Three distinct things have been called “referential opacity,” causing some confusion. A noun position in a sentence may be opaque in three different ways: (1) substitutivity of identity may fail there, (2) quantifiers prefixed to the sentence may not be able to bind variables in that position, or (3) substitutivity of identity may fail when the singular nouns in question are read as having small scope. Some connections among these three types of opacity are examined.

In this paper I attempt to trace certain aspects of the evolution of theories of space-time and mechanics as revealed by a brief comparative study of Newtonian theory, Robb's theory, general relativity, and Milne's kinematical relativity. The first object is to emphasise how each theory leaves us in a position in which the succeeding one appears as a perfectly natural next step in the development of ideas. The second object is to show how, in spite of superficial differences in character, the theories all necessarily possess the same general structure constituted by the presence of hypotheses, from which certain general mathematical relations are deduced, which in their turn are used to predict relations between observable quantities.

1. Argument. Questions that have arisen about the “existence” of elementary particles and other entities of physics have often been dismissed as unprofitable, with the tacit assumption that the categories suitable for the discussion of everyday knowledge are not suitable for the discussion of physical knowledge, which requires mathematical treatment. But for the layman who stumbles at the discontinuity between his world and that of mathematical physics, and for the physicist who wishes his knowledge of the world to have some kind of unity, a scheme which will embrace both kinds of knowledge is essential. Such a scheme is developed from a consideration of the dependence on mind, and conceptual modes of thought, common to science and all other intellectual approaches to the world, which is seen clearly in the growth of science from more primitive concepts. It begins with the concept as the most elementary category of the organization of experience, and moves to the construct, a distinctly scientific category arising out of the concept, and the isolate, corresponding to elements of reality not directly perceived. An escape from certain paradoxes generated by the incomplete nature of perceptual experience is thus provided.

In this paper I examine Salmon's response to two counterexamples to his conserved quantity (CQ) theory of causation. The first counterexample that I examine involves a time-wise gerrymandered world line of a series of patches of wall that is absorbing energy as a result of being illuminated in an astrodome. Salmon says that since the gerrymandered world line does not fulfill his “no-interaction requirement,” his CQ theory does not suffer from the counterexample. But I will argue that his response fails both at a theoretical level and at a practical level. In so doing I point out a problem for CQ theorists’ definition of a causal interaction. The second counterexample is concerned with a time-wise gerrymandered world line of a series of patches that are in shadow, in Hitchcock's well-known example. Salmon's response is based on a principle that Salmon thinks is derivable from the concept of a conserved quantity. However, I argue that the principle has a counterexample.

Recognition of and responsiveness to the behavioral dispositions of others are key features of moral systems for facilitating social cooperation and the mediation of punishment. Here we investigate the coevolutionary possibilities of recognition and conditional social behavior with respect to both altruism and spite. Using two evolutionary models, we find that recognition abilities can support both spite and altruism but that some can only coevolve with spite. These results show that it is essential to consider harmful social behaviors as both a product of and an influence on the core features of our moral systems.

In this paper, I argue against Andreasen and Sesardic, who have both claimed that recent cluster results in population genetics serve as evidence that the human species contains, or at least once contained, subspecies. I show that the cluster results are in fact evidentially inert relative to each author’s preferred subspecies concept. I then sketch the kinds of biological facts that could be used to push the debate further.

Occam’s razor refers to the idea that among competing explanations the simplest should be preferred. This principle has been understood and defended in different ways. Some systems biologists argue that traditional molecular biology is misguided because it relies on an unjustified application of Occam’s razor. I analyze which version of the principle is relevant in this context and ask whether the allegation stands up to scrutiny by looking at actual research. I defend the traditional approach by arguing that its use of Occam’s razor is innocuous and by showing that systems biology heavily relies on considerations of simplicity as well.

The renormalization group (RG) has been characterized as merely a coarse-graining procedure that does not illuminate the microscopic content of quantum field theory (QFT) but merely gets us from that content, as given by axiomatic QFT, to macroscopic predictions. I argue that in the constructive field theory tradition, RG techniques do illuminate the microscopic dynamics of a QFT, which are not automatically given by axiomatic QFT. RG techniques in constructive field theory are also rigorous, so one cannot object to their foundational import on grounds of lack of rigor.

It has long been known that the practice of testing all hypotheses at the same level (such as 0.05), regardless of the distribution of the data, is not consistent with Bayesian expected utility maximization. According to de Finetti's “Dutch Book” argument, procedures that are not consistent with expected utility maximization are incoherent and they lead to gambles that are sure to lose no matter what happens. In this paper, we use a method to measure the rate at which incoherent procedures are sure to lose, so that we can distinguish slightly incoherent procedures from grossly incoherent ones. We present an analysis of testing a simple hypothesis against a simple alternative as a case-study of how the method can work.

While practitioners think highly of randomized studies, some philosophers argue that there is no epistemic reason to randomize. Here I show that their arguments do not entail their conclusion. Moreover, I provide novel reasons for randomizing in the context of interventional studies. The overall discussion provides a unified framework for assessing baseline balance, one that holds for interventional and observational studies alike. The upshot: Practitioners’ strong preference for randomized studies can be defended in some cases, while still offering a nuanced approach to evidence appraisal, one where not all nonrandomized studies are treated equally.

This article examines the role existence plays in measurement validity. I argue that existing popular theories of measurement and of validity follow a correspondence framework, which starts by assuming that an entity exists in the real world with certain properties that allow it to be measurable. Drawing on literature from the sociology of measurement, I show that the correspondence framework faces several theoretical and practical challenges. I suggest the validity-first framework of measurement, which starts with a practice-based validation process as the basis for a measurement theory and only posits objective existence when it is scientifically useful to do so.

Cognitive representations are typically analyzed in terms of content, vehicle, and format. Although current work on formats appeals to intuitions about external representations, such as words and maps, in this article, we develop a computational view of formats that does not rely on intuitions. In our view, formats are individuated by the computational profiles of vehicles, that is, the set of constraints that fix the computational transformations vehicles can undergo. The resulting picture is strongly pluralistic, makes space for a variety of different formats, and is intimately tied to the computational approach to cognition in cognitive science and artificial intelligence.

The Copenhagen interpretation, which informs the textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, depends fundamentally on the notion of ontological wave-particle duality and a viewpoint called “complementarity.” In this paper, Bohr's own interpretation is traced in detail and is shown to be fundamentally different from and even opposed to the Copenhagen interpretation in virtually all its particulars. In particular, Bohr's interpretation avoids the ad hoc postulate of wave function ‘collapse’ that is central to the Copenhagen interpretation. The strengths and weakness of both interpretations are summarized.

How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium.

In this paper I wish to argue that counterfactual analyses of causation are inadequate. I believe the counterfactuals that are involved in counterfactual analyses of causation are often false, and thus the theories do not provide an adequate account of causation. This is demonstrated by the presentation of a counterexample to the counterfactual analyses of causation. I then present a unified theory of causation that is based upon probability and counterfactuals. This theory accounts for both deterministic and indeterministic causation, and is not subject to many of the traditional problems facing theories of causation.

In this paper I provide a metatheoretical analysis of speech perception research. I argue that the central turning point in the history of speech perception research has not been well understood. While it is widely thought to mark a decisive break with what I call “the alphabetic conception of speech,” I argue that it instead marks the entrenchment of this conception of speech. In addition, I argue that the alphabetic conception of speech continues to underwrite speech perception research today and moreover that it functions as a dogma which ought to be rejected.

This article focuses on recent discussions about holobionts and evolutionary individuality to evaluate the merits of integrative pluralism. I argue that integrative pluralism is the wrong approach to take when it comes to holobiont research because integrative pluralism is not liberal enough to accommodate both single-species and multispecies individuals. I conclude by suggesting two points. First, a pluralistic view helps us better understand holobiont research. Second, the case of holobionts helps us develop a better account of scientific pluralism.

In [1] Michael Polanyi argues that in order to understand how scientists come to recognize problems as problems, we must invoke a concept of “tacit knowing.” Tacit knowledge is a kind of knowledge of which we are aware but which cannot be made explicit. Polanyi argues that a paradox discussed in the Meno cannot be solved without appeal to this notion of tacit knowledge. Here I want to argue, quite simply, that Polanyi's formulation of the “paradox” can be easily subverted without an appeal to tacit knowing. Polanyi puts the paradox thus:

The purpose of this article is to update and defend syntax-based (conserved DNA-sequence motifs) gene concepts. I show how syntax-based concepts have been and can be extended to accommodate complex cases of genome expression, regulation, and processing. In response to difficult cases and causal parity objections, I argue that the syntax-based approach fleshes out a deflationary concept that defines genes in terms of sequences and organizational features of the genome that contribute to a phenotype.