (2) commuting operators must represent simultaneous measurements. However, in all Kochen-Specker arguments discussed in the literature either 1 or 2 is not met. Arguments meeting 1 contain commuting operators that do not represent simultaneous measurements and hence fail to physically justify the functional composition principle. Arguments meeting 2 associate some operators with more than one measurement and hence need to invoke an extra assumption different from noncontextuality.

When the layman reads a book or two of popularized physics and then moves solemnly forth, as occasionally happens, to expound some comprehensive doctrine purporting to be built directly out of the materials he has picked up, the type of comment which the physicist will make is plain enough in advance. But why does it so rarely occur to the physicist that others may think of his epistemologizing much what he is sure to think of their quantizing?

This essay focuses on the place of the second law of thermodynamics in Wilhelm Ostwald's physical chemistry. After a brief introduction to his energetic theory, which was supposed to be a generalization of thermodynamics, I contrast Ostwald's understanding of the second law, which ignored entropy and irreversibility, with Max Planck's, which emphasized both. I then consider how Ostwald sought to develop physical chemistry without any concern for irreversibility and little concern for entropy, and I argue that he was mistaken.

Philosophical studies of complex scientific concepts are predominantly “adaptationist,” arguing that conceptual complexity serves important purposes. This is a historical artifact. Having had to defend their views against a monist presumption favoring simpler concepts, pluralists and patchwork theorists felt compelled to show that complexity can be beneficial. This neglects an alternative possibility: Conceptual complexity is largely neutral, persisting simply because it does little harm. This article defends the neutral theory of conceptual complexity in two forms: (a) as a plausible theory in its own right and (b) as a useful foil for adaptationist arguments.

William K. Goosens claims to show that my account of epistemic utility runs into serious difficulties when confronted with certain attractive conditions of adequacy for the evaluation of experiments. I show that those conditions of adequacy which are, indeed, acceptable to both of us are satisfied by the procedures for evaluating experiments mandated by combining my theory of epistemic utilities with the approach to evaluating experiments on which Goosens' argument is based. In particular, I demonstrate that my theory does not violate the requirement that an “ideal experiment” be no worse than any alternative experiment.

Sober (1992) and Brandon et al. (1994) disagree about the role of screening-off in the appraisal of theories of natural selection. Some problems disregarded by them are unearthed in this discussion note.

Using Einstein's comparison of General Relativity and Descartes’ physics, this investigation explores the alleged conventionalism that pervades the ontology of substantival and relationist conceptions of spacetime. Although previously discussed, namely by Rynasiewicz and Hoefer, it will be argued that the close similarities between General Relativity and Cartesian physics have not been adequately treated in the literature—and that the disclosure of these similarities bolsters the case for a conventionalist interpretation of spacetime ontology.

Although most philosophers are not aware of it, research in cognitive development and in learning in the last decade has made considerable use of the characterizations of the nature and development of scientific knowledge proffered by philosophers of science. In a “reflexive” move, Alison Gopnik proposes philosophers of science can profit from the research of psychologists investigating cognitive development-specifically from that group of researchers who advocate the “theory theory.”

Several prominent philosophers have held that physical properties are dispositions. The aim of this paper is to establish the following conjunction: if the thesis that physical properties are dispositions is unsupplemented by controversial assumptions about dispositions, it entails a contradiction; and if it is so supplemented the resulting theory has the consequence that either many worlds which seem to be possible worlds are not possible worlds or some properties which seem to be identical are not identical. In this way it is shown that a dispositional account of physical properties is implausible.

Feminist proposals for reforming scientific method often ask that political evaluations be introduced into the context of justification. How might this work in practice? Fausto-Sterling's alternative conceptualization of biological sex is analyzed and criticized. We then use this case study to comment on recent work on the role of social values in science by Longino and Kitcher.

(1) the author has outlined several of the more important interpretations of measurement in quantum mechanics and discussed the problems arising from them. Particular attention was paid to the work of Bohr, Heisenberg and von Neumann and a tentative proposal was made for a possible interpretation which would mitigate some of the problems and dilemmas. This interpretation was essentially that proposed by Margenau (2) in terms of latent variables. He defines measurement to be any operation with physical apparatus which results in a number, including in this, of course, yes and no answers as well as conventional numerical answers. Further he makes the distinction between the preparation of a state and the measurement of the state (3). A preparation puts the quantum system into a particular state whereas the measurement frequently destroys the state in question. This paper presents several criteria to help in the evaluation of the alternatives presented in the first paper and carries further the suggested interpretation mentioned at the end of that paper.

Theories are conceptualized as predictors of phenomena using computable functions acting on prior world information. Formally, the concept of bounded prior world recursive function is defined and used as a candidate for a potential theory. An artificial world of fact is then constructed for which there exist two inconsistent best theories, in that they cannot be improved upon, and these theories are maximally inconsistent in that every best theory is a compromise. It is argued that in such a world the scientific objective would be to find these maximally inconsistent theories. The construction is motivated as an attempt to illustrate the status of theory in the social sciences and in economics, in particular.

Philosophers of physics should be more attentive to the role energy conditions play in General Relativity. I review the changing status of energy conditions for quantum fields—presently there are no singularity theorems for semiclassical General Relativity. So we must reevaluate how we understand the relationship between General Relativity, Quantum Field Theory, and singularities. Moreover, on our present understanding of what it is to be a physically reasonable field, the standard energy conditions are violated classically. Thus the singularity theorems are unavailable for classical General Relativity. Our understanding of singularities in General Relativity turns on delicate issues of what it is to be a matter field—issues distinct from the content of the theory.

There is a notion, cataleptic in its effects, that discussion in ethics and values must ultimately be blocked by the “naturalistic fallacy.” We can go so far in analyzing the categories of “good,” “right,” “ought,” “valuable,” and the like, but never so far as to embark from the field of logic or general philosophy and enter the alien provinces of science—at least with a visa. To think to reduce moral problems to those of psychology or biology or (in Northrop's amendment) to those of “culture,” is The Fallacy, insensitivity to which brands one as a positivist, a dupe of “scientism,” or at least a sympathetic fellow-traveller. Though the vocabulary of The Fallacy is not old—G. E. Moore and his earnest commentators will date it—the idea is almost as antique as philosophy itself; indeed, it is one of the prime devices whereby philosophy has managed to rationalize its subject-matter as something more than an historical accident.