This paper compares the impact of setting the money growth rate versus pegging the interest rate on aggregate real variables and their distributions. In either case, the monetary policy, in isolation, requires the price level to jump to ensure intertemporal solvency but has no real dynamic effects. The choice of monetary instrument has consequences for wealth and income inequality, doing so in potentially conflicting ways. Following real shocks, the accompanying monetary policy will influence the ensuing transition. For real variables, this operates entirely through its impact on the speed of convergence and is negligible. For financial variables, the impact also depends upon the initial jump in the price level. These effects vary more substantially between policies and have more significant distributional consequences. Overall, the impact on inequality is dominated by the real shocks themselves, rather than the accompanying monetary policy. Finally, we compare these two policies to inflation targeting, which is shown to be the least favorable for reducing wealth inequality, but the most favorable for reducing income inequality.

We compare two welfare programs: the universal basic income (UBI) and negative income tax (NIT). Under a linear income tax system, we show that (i) the NIT can replicate the allocation of the UBI exactly by providing an identical marginal effective tax schedule, and (ii) the budget of the NIT is always smaller than that of the UBI. According to our quantitative model, which is calibrated to approximate the income and wealth distributions in the United States, the optimal UBI is to pay everyone 7.2% of the average income. We also show that the NIT can achieve a similar average welfare with a much smaller budget (2.3% of the GDP) by providing a subsidy that is generous to the very poor and quickly phases out as income increases.

A mandate framework is proposed for delegating monetary policy to an instrument-independent, but goal-dependent central bank that emphasizes simplicity in both the objectives entering the welfare criterion and those in the instrument rule. It consists of: (i) a simple quadratic loss function penalizing deviations from target variables; (ii) a welfare-optimized, Taylor-type log-linear nominal interest-rate rule with targets that match those in the loss function; (iii) a zero-lower-bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate imposing a low unconditional probability of ZLB episodes; and (iv) a long-run inflation target. In an estimated New Keynesian model with these features, we find that for a quarterly probability of 5%, an optimal annual inflation target is close to 2%, weights for real variables in the loss function are small compared with inflation except for the real wage growth mandate and the optimized rules mimic a price-level rule.

This study develops a new dynamic general equilibrium model to explore the role of people’s love of novelty as a cultural preference in innovation and innovation-based growth. The model considers (a) an infinitely lived representative consumer who has standard love-of-variety preferences for differentiated products and additional love-of-novelty preferences for new products and (b) technological progress driven by two costly and time-consuming innovation activities, new product development and existing product development. We demonstrate that consumers’ love of novelty is a source of innovation-based growth, wherein economies with a moderate love of novelty can achieve innovation and long-run growth through endogenous cycles between periods in which new product development is active and those in which existing product development is active. However, if love of novelty preference is too weak or too strong, the economy is caught in an underdevelopment trap with less innovation and no long-run growth. We also provide some suggestive empirical evidence that supports our theoretical predictions.

We extract dynamic conditional factor premiums from the Fama-French factor model and find that most anomalies disappear after one accounts for time variation in these premiums. Vector autoregression evidence shows that mutual causation between dynamic conditional alphas and macroeconomic surprises serves as a core qualifying condition for fundamental factor selection. This economic insight is an incremental step toward drawing a distinction between rational risk and behavioral mispricing models. To the extent that dynamic conditional alphas can reveal the marginal investor’s fundamental news and expectations about the cross-section of average asset returns, our economic insight helps enrich macroeconomic asset return prediction.

This study develops a Malthusian model for the evolution of human society from hunting-gathering to agriculture and from agriculture to industrial production. Human society evolves across these stages as the population grows. However, under endogenous population growth, the population may stop growing at any stage. If it fails to reach the first threshold, the population remains as hunter-gatherers. If it reaches the first threshold, an agricultural society emerges. Then, if the population fails to reach the industrial threshold, it remains in an agricultural Malthusian trap without experiencing industrialization. Interestingly, high agricultural productivity triggers not only the Neolithic Revolution but also the subsequent industrialization. Using cross-country data to test this result, we employ an index of prehistoric biogeographic conditions that affect agricultural productivity as an instrument for the timing of transitions to agriculture and find that an earlier transition to agriculture has a positive effect on industrialization in the modern era.

We examine a theoretical model of liquidity with three assets—money, government bonds, and equity—that are used for transaction purposes. Money and bonds complement each other in the payment system. The liquidity of equity is derived as an equilibrium outcome. Liquidity cycles arise from the loss of confidence of the traders in the liquidity of the system. Both open market operations and credit easing play a beneficial role for different purposes.

Economists have long been interested in the effect of business sentiment on economic activity. Using text analysis, I construct a new company-level indicator of sentiment based on the net balance of positive and negative words in Australian company disclosures. Company-level investment is very sensitive to changes in this corporate sentiment indicator, even controlling for fundamentals, such as Tobin’s Q, as well as controlling for measures of company-level uncertainty.

The high sensitivity of investment to sentiment could be due to several mechanisms. It could be because of animal spirits among managers or because of sentiment proxies for private information held by managers about company prospects. Overall, I find mixed evidence of the underlying causal mechanism. The effect of sentiment on investment is relatively persistent, which is consistent with managers having private information about company fundamentals. But the sensitivity of investment to sentiment is not any stronger at opaque companies in which managers are likely to be better informed than investors. Further, investment is sensitive to sentiment even when investors have an information advantage over managers by lagging the sentiment indicator by a year. Overall, the sensitivity of investment to sentiment appears to reflect both animal spirits and fundamentals.

Corporate investment has been weak since the global financial crisis (GFC) and demand-side factors, such as lower sales growth, explain more than half of this weakness. Low sentiment and heightened uncertainty weighed on investment during the GFC but have been less important factors since then.

The retirement of old workers increased during the COVID-19 pandemic, and health concerns are considered to be a critical factor. To understand the effect of pure health concerns during the pandemic, we analyze the impact of the aggregate health shock on retirement decisions using a life cycle model. The aggregate health shock changes the economy from the normal state to the pandemic state, where the probability of adverse idiosyncratic health shock increases, especially if agents are working. Simulation results suggest that the shock accelerates the retirement of agents aged over 60. The increase in retirement is significant even though the shock is expected to be temporary. Also, the effect hinges on the assumption that working poses a greater risk of receiving a negative health shock than retiring. Even accounting for the large income and wealth changes that US households experienced in 2020, a counterfactual experiment suggests that the aggregate health shock plays a prominent role in increasing retirement.

The US Social Security program was created in part as an explicit response to the Great Depression. We evaluate the performance of Social Security as a protective safety net against a rare episode of sudden and significant loss of private wealth such as the Great Depression. We construct a model in which a rare event causes a shock to wealth at an unknown time. How well does Social Security function as a safety net against such risk? The answer depends critically on whether households optimize in the face of this risk. If the household has full information on the distribution of rare event risk and solves a dynamic stochastic problem to hedge this risk, then Social Security is unnecessary along this dimension. Alternatively, if the household does not account for rare event risk in its financial planning, then Social Security can provide very large welfare gains as a safety net.

In this paper, we empirically explore the endogeneity of uncertainty and the interaction between different types of uncertainty and monetary policy using a shock-restricted vector-autoregression model. We find that a contractionary monetary policy shock reduces financial uncertainty, opposite to the findings in the previous literature, while at the same time it also heightens real uncertainty. This discrepancy arises because the model allows endogenous shifts in uncertainty. We also show that endogenous responses of uncertainty amplify the effects of monetary policy on real activity.

This paper investigates how responses of US macroeconomic activities to monetary policy shocks depend on the state of broker–dealer leverage. The analysis makes use of leverage data to create an indicator series that distinguishes above and below-trend leverage states for the economy which is then integrated into switching econometric models. Using state-dependent local projection methods, we find that during the below-trend leverage state, monetary policy affects the economy in a traditional fashion. However, during the above-trend leverage state, expansionary monetary policy is problematic for stimulating the economy. Additionally, during the above-trend leverage state, we find that a policy rate cut raises counterparty risks in financial markets, which in part accounts for the weaker effectiveness of the monetary policy. These findings are robust to several alternative modeling specifications and suggest that monetary policy authorities should monitor the leverage cycle when determining their policy stance on macroeconomic stability.

We contribute to the literature on empirical macroeconomic models with time-varying conditional moments, by introducing a heteroskedastic score-driven model with Student’s t-distributed innovations, named the heteroskedastic score-driven $t$-QVAR (quasi-vector autoregressive) model. The $t$-QVAR model is a robust nonlinear extension of the VARMA (VAR moving average) model. As an illustration, we apply the heteroskedastic $t$-QVAR model to a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, for which we estimate Gaussian-ABCD and $t$-ABCD representations. We use data on economic output, inflation, interest rate, government spending, aggregate productivity, and consumption of the USA for the period of 1954 Q3 to 2022 Q1. Due to the robustness of the heteroskedastic $t$-QVAR model, even including the period of the coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we find a superior statistical performance, lower policy-relevant dynamic effects, and a higher estimation precision of the impulse response function for US gross domestic product growth and US inflation rate, for the heteroskedastic score-driven $t$-ABCD representation rather than for the homoskedastic Gaussian-ABCD representation.

Many economies have recently adopted the defined-contribution retirement financing system, but one disadvantage of this system is that retirees have to bear longevity risk. As a result, several economies have also introduced the public annuity plans. We analyze the similarities and differences between voluntary public annuity with ceiling (VPAc) plan and mandatory public annuity with flexibility (MPAf) plan that are empirically observed. Introducing either plan reduces the severity of adverse selection in public annuities, but further distorts the private annuity market. These two plans have systematically different effects on retirees’ utility levels: the good health group is adversely affected and the average health group benefits. On the other hand, the poor health group benefits from the VPAc plan but may be adversely affected under the MPAf plan.

Can monetary policy stimulate consumption through inflation expectations? We study how US consumers revise inflation expectations and readiness to spend in response to monetary policy shocks using a structural vector-autoregressive model, where we identify exogenous policy shocks with interest rate surprises around FOMC announcements. Based on survey data, we construct measures of changes in consumers’ readiness to spend conditional on how consumers update their inflation expectations. Expansionary policy shocks tend to increase readiness to spend conditional on higher expected inflation outside the zero lower bound (ZLB), but the effect is small. At the ZLB, consumers increasingly reduce their readiness to spend if they expect higher inflation. Overall, we find only limited evidence suggesting that policy-induced variations in inflation expectations are associated with adjustments that are in line with the predictions of standard macroeconomic models.

This empirical paper deals with the impacts of sentiment about the future, short-run risk, and long-run risk in a dynamic economic model of optimal consumption decisions with Schroder and Skiadas [(1999) Journal of Economic Theory 89, 68–126.] continuous-time stochastic recursive preferences. The empirical strategy combines both a latent factor method and a democratic orthogonalization technique. The latent factor method is applied to a large database of macroeconomic indicators, and a democratic orthogonalization technique is used to separate the relative importance of sentiment about the future and long-run risk channels in shaping optimal consumption decisions. The empirical results suggest that consumers with recursive preferences are not indifferent to long-run uncertainty shocks to future consumption prospects. Endogenous consumption variations are driven by a multicomponent mechanism, where on average, the sentiment component accounts for 15.33%, the short-run risk accounts for 16.89%, and the long-run risk pertains to 34.51%.

Bad news about future economic developments have larger effects than good news. The result is obtained by means of a simple nonlinear approach based on SVAR and SVARX models. We interpret the asymmetry as arising from the uncertainty surrounding economic events whose effects are not perfectly predictable. Uncertainty generates adverse effects on the economy, amplifying the effects of bad news and mitigating the effects of good news.

US output is more strongly correlated with the output of energy-exporting countries than with that of energy-importing countries. I first document this empirical finding, then construct a three-country model in which countries’ different energy production and trade structures are considered. The three countries are the USA (an energy importer), a non-US energy importer, and an energy exporter. Consistent with the empirical findings, the model produces a higher output correlation between the USA and the energy exporter than between the USA and the energy importer. A positive productivity shock in the USA, raising its output, leads to increases in energy prices and its import demand for energy. The increased energy prices adversely influence output in the energy importer, whereas the rise in US energy imports has positive effects on output in the energy exporter, enabling the correlation of US output with the exporter’s output to be higher.

This paper proposes that an International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy shift was the reason behind major changes in sovereign debt negotiation outcomes observed in 1989. The new policy, in marked departure from past policy, allowed the IMF to lend to nations in default. The paper highlights the stark improvements in debt forgiveness and post-negotiation debt servicing ability coincident with the IMF policy shift. A theoretical framework is proposed in which the IMF policy shift causes the observed changes in negotiation outcomes. The model highlights the policy’s potential to improve a country’s outside option during negotiations of defaulted debt. In the model, this improvement leads to increased debt forgiveness which in turn leads to less post-negotiation debt servicing difficulties. The model is then used to address an important question regarding the nature of post-negotiation default risk. The case is made that countries face persistent, rather than temporary, default risk after such negotiations. To avert such risk, they moderate their borrowing.

We estimate a smooth-transition vector autoregression model (ST-VAR) using panel data from 14 OECD countries to study the cross-country spillover effects of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) shocks. An unexpected elevation of EPU originating abroad has an overall contractionary real effect, and the spillover effects depend on the state of the business cycle of the recipient country. EPU spillover shocks during recessions have stronger but less persistent effects on a number of economic indicators. We also find that the interconnectedness of EPU, financial markets, and business confidence are important channels for the EPU shocks to propagate across countries, while the trade channel has limited effects, especially during expansions.