This article proposes a research agenda for the organization of the executive branch in Latin America by reviewing the literature on the U.S. and Latin American presidencies and outlining the research gap between them. The study finds that while strong, regionwide patterns have been established about cabinets in Latin America, research is lagging behind on the presidential center, presidential advisory networks, and their effects in policymaking. The article sets forth a series of research questions and suggests a combination of quantitative, social network, and case study strategies to address them.

High commodity prices have led to the proliferation of informal gold mining in the Andes. Despite their limited financial capacity, informal gold miners have proved capable of influencing national-level policy outcomes. Why are they able to do so? This study puts forward a comparative study of Bolivia, where informal miners have been politically incorporated, and Peru, where they have been traditionally excluded. It shows how, despite the very different institutional contexts, informal miners are similarly capable of leveraging their contribution to the local economy and the fracture between the central state and its peripheral branches to form pressure groups with local authorities. Based on 120 interviews with politicians and leaders from the largest gold-mining communities in Bolivia and Peru, this study contributes to the scholarship on state-society relations, resource politics, and decentralization by outlining the conditions and mechanism through which informal groups contest exclusionary resource governance in fragmented states.

The financial problems faced by Mexico since late December 1994 are the result of a balance of payments crisis which developed earlier during the year when a number of economic and political developments came together to disrupt its financing plans. A combination of events — an increase in US interest rates, political ferment and presidential elections in Mexico, plus capital flight from Mexico which was prompted, in turn, by lax monetary policy during the last weeks of the Salinas administration — all helped contribute to, and culminated in, a collapse of the peso at the end of 1994. As a result, the incoming administration of President Ernesto Zedillo found itself in the position of having to devalue the peso, a move that sparked severe economic repercussions, including a crisis of confidence that spread beyond Mexico to affect other emerging markets as well.

In democratic, integrated political systems characterized by a sharing of fundamental social values and “primitive beliefs” among the population, elections serve a salutary purpose. They not only reaffirm the commitment and involvement of the citizen to the prevailing political system by the ritual act of voting participation, but simultaneously legitimize the means and processes by which political values are authoritatively allocated (Milnor, 1969: 1-2). Elections and voting “draw attention to common social ties and to the importance and apparent reasonableness of accepting the public policies that are adopted (Edelman, 1964: 3). For these reasons, elections serve to integrate the citizen into the polity.

Religion and politics have depended on and influenced one another since the origins of what we know as Latin America. Their relation is both mutual and multifaceted; mutual because religion and politics have evolved together over the years, taking material and symbolic support from one another, and multifaceted because it embraces interinstitutional conflict and accommodation (e.g., the “church-state” relations which dominated earlier scholarship) as well as more subtle and elusive exchanges whereby religious and political orders gave legitimacy and moral authority to one another. In this process, religious notions of hierarchy, authority, and obedience reflected and reinforced the pattern of existing social and political arrangements to such an extent that the two orders often seemed indistinguishable.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the development policies applied to Latin American countries in the post-war period, particularly those designed to develop manufacturing production for the domestic market through tariff protection. The paper will try to find out whether such policies (1) brought about reasonably high rates of growth; (2) distorted the structure of domestic prices and hindered the later development of manufactures exports; (3) provoked persistent balance of payments disequilibria, thereby forcing the countries to borrow abroad in large quantities; and (4) weakened the countries' capacity to resume development in the future, once the current debt crisis is overcome.

Advancing conclusions, the first and fourth questions can be answered with a relatively high degree of confidence: inward-oriented policies promoted a high rate of growth during the three decades spanning 1950 to 1980, but narrowed the import coefficient to a degree that will force the countries to depend almost solely on export promotion to resume their development in the future.

The early 1950s mark a turning-point in the history of religious movements among the Japanese minority in Brazil. Various religious groups, particularly certain Buddhist sects and the so-called “new religions” of Japan for the first time undertook active proselytization through organized propaganda and missionary activities. The following are representative types of these religious groups:

1. (1) those which had been transplanted from Japan to Brazil by Japanese immigrants in the period before World War II and immediately after: Honmon Butsuryü Shü (a Buddhist sect), Tenri-kyō, Ōmoto, and ō-no-Ie (all three new religions), and the like;

2. (2) Buddhist sects which began to try to organize their “potential adherents” among the Japanese on the basis of household religious affiliation, regardless of how tenuous or how thoroughly lapsed;

3. (3) those which had grown rapidly in postwar Japan and extended their propagation activities overseas: new religions like Sekai Kyūsei Kyō, P.L. Kyōdan, and so on;

4. (4) those which originated with the Japanese minority in Brazil on the basis of traditional Japanese folk beliefs: Nossa Senhora de Kannon (Our Lady of Kannon, or Sei Kannon Shū HakkokuKannon Dō), Kaminoya Yaoyorozu-kyō, Fudō Myōō, Shinreikyō, and the like;

5. (5) Umbanda, a syncretic fusion of African cults, Catholicism, and ‘ spiritism.

Throughout the 1960s, all these religious movements became increasingly active and gained more and more followers.

This article examines the World Bank's role in the market policy reform experiences of Mexico and Argentina. It argues that while reform was driven by domestic elites, the bank played an important role, providing technical advice and financial support and helping to spread market reform ideas. The nature of the bank's involvement, however, differed substantially in the two countries because of their distinct political arrangements, histories, and geopolitical positions in regard to the United States. In the recent era of second-generation reforms, the World Bank's involvement in compensatory policy development has become more focused, although still more intense in Argentina than in Mexico. This involvement has important implications for the quality of democracy, insofar as the 1990s market reforms were formulated by insulated international policy networks unaccountable to the public. Recently, the bank has declared its commitment to involve civil society in its lending policies, a move that may have important implications for democratic development.

The informal sector challenges economic growth and hinders the abatement of income disparities in developing countries. This study argues that a weak and poorly governed welfare state can cause the informal sector to increase when individuals use it as an exit option from an unsatisfying welfare system. The article explores how the welfare state’s benefit structure and citizens’ trust in institutions to deliver public goods affect the likelihood of informality. A logistic hierarchical model, based on cross-sectional survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean and descriptive panel data from Brazil, is used to test the hypothesis. Findings reveal that social policy discontent, low trust, an elitist distribution of welfare benefits, and dysfunctional institutions increase the likelihood of being informally employed. However, workers with greater agency—the better-educated—seem notably less likely to informalize when social policy benefits are targeted toward their own socioeconomic group.

Boom and collapse characterized the history of the Brazilian rubber industry. Its rise and fall followed a pattern well established by dyewood, sugar, gold, diamonds, tobacco, cotton, and cacao. The story of these industries points out one of the major themes in Brazilian history: the recurrence of economic cycles during which one product of the soil dominates the development of the entire country or a large part of it. This cyclical development prompted the Brazilian economist J. F. Normano to conclude: “The history of Brazilian economy is a sensational record with amazing fluctuations. It is a history of the appearance and disappearance of entire industries.” A team of American economists sent to study the economy in the late forties concurred.

Until relatively recently, the small, poor countries of Central America were typically regarded as particularly poor candidates for democratization, despite a good measure of early and sustained success in Costa Rica (Ebel 1972, 1984; Rosenberg 1987). Nevertheless, over the years 1984–1996, “transitions to democracy” have been realized throughout the region. Given the extremely negative economic conditions of the 1980s and 1990s and the extent and historical intractability of political violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, these transitions via peace processes and “elections of the century” are remarkable achievements. Still, the fullness and consolidation of democracy remain very much up in the air, as is widely the case among countries that have experienced some degree of democratic transition during the last two decades (the so-called “third wave”). This situation raises the prospect of a historical era in which the poorer provinces of the globe are populated largely by “hybrid regimes” that are, at best, highly incomplete democracies.

Taking the 1997-98 electoral season as its case study, this article seeks to determine whether Colombia’s party system is undergoing deinstitutionalization. The resilience of the Liberal Party and the lack of an organized alternative to the traditional parties may mean that Colombia is in the process of party system transformation.

The growing importance of third world countries in the international system brings their potential for conflict and cooperation to the forefront. Given the fact that the East-West conflict tends to intensify the North-South conflict, a general tendency toward more warlike antagonisms is becoming evident within the Third World. In view of this trend, Latin America as a region becomes particularly interesting; conditions here have always led to conflict situations between the various countries, but specific historical factors seem to have kept these conflicts from erupting to the same extent that they have in other regions of the Third World.

Conflicts between two states do not suddenly occur. Their virulence rather gradually develops from a mixture of border conflicts, historical animosities, economic disputes, differences in political systems, arms races, and certainly, the influence of the big powers.

After a period of economic stagnation that lasted from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, Uruguayan economic growth took off. Between 1974 and 1981 real GDP growth averaged 3.8% per annum (p.a.) versus .7% p. a. between 1956 and 1974. Yet, in 1974 Uruguayan prospects appeared rather dismal—inflation was high and accelerating, the fiscal deficit amounted to 4.5% of GDP, international reserves were largely exhausted, the debt service ratio exceeded 40%, the terms of trade were falling as a result of the oil price rise, and the EEC had just cut off imports of Uruguayan beef. How Uruguay achieved a dramatic turnaround in the face of these poor initial conditions is an interesting case study in the role of stabilization cum liberalization programs.

Social movement research indicates that mobilization can effect change in political attitudes, yet few works have systematically tested the effect of protests on public opinion. This article uses survey and protest event data to assess the spatial and temporal effect of mobilizations on political attitudes Chile. It combines the 2008, 2010, and 2012 LAPOP surveys and a dataset of college student protest events, mapping respondents and protests at the municipal level using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Using regression analyses, it finds that proximity to college student protests has a significant effect on various political attitudes. The effect, however, tends to be substantively larger on “weak” attitudes and smaller on “strong” ones. The results highlight the importance of mobilizations in shaping individual political attitudes and the role that social movements play in the policy-making process.

MERCOSUR’s success as an economic bloc suggests that it could serve as a stimulus or even a model for security integration. Improved military ties among the MERCOSUR nations have grown out of a sequence of developments, from political rapprochement to economic convergence and improved civilian state control. Yet increased cooperation has not led to a regional defense system. Case studies reveal that national considerations have inhibited most MERCOSUR members from accepting the idea of a regional security alliance.

In Just 20 Years Peru has shifted from beacon of hope to basket case. As late as the mid-1970s, Peru's reformist military government (1968-1980) appeared to offer significant possibilities for economic and political development (defined as improved distribution of income and greater participation by the citizenry). From 1940 to 1975, economic growth and low inflation had been the norm. A major agrarian reform during the military docenio (12-year rule) created production cooperatives nation wide; the industrial community gave workers a meaningful management role in the operation of their firms. Both stirred the imagination of many Peruvians and the academic community alike.

Few Countries In The World, and certainly none in this hemisphere, could lay more claims to the title “original heroic land” than Haiti. If, indeed, such things mattered in this world, Haitians could rightfully note that, at a time when the dominant secular and religious ideologies defined the African as subhuman and thus “naturally enslavable,” Haitians challenged and defeated the supreme advocates of those doctrines, and their heroism became the stimulus for other liberation attempts.

Not much after independence in 1804, Haitians opened their ports and hearts to all those battling slavery and oppression. Many benefitted from this daring act. Defeated and abandoned by many around him, Simón Bolívar turned to Haiti and they, not once, but twice, acted to help, true to their vows. Quite correctly did Bolívar write Petión that the liberation of America was only one of the debts owed Haiti.

In years past, Mexico's political system was often cited as a model for political development in the “third world” (Scott, 1974, 1965). While most Latin American governments allowed associational interest groups little opportunity to articulate their needs and demands, Mexico's ruling party (the PRI) provided institutionalized representation for three major segments of the nation's population: the agrarian sector (peasants and agricultural workers); the middle class (the “popular sector”); and organized labor unions. Anderson and Cockcroft (1966: 16) indicated that “the Mexican national leadership seem … to be committed to tolerating a substantial amount of political pluralism. It is taken for granted … that occupational groups attempt to promote their interests and demands through organizations.”

More recently, however, a “revisionist” group of political scientists has disputed the contention that Mexico is moving toward democratic pluralism; instead they characterize its political system as essentially authoritarian (Purcell, 1973; Johnson, 1971; Stevens, 1970; Davis and Coleman, 1974). In this article I shall examine the degree of latitude which the Mexican political system allows independent labor movements I in articulating the demands of their members and in pressing I those demands on the ruling party.