As indigenous movements around the world seek to strengthen their collective voice in their respective political systems, efforts continue to design political institutions that offer both sufficient local autonomy and incentives to participate in the broader political system. The state of Oaxaca, Mexico, offers a test case of one such effort at indigenous-based institutional design. This article argues that such reforms often fail to confront the tension between local autonomy and citizen engagement in politics outside the borders of the community. Testing this theory through a comparative analysis of voter turnout rates in municipalities across the state of Oaxaca and the neighboring state of Guerrero, this study finds that the adoption of indigenous institutions at the local level is associated with significantly lower voter turnout rates for national elections.

Research on strikes has traditionally focused on how economic, institutional, and political variables shape strike patterns. Recent work examines how workers' structural, associational, and symbolic power facilitate strikes. Building on this research, this article asks, what factors determine strike outcomes? It analyzes four strikes at MADECO, Chile's largest copper manufacturer, across democratic, authoritarian, and postauthoritarian regimes. Using qualitative and documentary evidence, it argues that strike outcomes reflect workers' capacity to halt or disrupt production and to access government allies who can pressure management to settle strikes in workers' favor. Outcomes vary based on the political composition of government, workers' capacity to halt production, and industry's and government's dependence on foreign investment. MADECO workers' location in Santiago, near national officials, allowed them to mobilize at the local, national, and international scales to pressure management. Comparisons with other strikes in Chile, Argentina, and Peru identify similar mobilization patterns.

Since 1999, growing citizen dissatisfaction in Bolivia has been manifest in a cycle of often violent protests. Citizens believe that they have no means of expressing themselves except demonstrations. The public has grown weary of neoliberalism, which is perceived as benefiting only the elite. A recent economic downturn provided the catalyst for the unrest. Underlying these economic concerns, however, are fundamental problems with representation. The second Bolivian “revolution” involved not only the shift from state-led economic development to neoliberalism but also a shift from corporatism to pluralism. Representative institutions have not fully responded to the new pluralistic landscape, despite a range of political reforms. Many Bolivians find that their voice in government has weakened even as their needs have grown. The Bolivian case thereby highlights the obstacles young democracies face in winning over decreasingly tolerant citizens.

The end of the Cold War raises many questions about the role of Third World states in the emerging “New World Order.” During the “old” world order, however, Latin America played a crucial role in the US sphere of influence. This alone merits study of its recent foreign policy behavior, not only because the region is home to many of the newly industrializing states, but also because it will undoubtedly be an important player in regional and global politics into the 21st century (Brysk, 1992; Lowenthal, 1993). How will Latin Americans respond to a Hemisphere dominated by the United States? Will they resist or endorse the trend towards open markets and economies? This article investigates this question with regard to Ecuador, exploring whether Ecuador's foreign policymakers are in the process of shifting towards embrace of a US-dominated Hemisphere governed by free-market economic ideals or, rather, are developing policies in accordance with their own ideological predilections.

With the outbreak of the Latin American debt crisis in late 1982, nervous bankers and hard-pressed debtors turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for both short-term finance and macroeconomic advice. By 1985, however, steadily increasing inflation and stagnant output reduced what little appeal such orthodox IMF programs had ever enjoyed. In late 1985 and early 1986, Argentina and Brazil adopted new “heterodox” stabilization programs, whose essential elements included income policies to break inflationary inertia, monetary reform (especially the creation of new currencies), and a verbal commitment to fiscal restraint.

This article investigates the effect of local economic conditions on voting behavior by focusing on the export-oriented agricultural areas of Argentina during the commodities boom. It assesses the marginal effect of export wealth on electoral outcomes by studying the impact of soybean production, the main Argentine export product during this period. The combination of rising agricultural prices and a salient national tax on exports allows us to evaluate how wealth and tax policy shape local electoral behavior. This study relies on a spatial econometric analysis of the vote across Argentine departments for the 2007–15 period, along with qualitative evidence from interviews and a descriptive analysis of government appointments.

The US.-sponsored programs of military and police collaboration with the Central American governments during the Cold War also contributed to the surveillance capacity of those states during the period when the Central American state formation process was being completed. Guatemala is used as a case study. Washington’s contribution was framed by the conventional discourse of “security against communism” but also by an underlying technocratic ethos in which “modernization” and “security” were higher priorities than democratization.

“Being in Sugar is like collecting Confederate currency”. This assessment, offered by anthropologist Sidney Mintz (1985), is shared by many sugar industry observers, insiders, and, increasingly, by many Caribbean officials. King sugar, instrumental in shaping the diverse political, economic, and social histories of the Caribbean since colonial times, confronts a seemingly intractable crisis: a severe, and sustained, disequilibrium between global demand and supply which makes export of sugar very unattractive. Except in those cases where preferential arrangements exist between producers and consumers-the Lomé Convention, the US sugar quota system, and the Soviet guaranteed purchase of Cuban sugar-world prices for sugar are at a record low, well below production costs.

Do attitudes toward immigrants shape public policy preferences? To answer this question, this article analyzes a prominent example of South-South migration: the Nicaraguan immigrant community in Costa Rica. Over the past two decades, Costa Rica has experienced extensive socioeconomic changes, and Nicaraguans have been frequent scapegoats for the fears and worries generated by these changes. Relying on the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey, this analysis finds that respondents who perceive immigrants as an economic threat are significantly more supportive of punitive crime control policies. Attitudes toward immigrants were also significantly linked to support for government policies to reduce income inequality. However, given the historically strong support for the Costa Rican social welfare state, attitudes toward immigrants did not significantly affect support for government services.

The experiences of communities in Rio de Janeiro under threat of removal through gentrification or mega-event construction present an opportunity to review the process and impact of urban community mobilization. This article assesses the determinants of community strategies, the challenges to implementation, and the impact of mobilization on outcomes for such communities. It reviews the case of Vila Autódromo, detailing the dynamic influence of both rational expectations and the “right to the city” ideology in developing resistance strategies and providing evidence to confirm the importance of social capital and civic capacity for community efficacy. The analysis updates theorizing beyond the politics of clientelism and contributes to understanding how the urban regime approach may apply to the Latin American context, while demonstrating the continued relevance of the political opportunity structure for determining policy outcomes.

Can popular organizations engage with the state in a lasting collaborative interaction that benefits their interests without being politically co-opted or captured? This article addresses this question by analyzing the interaction between cartonero organizations and the PRO administrations in Buenos Aires City between 2002 and 2018. It shows how cartoneros managed to prompt a change in the PRO’s policies on recyclable waste collection. The article’s main arguments are that popular organizations’ opportunity to gain formal access to the state without losing their autonomy is related to the strategic orientations of both the popular organization and the ruling party, and that such a possibility increases when the popular organization is not part of the incumbent party coalition. The “troubled collaboration” between cartoneros and the PRO was possible due both to the cartoneros’ combination of contentious and institutionalized actions and to an important change in the PRO’s strategic orientation toward cartoneros.

Decentralization has triggered widespread use of the subnational comparative method in the study of Latin American politics. Simultaneously, it has created challenges for this method that deserve careful attention. While subnational governments after decentralization can often be treated as potentially autonomous policy jurisdictions, their autonomy is also subject to new constraints and incursions, which may limit scholars’ ability to treat them as relatively independent units. By taking stock of the vibrant literature that has emerged in recent years, this article explores three major challenges that complicate the use of the subnational comparative method. Two are vertical in nature: how to theorize national causes of subnational variation, and how the varied linkages between subnational governments and transnational actors can be conceptualized in work that compares subnational units. The third challenge is horizontal, referring to interactions between governments at the same subnational level that can either enhance or subvert autonomy.

For thirty years, Cuba was a focal point of the Cold War. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s close ideological and military partnership with the communist superpower posed a challenge to U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Third World (see, e.g., Domínguez 1989). With the end of the Cold War, Cuba retrenched, ending its aid programs for foreign revolutionaries and regimes. Without the Soviet Union’s sponsorship, Cuba could no longer afford the luxury of a global foreign policy exporting revolution. Instead, its diplomats focused on reorienting Cuba’s international economic relations toward Latin America and Europe, building friendly relations with former adversaries.

Most economic models do not explicitly incorporate the “state” or the “government” into their analyses. Instead, this entity is viewed as a deus ex machina which plans and directs economic policy according to notions of efficiency, growth, distributional justice, and so on, that form the central concepts of the models. Unfortunately, the same naive thinking permeates a good deal of public policy analysis. This is the case, for example, with issues of development and underdevelopment. Here, attention is concentrated on “technical,” or “economic,” solutions, while taking for granted, either implicitly or explicitly, the existence of the political will necessary to implement them.

Since the mid-1970s, the Southern Cone countries of Latin America have experienced profound political, institutional, and economic reforms. Their immediate causes can be found in the evolution of their relatively recent (prereform) political situation, which saw marked polarization of different groups and political forces, social unrest, and a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the countries’ economic performance.

These events were followed by the installation of military regimes, with the new characteristic of trying to go far beyond the traditional attempt of introducing social (and particularly, labor) discipline and put the “house in order.”

Coups d’état, once a common end for democracies in the Americas, have declined sharply in recent years. This article investigates whether overall public support for coups is also in decline. Examining 21 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from 2004 to 2014 helps to evaluate two alternative theses on democratization: Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán’s 2013 normative regime preferences theory, which inquires (but does not test) whether public opinion can signal to elites a reluctance or willingness to support a coup; and classic modernization theory (Inglehart 1988; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). We find a substantively meaningful effect of democratic attitudes on coup support and a weak effect for national wealth, from which we infer that evolving elite values and preferences are paralleled at the mass level and that together, those two trends play a stronger role in the consolidation of democratic regimes than does modernization.

This article discusses the relationship between certain institutional regulations of voting rights and elections, different levels of electoral participation, and the degree of political instability in several Latin American political experiences. A formal model specifies the hypotheses that sudden enlargements of the electorate may provoke high levels of political instability, especially under plurality and other restrictive electoral rules, while gradual enlargements of the electorate may prevent much electoral and political innovation and help stability. Empirical data illustrate these hypotheses. A historical survey identifies different patterns of political instability and stability in different countries and periods, which can be compared with the adoption of different voting rights regulations and electoral rules either encouraging or depressing turnout.

Contending rationales of peace and conflict coexist between countries and within regional spaces as conditions that motivate or constrain militarized behaviors. While the idea of balancing is still a relevant concept to understand contemporary security in South America, the region produces patterns of a nascent security community. This article argues that the regional repertoire of foreign and security policy practices draws on a hybrid security governance mechanism. The novelty brought by the cumulative interaction among South American countries is that the coexistence turns into a hybrid between both practices and discourses. To explain how hybrid formations are produced, this study analyzes the most empirically intense and academically controversial political and security interactions from interstate relations in the two security complexes in the region, the Southern Cone and the Northern Andes.

The standard account of military dictatorship in Chile (1973–1990) portrays the case as a personalist regime, and uses the dynamics associated with this type of regime to explain General Pinochet's control of the presidency, the enactment of the 1980 Constitution, and the longevity of military rule. Drawing on records of the decisionmaking process within the military junta, this article presents evidence for a different characterization of the dictatorship. It shows that Pinochet never attained the supremacy commonly attributed to him, that the commanders of the other branches of the armed forces retained significant powers, and that the 1980 Constitution was not enacted to project Pinochet's personal power. More generally, this study suggests that personal power is not a necessary condition for regime longevity; collective systems can also produce cohesion and stability.

It is by now conventional wisdom to say that, while the countries of Latin America have improved their economic performance over the past few years, the majority of their populations have suffered a reversal in their standards of living compared to, let us say, 1980. After the protracted recession and acute macroeconomic disequilibria which was experienced by almost all the countries during the first half of the 1980s, many are staging a recovery in the 1990s. On the positive side, some of the indicators most frequently cited include the resumption of growth (albeit at moderate rates), greater financial stability, an increasingly diversified export sector, and political democratization. On the negative side, one finds inevitable mention of the following: inequitable distribution of income, a high incidence of absolute poverty, and the social tensions that tend to accompany them.