Intellectuals have always played a role in the political development of their societies. Their role, however, has fluctuated with changes in time and place, and in the 20th century the intellectual's function in society seems ambiguous both to the intellectual himself and to those who have studied him. In spite of this ambiguity, there is a consensus in recent literature that the ability of intellectuals to influence elite groups and the government itself is on the increase (Ladd and Lipset, 1976: 309). The reasons for this increased influence are several, and although there is recognition of the expanding importance of men of knowledge, there are few serious examinations of this group and its role (Marsal and Arent, 1970: 466; Marsal, 1966: 36; Friedmann, 1960: 540-541).

The growth of public enterprise is generally viewed as a product of the post-World War II developmentalist state. In late-developing capitalist countries, however, many important firms already came under state control during preceding liberal regimes. Because of the liberal context in which they operated, such companies frequently adopted policies that differed in important ways from those followed under the developmentalist state. The purpose of this study is to focus on the Banco do Brasil—the single most important publicly controlled firm of Brazil's First Republic (1889-1930) and today the seventh largest bank in the world—in order to examine the nature of state enterprise in a liberal regime.

Separated by many thousands of miles and very different cultural heritages, Argentina and Canada might not seem to have much in common. But during the period between 1870 and 1930, there were many striking similarities between the economic development of these two countries at opposite ends of the New World (Blain, 1972). Indeed, by the late 1920s, Alejandro E. Bunge, the distinguished head of the economics faculty at the University of Buenos Aires, was pointing to the “Argentine- Canadian economic parallel” in his publications (Bunge, 1929). Bunge had perceived that Argentina and Canada were two of a small group of historically favored new countries that shared what Canadian economist Melville Watkins (1963: 149) has called, “an enormous advantage over the typical underdeveloped country,” because they did not “start their development with population pressing against scarce resources.”

The British experience with federations is not a happy one. Attempts to combine its smaller and poorer colonies into some form of larger political and economic union as part of its decolonization process are generally reckoned to have failed. Almost without exception, the individual colonies decided to go it alone, to seek independence on their own, that is.

The former West Indian colonies are a case in point. Notwithstanding several attempts to bring them closer together, they have shown a remarkable tenacity to retain their individual existence and identity. The 1958 Federation, the most ambitious attempt to weld them into a nation, ended in failure after only three years and much internal wrangling. The larger islands of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago went on to become independent on their own. A further attempt to amalgamate the remaining units, the so-called "Little Eight" into a Federation of the Eastern Caribbean also failed, after which Barbados sought independence on its own.

In 1982-83 Latin America experienced a depression which rivaled that of the 1930s. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined by 1% in 1982 and by 3.3% in 1983. Per capita income fell 10% below 1980 levels. The proximate cause of this depression was the crisis produced by external debt.

By 1984 several countries in the region began to show signs of recovery from the severe recession and external-sector crisis. Economic growth rebounded to 2%, and the larger countries achieved impressive improvements in external balances. Brazil's total exports grew sharply, as did Mexico's non-oil exports. In 1985 growth has surged ahead in Brazil and Mexico although falling commodity prices have placed new strains on the smaller countries (and weaker oil prices, as well as erosion in domestic policy, have undermined Mexico's external position).

Had the military not ousted President Fernando Belaúnde Terry and substituted their rule for constitutional processes, 1969 would have been an election year in Peru. According to Belaúnde, the probable winner of those elections would have been Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the perennial candidate of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). Therefore, to paraphrase the comment attributed to Mark Twain on arising from his sickbed and reading his obituary in the local newspaper, announcements of Apra's demise are somewhat premature.

Few political movements in Latin America have enjoyed a comparable fame, and none has matched that of the apristas in having contributed a nonpersonalistic genre to the family of Latin America political parties.

The literature on voting behavior has generally accepted that party identification largely determines voter choice. While many studies have found that party identification is largely transmitted through social learning, less studied are the processes of the construction of party identity by way of group membership. This study seeks to understand how group identity influences party identification among Mexican workers through an analysis of the effects of union affiliation on political behavior. It assesses the utility of corporatist legacies in explaining party identity in Mexico and provides a first assessment of party affinities among independent unionists. The evidence draws from original survey data collected during six demonstrations in Mexico City. The study finds that union membership does condition the party identity of corporatist workers but not that of independent unionists.

The field of Latin American politics has undeniably achieved major advances in the last several decades. Nevertheless, one detects a growing intellectual unease and a sense that the excitement engendered by the pathbreaking work and heated debates of previous decades—focusing on authoritarianism, democratization, and market restructuring and related structural transformations—has waned and perhaps given way to a certain “normalization” of our intellectual enterprise.

Brazil, for many scholars and pundits, showcased the risk of democratic breakdown with the election of a far-right populist like Jair Bolsonaro. Against pessimistic expectations, however, not only has Brazilian democracy survived but politics has returned to business as usual. What can explain this supposedly unanticipated outcome? This article provides an analytical assessment of this this puzzle and offers an alternative explanation. We argue that both the diagnoses of Brazilian institutions and the predictions made were misguided. We explore the role played by the Supreme Court, party system, media, and congressional politics in restricting Bolsonaro’s illiberal initiatives.

Political alternate positions (otherwise known as substitutes) can have important effects on women's abilities to enter politics. Using the case of Nicaragua, this study assesses whether these alternate positions are being used to increase women's political representation or as a tool to undermine women's advancement into positions of power. By examining patterns of women's representation as candidates in the 1996, 2001, and 2006 elections for the National Assembly and as elected officeholders (as both alternates for those assembly members and titleholders), the article analyzes how various political parties are utilizing these alternate positions. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this study finds no evidence that these alternate positions are used to undermine women's political progress.

Political decentralization has been promoted as a way to devolve responsibility, bring government closer to citizens, and improve accountability. The shift prompted new local elections, but were the elected officials responsive to citizens or to national party elites? This study examines unique survey data from 125 Colombian mayors to identify the factors they believe were critical in their victories and thereby to identify the people to whom they believe they owe loyalty: citizens or party leaders. Examining the relative value mayors assign to their own actions versus those of the party, combined with information on how they financed campaigns, sheds important light on subnational electoral dynamics in Colombia.

This article disputes recent studies that find no relationship between homicides and vigilantism. Using a unique panel dataset that controls for time and region, this study shows that the relationship exists. The evidence is consistent with the theory of low-capacity states: high homicide rates indicate unchecked criminal enclaves that further corrode trust in police. The territorial gaps in the central state’s presence that O’Donnell once called “brown areas” cost people their lives. Vigilantes react through defensive movements in which ordinary people substitute for the police to fill a security gap. The panel results also indicate that wealth inequality matters. Business people reportedly finance the vigilante organizations, which helps them to sustain collective action over time. Together with income inequality, Mexico’s low-capacity state facilitated an armed vigilante movement between 2012 and 2015.

On March 20, 1980, a small group of would-be Cuban exiles attempted to force a bus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana. In the process, they killed one Cuban military guard on duty and apparently touched off a chain of events that resulted in the “Freedom Flotilla“—the dramatic emigration of 125,266 Cubans (Bowen, 1980:9). This exodus, one of the most controversial episodes in recent U.S.-Cuban relations, also sparked a national and international ideological debate over its significance. Central to the ideological struggle and the theme of this article are the legitimacy problems facing the Cuban state.

In the literature of development, it is recognized that the possibilities for national economic growth are strongly conditioned by prevailing institutional patterns. Exogenous factors, such as international market trends, the supply of foreign investment funds, and terms of trade, define outer constraints on the growth of many less developed countries; but within these boundaries, the realizable growth depends on endogenously set parameters that influence public policy alternatives, the level and direction of domestic capital formation, and the scope and rapidity of structural economic changes. It is in this latter area that the study of institutional performance becomes relevant.

To date, the focus of institutional analysis has been on a variety of social organizations that influence the economic process at one point or another, e.g., trade unions, political parties, financial intermediaries, land tenure systems, and government agencies.

Despite the Mexican regime's track record of adaptiveness, the 1980s seemingly altered the nature of political reform there. Secular, conjunctural, and policy trends attenuated traditional reformist mechanisms (i.e. the regime's capacity to co-opt, or corruption's “lubricating” potential), exposing a series of wrenching political dilemmas and potentially zero-sum equations. The watershed presidential election of July 1988 and the continuing challenge posed by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas Solórzano's PRD (Parttdo de la Revolutión Democrática) both reflected and crystallized these quandaries, magnifying the need and inherent dangers of reforming the one-party system. Yet during the ensuing years, and contrary to unwieldy predictions and scenarios, the regime neither unraveled (see Wiarda 1988/89), capitulated before a Cárdenas-led electoral or revolutionary front, nor stagnated. Instead it rebounded, raising new questions about Mexico's political future.

With these ringing words, Colonel Henry L. Kincaide, at the 1913 Convention of the American Manufacturers Export Association, urged his fellow manufacturers into battle. The adversaries were England and Germany; the prize, world trade (Faulkner, 1924; Beard, 1934; Williams, 1959; LaFeber, 1963).

The speech came at an opportune time, because just three months later Congress was to pass the Federal Reserve Act and thus sanction a trade aid for which exporters had been lobbying for many years-the legal establishment of American branch banks in foreign countries (Chandler, 1911; Holmes, 1912; Bankers Magazine, 1913; Ring, 1913).