Political polarization is a systemic-level and multifaceted process that severs cross-cutting ties and shifts perceptions of politics to a zero-sum game. When it turns pernicious, political actors and supporters view opponents as an existential threat and the capacity of democratic institutions to process political conflict breaks down. The article identifies four common fault lines of polarization globally – who belongs, democracy, inequality and social contract. It argues that while Latin American countries experience, to varying degrees, all four of the fault lines, it is the deep-seated, persistent social hierarchies oriented around class, race, and place that stand out relative to other countries. Reaching consensus on reforms that may renew or reformulate agreements on the terms of the social contract, boundaries of community membership, and redressing social inequality is a tall task. Yet the region’s sustained consensus on the democratic rules of the game can provide the mechanisms for addressing this task if new majority coalitions can be formed.

Many successful political parties depend for their initial popularity and cohesion, and even for their long-term brand strength, on a leader. Nevertheless, literature on successful party building downplays the role of leaders. Thus, the question, what type of leader is good for party building?, remains undertheorized. This article presents and provides initial evidence for a leadership-centered theory of successful party building. It argues that externally appealing, internally dominant leaders facilitate party building by lifting new parties to electoral prominence and helping to prevent debilitating schisms. The article provides evidence for this argument through a most similar cases comparison of three new left parties in Latin America: two that took root (Brazil’s Workers’ Party, Mexico’s Party of the Democratic Revolution), and one that collapsed (Peru’s United Left).

In Less than Twenty Years Brazil has become one of the ten largest exporters of conventional armaments in the world. How the Brazilian armaments industry has achieved such success offers a rich case study of an effective division of labor between state and firm. With the state acting as technological agent and ambassador to external markets, the firms have become innovators of internationally competitive armaments systems. Rather than being forced, by military control, to produce highly sophisticated weapons systems, Brazilian defense firms receive support to develop products which cater to an international demand for those conventional armaments which occupy a niche just below the technological frontier defined by the superpowers.

This article will serve as a commentary on the future of Latin America and on some possible alternatives for the problems facing it while taking worldwide issues and problems into account. It does not claim to formulate or reformulate existing theories on the management and dynamics of the global crisis that threaten the world today. It will, however, go into the premises on which our thinking is based and the various levels of distinction used in approaching these global problems.

The basic premise is that the relationship of man in society with nature has progressively deteriorated. Man is an integral part of nature, a fact that is increasingly being ignored. As society has increased in complexity and extent, there has been a growing alienation between man and the natural system of which he is a part. This has resulted in a series of crises between man and nature in areas such as the environment, food, energy, population, and so on, which are only different facets of the global crisis.

At the end of 1986, when Contadora and its Support Group reduced their presence in Central America, their member countries decided to create a permanent organism for consultation and agreement, thus re-orienting and extending their working agenda, which had originally been limited to the issues of Central American policy and, in the economic area (through the Cartagena Group), to the problem of external debt. Several factors prompted them to take this course. First, all had found the experiment in concertación policymaking to be valuable and were reluctant to lose the experience and momentum acquired over the years. Second, it was apparent that changing circumstances had altered their position in resolving the Central America crisis, so that the Contadora and Support Groups found themselves playing only a secondary role in the negotiations and becoming increasingly marginalized. Furthermore, some countries felt that the excessive emphasis on the Central American problem had circumscribed the ability of the Group to focus on other issues which, as tensions eased in Central America, were gaining priority on the foreign policy agendas of their respective governments.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently published a pamphlet on the question of whether the IMF, as an institution, imposes austerity on debtors. The response focused on the second half of the question and argued that IMF adjustment programs were, in fact, not systematically austere. However, from a political perspective, the first half of the question is much more provocative. Does the IMF “impose” its will on member states, and, if so, how? Many have argued i that, by virtue of its political connections with the financial centers of the world and its intellectual sophistication, the so-called “negotiations” which debtor nations conduct with Fund staff, prior to the drafting of an agreement on lending conditions, is little more than an exercise in coercion on the part of the Fund.

El acontecimiento político más importante en América Latina durante el período entre las dos guerras mundiales fue el desarrollo de partidos indígeno-reformistas. Dedicados a la reconstrucción de la sociedad en Latinoamérica sobre una base más equitativa de lo que había sido la regla general en el pasado, estos partidos cambiaron considerablemente el complejo de la vida política latinoamericana. Los partidos populares que han logrado mayor estabilidad son aquellos que tratan de crear fórmulas políticas y formas de organización adaptables a las condiciones de América Latina. Prácticamente todos los partidos populares han llevado una existencia precaria, perseguidos por las tiranías militares que durante años han desgobernado a las naciones latinoamericanas. Sin embargo, los partidos populares han logrado estimular a nuevos elementos para que participen en la actividad política y muchos de estos partidos han asumido el poder en sus países durante períodos más o menos largos.

Using survey data and interviews, this study examines Panamanian attitudes toward the United States and toward the central issues in US.- Panama relations. It also compares Panamanian attitudes with opinions toward the United States in the rest of Central America. The study finds that nationalism, system support, anticommunism, and, for the mass public, ideology are the most important variables in determining support for the United States. Elites are more nationalistic and less accommodationist toward the United States than the mass public. Concern about the politicization and misuse of the Panama Canal and adjacent lands has led many in the general public to support a continued US. military presence on the Isthmus of Panama.

The decade of the 1960s could well be termed the First Economic Integration Decade in Latin America. During this period the republics of Latin America experienced a “collective awakening,” inspiring an environment in which superficial and exclusivist values gave way to pragmatic and cooperative attitudes. Economic alliances were formed among neighbors, predicated on the rationale that, by joining forces in the spirit of cooperation and applying an ecumenical approach to common problems, each of the participating countries would be better off than pursuing a strictly autarkic course (see Figure 1).

The initial effort at integration was the Central American Common Market (CACM), formed in late 1960 and including all the countries of Central America except Panama.1 That same year, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was created and, measured in terms of territory and population, represented the most significant economic cooperative. A third grouping was the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), established in 1968 as an agreement among eleven British Commonwealth nations and territories.

Canada, Long-Oriented toward Europe and the Commonwealth, seeks to expand its involvement in Latin America. The development of a coherent Canadian policy for Latin America will depend on a variety of domestic and external factors, among them the Canada-United States relationship, rapid global change, and North American economic integration. Such a policy must reflect Canadian values and concerns — the importance of the collective welfare as well as individual good, the peaceful negotiation of disputes, and the acceptance of cultural, political, and ideological diversity.

Reform agendas are no novelty in Brazilian politics. Perhaps the first “reform agenda” was foisted on Brazil by the Marquis de Pombal during the colonial period (Maxwell 1995). In the independence period during the Second Empire (1840–89), reforms were frequent, especially after the Triple Alliance War in the 1870s and 1880s, as successive cabinets labored under strong pressures for change.

By Latin-American standards, Chile has enjoyed a remarkably stable government. Yet, there have been significant intervals of political unrest marked by violence and internal disorder. At both the beginning and the end of the nineteenth century, Liberals and Conservatives clashed in bloody battles, opening wounds that festered for many years. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the military revolted three times in the space of eight years (1924-1932) in order to promote social reform. Marmaduke Grove Vallejo figured prominently in these events, first as a participant in the January uprising of 1925, later as an opponent of the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, and finally as a leader of the military forces that overthrew the government of Juan Esteban Montero Rodríguez and established the Socialist Republic of Chile.

There are a number of reasons why Mexico attracts students of economic development. Boasting an impressive rate of economic growth that has been sustained for four decades, yet plagued with discouraging and mounting problems of surplus labor and maldistribution of income, Mexico is one of the prime cases that has sparked the discussion over the distinctions between “economic growth” and “economic development.” Furthermore, Mexico affords a classic test of the validity of some dependency writers’ claim that periphery countries’ subjugation to external control varies directly with the length and intensity of contact with center nations (Frank, 1972: 10). The sudden revelation of Mexico's potential as an energy supplier, the growing concern with the magnitude and consequences of illegal Mexican migration to the United States, and the increasing recognition of the uniqueness and importance of the Mexico-U.S. border economy add further appeal for economists, political scientists, and sociologists.

When it assumed office in 1921 the Harding administration found itself confronted with the problem of arranging the withdrawal of American troops from the Dominican Republic. Terminating the American presence in that country was part of the administration's policy of improving relations with Latin America, and both Warren G. Harding and Charles Evans Hughes were strongly committed to this goal. They believed that abandoning armed intervention in favor of advice and counsel would foster good will in Latin America and ultimately benefit the United States by enabling it to garner the trade and support of the region. The president and secretary of state also contended that such a policy could stabilize the area and thereby render the military interventions of the past unnecessary. Thus withdrawal from the Dominican Republic was part of a larger policy.