Many communally divided postcolonial states rely almost exclusively upon an effective machinery of control to ensure political order. This has stemmed from two factors: (1) unrestrained communal competition for votes; and (2) inheritance of a highly centralized state apparatus. The first condition has tended to politicize sectional cleavages, exacerbating distrust (Premdas, 1972: 19-20). Without a body of shared values in the state, protection of a communal group's interest is perceived to reside on the capture of the government. The second condition under such circumstances facilitates “effective domination of one group over another” (Smooha, 1980: 257). Apart from a consociational arrangement, democracy in deeply divided societies is elusive, rendering authoritarian control seemingly necessary to prevent protracted communal conflict and political disintegration (Lijphart, 1969: 207; Milne, 1975: 413; Norlinger, 1972). As a legitimator of domination, stability is a controversial value, especially in the face of cynical and brutal abuses of human rights.

Many democratic governments in Latin America have implemented broad judicial reforms, some of which are aimed at making criminal law and legal institutions more transparent and modern. Although such reforms are important for democratic development, scholars debate whether the reforms result in more rights for defendants and whether they jeopardize citizens' perceptions about security. Using two original datasets and a fixed-effects model, this study shows that groundbreaking criminal law reforms in Chile have improved certain aspects of defendants' rights by decreasing the number of individuals in pretrial detention. Chileans' perceptions about crime and violence in regions where the reforms were implemented also have improved. Chile's success appears to be due to the government's commitment to the reforms, as well as to concerted and consistent efforts by the police to fight crime. These results have implications for other countries implementing similar significant reforms.

After a decade of civil war and four consecutive conservative administrations, El Salvador's leftist FMLN won its first presidential election in 2009. How has public policy changed under this New Left government, and why? This article addresses the question in the area of public health care. An alliance of health sector leaders with both technocratic and diplomatic abilities capitalized on the policy window opened by the FMLN's electoral victory and worked within the parameters set by President Mauricio Funes, the FMLN, and civil society to universalize health care. The new minister of health, a professional highly esteemed inside and outside the country, was able to engage both a large social movement protesting neoliberal policy and an energetic health diplomat sent by the Pan American Health Organization. In designing its reform, this alliance benefited from international as well as “bottom-up” policy diffusion.

This article uses the concept of entrepreneurial powers to discuss how and under what circumstances Brazil successfully accomplishes its goals in international crises. The concept of entrepreneurial power focuses on systematic evidence of middle-power behavior and its relation to foreign policy tools. Brazil resorts to three agency-based foreign policy tools that are the substance of its entrepreneurial power. These instruments are always mediated by a structural condition, the dominant power pivotal position in the crisis. This study applies qualitative comparative analysis methodology to 32 international crises since the early 1990s in which Brazil played a role. It finds that for regional crises, the use of only one agency-based tool is sufficient for success, regardless of the dominant power position; and for global crises, the use of only one agency-based tool is a necessary and sufficient condition for Brazil to accomplish its goals, despite the dominant power position on the issue.

During the last two decades, military rulers have been replaced by democratically elected civilian governments throughout Latin America. Nevertheless, scholars (Mainwaring et al., 1992:3,8) contend that nearly all contemporary Latin American polities remain unconsolidated democratic regimes principally because civilian control over the armed forces has not yet been established. Although the armed forces have returned to their barracks, they have retained considerable political and institutional autonomy. A number of scholars (Loveman, 1994; Agüero, 1992; and others) emphasize that most Latin American constitutions still recognize the military's right to intervene when the constitutional order is threatened. The armed forces are also generally granted broad jurisdiction over internal security, as well as the freedom to organize their institution without civilian interference. There is a considerable body of opinion which maintains that fears of military intervention continue to constrain the behavior of civilian politicians and social groups (Valenzuela, 1992; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Rouquié, 1986; and Rial, 1990).

This paper considers the deep-seated roots of income inequality in the structure of Latin American economics. These include unequal distribution of land ownership, the “Kuznets effect” of rapid industrialization, regressive tax systems, and failure of governments to pursue aggressively income equalization policies. While examples are drawn from the experience of Brazil and Mexico, similar conclusions hold for other countries of the region.

How do Latin America’s poorest citizens participate in politics? This article explores the role that community organizations play in mobilizing individuals into three common modes of political participation: voting, protesting, and contacting government. It argues that community organizations help mobilize poor individuals both through the resources they provide for mobilization and because they serve as sites where political parties target individuals for mobilization. It analyzes survey data from LAPOP surveys for 18 Latin American countries and finds that overall, poor people are just as politically active as more affluent individuals; that involvement in community organizations is a very strong predictor of all types of political participation; and that membership in organizations has an especially strong effect on voting and protesting for poor people. By equalizing levels of political participation across income groups, organizations help erase class-based inequalities in participation that have plagued democracies in the region.

The process of political transition in Mexico has fostered several institutional transformations in the political system. Such changes do not modify the system's design, but they do reactivate some basic institutions and forgotten powers that affect the operation of the political system as a whole. The state governors have undergone one of the most relevant transformations: they have gained more autonomy and have forged a new relationship with the federal executive. This essay analyzes the different actions governors have taken depending on their partisan origin. While the PAN governors focus on administrative and financial issues, the PRI governors have developed the most important political challenges to the president's authority.

Despite weak partisanship and considerable political change in the wake of the 2002 election, three-quarters of Brazilian voters supported a presidential candidate in 2006 from the same party they had backed in 2002. This article assesses the factors causing both electoral stability and electoral change with a transition model, a model testing whether the effects of respondents' evaluative criteria depend on their initial vote choices. Social context—personal discussion networks, neighborhood influences, and the interactions of social networks and municipal context—is the major force promoting stability and change, while the impact of partisanship is limited to a small share of voters.

Colombian Politics, by 1982, were characterized by stagnation, increased levels of violence, and diminished regime legitimacy. In the face of an active, though limited, guerrilla insurgency as well as nascent labor unrest and popular protest, the successive governments of the National Front had come to depend on the coercive powers of the state to preserve public order and political stability. Colombia's peace process, initiated during the government of Conservative President Belisario Betancur (1982- 1986), was a recognition of the limits, indeed the failure, of the military solution to the maintenance of public order.

The February 1990 elections in Nicaragua were hailed by the popular media and the US administration as signaling the country's rejection of authoritarian rule in favor of Western-style democracy. Most commentators interpreted the results in Nicaragua as part of a worldwide trend triggered by events in Eastern Europe. According to the conventional wisdom, as long as the Sandinistas handed over power, including control of the military and security forces, democracy would flourish in Nicaragua.

While competitive elections may be a necessary condition for democracy, they certainly are not a sufficient one. Throughout history, countless elections have been held, yet relatively few have contributed much of anything to the consolidation of democratic rule. Elections can serve a number of functions other than the public contestation of power. For example, they can be used to legitimize an incumbent regime, diffuse political opposition, or respond to foreign pressure.

Chile today is experiencing a new sociopolitical compromise no less significant than the so-called “compromise state” of the 1930s and 1940s. A central feature of the new arrangement has been the performance of Chile’s party system. This role should be understood in terms of how it reflects, and helps to mitigate or aggravate, the tension between capital accumulation and the struggles over sociopolitical inclusion and distribution.

The early relations of Latin America and Japan, representing a distinct chapter in the discovery of East Asia by the West, are attributable to the initial thrust of West European expansion beginning in the late fifteenth century, led by Portugal and Spain. Magellan claimed the Philippines for Spain in 1521, and following the conquest of Mexico, and later Peru, Spain sought to establish a trans-Pacific route for communication and commerce. The conquest of the Philippines, carried on from 1565 to 1571 under the leadership of Miguel López de Legaspi, foreshadowed the beginning of the Manila-Acapulco trade, which was subsequently carried on until 1815. In 1606 there were 3,000 Japanese colonists in Manila, and 15,000 in Dilao, which included Manila. Some Japanese, as well as Chinese, served as crew members on the Spanish galleons, and it is probable that these Japanese were the first in recorded history to reach the Americas (Ishii, 1937: 88; Bradley, 1942: 11; Meskill et al., 1971: 74-86; Schurz, 1939: 99-128).

Prior to the mid-1960s, there was little concern in Brazil for the relative size of different ownership sectors—state, domestic private and multinational (Baer et al., 1973; Baer et al., 1977). The main policy objective had been the promotion of import-substitution-industrialization (ISI). Because the Brazilian domestic private sector did not have the technological and financial means to create new industries with a high technology content or to help expand public utilities, multinational firms and state enterprises were relied upon to carry out those tasks. The National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE) was created in order to finance the state's direct participation in Brazil's economy.

The problems associated with drug abuse in the United States have received considerable attention in recent years. By the mid-1970s, approximately 500,000 Americans were addicted to heroin, while at least 15 million were regular or casual users of marijuana. None of this heroin originates domestically, and only a small percentage of the marijuana, and this of low potency, is home-grown. Consequently, the question of source has become cardinal to most analyses of drug use and abuse in the United States.

Mexico has long been the primary source of high potency marijuana for the American market. Despite the recent influx from Jamaica and Colombia, Mexico still supplies an estimated 70% of the annual American consumption, or some 10 million pounds. More importantly, Mexico is currently the source of 70% to 80% of the heroin on the U.S. market, an alarming 6-8 ton annual figure. Furthermore, Mexico is both a primary transshipment route for cocaine, an increasingly popular drug originating in South America, and the source of vast quantities of psychotropic substances.

The financial problems faced by Mexico since late December 1994 are the result of a balance of payments crisis which developed earlier during the year when a number of economic and political developments came together to disrupt its financing plans. A combination of events — an increase in US interest rates, political ferment and presidential elections in Mexico, plus capital flight from Mexico which was prompted, in turn, by lax monetary policy during the last weeks of the Salinas administration — all helped contribute to, and culminated in, a collapse of the peso at the end of 1994. As a result, the incoming administration of President Ernesto Zedillo found itself in the position of having to devalue the peso, a move that sparked severe economic repercussions, including a crisis of confidence that spread beyond Mexico to affect other emerging markets as well.

Using an innovative survey of protest participants and nonparticipants from five major street demonstrations in Mexico City in 2011 and 2012, this study tests the assumption that influences on protest participation vary across different types of events; namely, ritual demonstrations and reactive protests. The comparison is based on two assumptions: that these are two of the dominant forms of protest in contemporary Latin America, and that specifying the context for different types of social movement participation provides a better understanding of the individual mobilization process for groups seeking to defend their rights or gain new benefits. The comparative analyses reveal some crucial differences. Political interest and previous political experience are more influential in the decision to take part in reactive demonstrations. For ritual demonstrations, the decision to participate tends to be driven more by personal and organizational connections.

Postwar El Salvador and Guatemala have undertaken to reform and democratize the state and to support the rule of law. Each country entered the 1990s hobbled by a legacy of authoritarian rule, while a corrupt and politicized judiciary offered virtually no check on the abuse of power. Because the judiciary has performed poorly as an institution of horizontal accountability, this article examines the performance of a new “accountability agency,” the Human Rights Ombudsman. The article discusses the context in which the office was established and developed in each country, perceptions of its performance, and political responses as the office began to perform its function of holding public officials accountable in their exercise of power. Unfortunately, this new office may fall prey to the same weaknesses that have plagued older institutions in both countries.

This article promotes the idea that multinational corporations have independent agency in the process of economic reform in Latin American host countries. Through a number of pooled cross-sectional time series analyses, it shows that accumulated foreign direct investment can affect policy reform in ways unanticipated by earlier theories predicated on the obsolescence of firms' influence after initial investment. The influence of firms varies across different reform areas, and competitive pressures lead firms to press alternately for liberal and illiberal reform measures. The study also considers sectoral issues, and argues that a preponderance of natural resource–oriented FDI can alter the impact of multinational investment on policy reform. Indexes of economic reform are measured against stocks of FDI and a number of political and economic control variables. Evidence shows that the dramatic increase in FDI in the region in recent years has bolstered firms' bargaining power and concomitant policy leverage.

This article examines candidate favorability among Colombian expatriates and Colombians in the home country in the 2010 Colombian presidential elections. It analyzes the influence of several socioeconomic, migratory, mobilizing, and contextual factors on candidate appraisal using a large exit poll conducted at Colombian consulates in five cities in the United States and Europe and five cities with high emigration rates in Colombia. Aside from differences in candidate favorability stemming from socioeconomic variables (education, income, and religious affiliation), Colombians living abroad largely evaluate candidates in ways similar to Colombians living in the country.