For the past 30 years, Chilean unionism has been shrinking. Through a comparison of the membership trajectories of 26 unions in two firms between 1990 and 2004, this article explains why some unions defied this trend and how their success affected overall union density in their firms. It argues that the unions that experienced the most favorable membership outcomes were those that, at key junctures of firm restructuring, earliest or most aggressively established a partnership relationship with management. However, in a context of great labor weakness, these cases of union accommodation took the form of exclusive patron-client exchanges, which exacerbated collective action problems and further eroded union density.

Since President Hugo Chávez was first elected in 1998, the Venezuelan opposition seems to have alternated between institutional and extra-institutional power strategies at different junctures. To help explain this pattern, this article constructs a novel theoretical framework from critical readings of both general theory and accounts of the Venezuelan opposition. It proposes that the strategies should be viewed as dialectical rather than discrete. On this basis, it finds that while the Venezuelan opposition has undergone important changes toward institutionalization in its composition, discursive emphasis, and strategic direction, close readings of opposition texts, interviews with opposition actors, and observations of street demonstrations all reveal continuity with previous rupturist and extra-institutional tendencies. Both strategies therefore must be considered to achieve a fuller, more comprehensive vision of the Venezuelan opposition; this conclusion has important theoretical implications for the study of opposition in the wider region.

Mercosur has survived several crises by resorting to presidential diplomacy, but it risks becoming an empty shell unless member states work to coordinate macroeconomic policies. Its survival depends on the outcome of domestic political struggles in Brazil and Argentina and on the harmonization of exchange-rate policies between the two countries. This article examines the Argentine-Brazilian “trade wars” provoked by successive devaluations of the Brazilian currency, aggravated in 2001 by the Argentine economic crisis. The social explosion in Argentina in December 2001 showed that domestic actors can successfully challenge proglobalization policies. To consolidate, Mercosur will have to address the democratic deficit while building supranational institutions and an effective dispute-settlement system.

In May 1996 Brazil's National Confederation of Industry (CNI) convened a meeting of industrialists in Brasilia for a mass show of unity and focused lobbying in favor of constitutional reform. Industrialists large and small heeded the call. Nearly three thousand of them from all over Brazil chartered planes and packed shuttles. Fortified by a morning of speeches demanding constitutional reforms, the industrialists fanned out over Brasilia in the afternoon to argue their case to members of the national congress. As if to demonstrate that it could not be intimidated, however, Congress chose that very afternoon to vote down a reform proposal backed by business. By the end of that year, it was clear that business had made little progress in pushing several amendments it supported.

By the application of fresh analytical approaches such as prosopography and the concepts of “secular trend” and “conjuncture” pioneered by the Annales school, historians are at last beginning to probe the social and political structures of Latin America in the national period. What before had been surmised or supposed, particularly in regard to the dominance of political and social life by elites, can now be quantitatively confirmed, while the identification of secular trends permits the historian to penetrate behind the confusion of the incidentals to the basic characteristics of the different nations and their evolution over time.

The standard interpretation of Imperial Brazil (1822-1889) has until recently been that of a stable but anomalous monarchy dominated for most of its existence by its ruler Pedro II. The aging of the Emperor, the abolition of slavery on which the regime is conceived as being based, the discontents of the military, and the inevitable advance of Republicanism have been taken as the principal causes for the collapse of the Brazilian Empire on November 15, 1889.

For only the fifth time since 1978, the Dominican Republic held concurrent elections in 1994 for candidates at every level of government — presidential, congressional and municipal. The most important of these contests, for the presidency, saw the incumbent, Joaquίn Balaguer, returned to the post he has held for so long, defeating his principal challenger, José Francisco Peña Gόmez, by a margin of 22,281 votes. The most recent election, on 16 May 1994, proved to be just as traumatic and incident-prone as those that preceded it, dating back to the first democratic election in 1978. Unlike the last election (in 1990), however, in which Balaguer also won a narrow victory, this time the charges of electoral fraud were well-documented and the accuracy of the tally widely disbelieved, not just domestically but internationally as well.

This article explores practices of political clientelism in a native village in Mexico City during recent elections (2006, 2012), aiming to create more conceptual clarity and to demonstrate the usefulness of ethnographic approaches. Seen from the clients' and the brokers' perspective, political clientelism and vote buying are two different practices, carried out in different ways, with different degrees of legitimacy. The problem-solving network studied here bridges the gap between the citizen and the state, while the political operators hope to be rewarded with public employment. In this case, one candidate-patron changed parties a few months before the 2012 elections, and the electoral statistics provide indications of the numerical effectiveness of his clientelist network. Multiparty competition, instead of undermining clientelist practices, appears to “democratize” them.

This article outlines the factors that explain changes in the rules of the game in Chile after the restoration of democracy in 1990. It looks particularly at the reasons why the right-wing parties—strong defenders of the constitution imposed by General Augusto Pinochet in 1980—accepted reforms that eliminated many of what the literature has termed authoritarian enclaves. The article explains this shift by observing significant changes in the political context that, in turn, affected the priorities of veto players. In this context, short-term strategic calculations by the right-wing parties, aiming to achieve a new balance of power less detrimental to their interests, opened a window of opportunity that led to congressional approval of important reforms. Particular institutional features of the Chilean political system—party discipline and a balance of power in favor of the executive—also helped the political actors to reach agreement.

Youth politics in contemporary Latin America diverge from those of previous generations. Increasingly decoupled from parties, unions, and the state, young people glide seamlessly across previously assumed boundaries: culture and politics, individual and organization, subjectivity and collectivity, virtual and “real.” This article presents findings from a systematic review of research on youth politics and demonstrates the new direction through three main categories: repression, incorporation, and exclusion, relationships between state institutions and youth identities; generational, cultural, and digital lenses, the innovative trends for theorizing current patterns of youth politics; and unsettling politics, the fusion and diffusion of youth political dexterity. The article concludes by highlighting current strengths and proposing future steps to build on this new direction.

Theoretically based on Albert O. Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, this study examines three cases of rupture or exit by Mexican presidential contenders, in 1940, 1952, and 1988, and one “noncase,” in 1999, with a view to how dissidents' strategies shape political institutions. Mexico's PRI-dominated political system depended on its leaders' ability to create an equilibrium based on mutual incentives to remain loyal to the regime.

Venezuelan politics presents a puzzle to students of Latin America, and to anyone concerned with the comparative analysis of democratization and democracy. As the major countries of Latin America (and the majority of scholars) worked their way from authoritarianism through “transitions”to democracy and hopefully toward democracy’s consolidation, Venezuela moved in the opposite direction. After decades of political stability and social peace, beginning in 1987 Venezuela’s democratic order was shaken by widespread unrest and citizen disaffection, the decay of key parties and state institutions, attempted coups, and the impeachment and removal of the president in 1993.

This article presents a short summary of the world-systems perspective on globalization as relevant to considering the possibilities and probabilities of Guatemala’s prospects for democracy and development. Guatemala’s structural position in the larger global political economy is examined. The strategy of “globalization from below” as popular movement alliances’ response to neoliberal corporate globalization is considered in the Guatemalan context.

In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship between economic inequality and redistribution. The well-known hypothesis set forth by Meltzer and Richard (1981) states that larger income differences between the median voter and the average income earner should increase redistributive pressures in democratic regimes. Power Resource Theory (PRT), by contrast, argues that income inequality breeds power inequality and should dampen redistribution. Critical to both theories is the translation of redistributive interest into policy signals. This article considers protests as signals that increase the salience of inequality among voters. Results provide evidence that protests facilitate more progressive cash transfers in highly unequal environments but have modest effects in more egalitarian ones.

Amid the aura of urgency in which many today view hemispheric affairs, criticisms of the Organization of American States are legion. In both Latin America and the United States, there are growing numbers who believe that the only viable alternative to complete systemic collapse is a radical organizational transformation. For critics of the inter-American organization, there has been a sharp predilection to place the burden of their argument on either a cataloguing of bureaucratic ills or a polemic attack upon the problems and inconsistencies of United States involvement. And certainly various North American actions and policies have helped contribute to the present precarious position of the OAS.

Although one recent influential textbook on Latin America has characterized the decades immediately following the achievement of independence as “the long wait,” in Mexico at least, these years were marked by an intense political and ideological conflict which defined the direction of its future (Halperín Donghi, 1969: 134-206). The most perceptive student of the epoch, Edmundo O'Gorman (1960) traces within the confused welter of pronunciamientos and manifestos two great forces: the search for a providential leader and the desire for some form of democratic populism. An analysis of ideology cannot be separated from a consideration of society. The presidential power created by Benito Juárez and perpetuated by Porfirio Díaz operated outside the strict legal confines of the Constitution. At the same time, the failure of classic liberalism to express popular aspirations retarded social reform for over half a century. Without the sanction of theory, few such demands could be translated into law.

The October 1983 crisis in Grenada left little doubt that the Soviet and Cuban presence had been expanding in the Caribbean basin. But the October crisis did not answer questions regarding the extent of their actual influence there, nor the direction it might take in the future, nor even what the most appropriate U.S. policy responses should be to that influence elsewhere in the region. Therefore, in the wake of the U.S. occupation of Grenada and the evidence it uncovered about the degree of Soviet and Cuban activity there, it is useful to examine the kind of situations that have encouraged the Soviets to expand their presence and/or influence in Latin America. At the same time, it equally is useful to examine the limitations or constraints on such an expanded presence or influence.

Clearly, Soviet policy in Latin America has been the product of two conflicting forces or tendencies.

This article investigates the impact of trade-based social clauses on labor rights enforcement. Drawing on insights from recent theoretical work on transnational advocacy networks and labor rights, the study examines how transnational groups and domestic actors engage the labor rights mechanisms under the NAFTA labor side agreement, the NAALC. A statistical analysis of original data drawn from NAALC cases complements interviews with key participants to analyze the factors that predict whether the three national mediation offices review labor dispute petitions. This study suggests that transnational activism is a key factor in explaining petition acceptance. Transnational advocates craft petitions differently from other groups and, by including worker testimony in the petitions, signal to arbitration bodies the possibility of corroborating claims through contact with affected workers.

This brief article is designed to highlight an unfortunate discrepancy in the field of Latin American political economy. The field’s raison d’être has never been more compelling. Latin American societies have simultaneously been experiencing profound transformations—including democratic consolidation, demographic transition, and the growth of identity politics—and a palpable sense of déjà vu animated by the recovery of commodity prices and the return of populism. In a nutshell, the region is undergoing a deep economic transformation, which takes place in the context of unprecedented levels of political participation.

Latin American evangelicals have become a common presence in legislative politics. Brazil exemplifies the potential clout of evangelical legislators and a troubling tendency toward political corruption. This article explains the quality of evangelical interest representation by focusing on church organization and theology, arguing that evangelicals approach electoral politics via three different modes: rejection; participation as individual, politically engaged believers; and engagement as church corporate project. While individual participation is unrelated to political corruption, the corporate model fosters machine politics, characterized in Brazil by resource-based politics, narrow voter bases, and frequent party switching. We link these characteristics to evangelical involvement in two corruption scandals that occurred during the administration of President Lula da Silva. The analysis shows the central role of evangelical organization and theology in shaping interest representation and suggests future duplication of the church-as-political-machine model, particularly where the “Prosperity Theology” variant of pentecostalism is strong.

This article argues that social democratic and orthodox Marxist conceptualizations of politics are unable to “engage in solidarity” with many new forms of Latin American popular politics. Such movements challenge the politics of representation, the market economy, and the state form by reinventing territorialized experiments in self-government, which politicize place, subjectivities, and social relations. Developing a critique of these frameworks of political analysis, this article argues that conceptual categories combining the insights of autonomist or open Marxism and poststructuralism and the critical reflections and theorizations by Latin America's newest social movements enable a deeper engagement with such movements. This critique challenges academics committed to progressive social change to reexamine long-held notions about the nature and agents of social transformation and the epistemological categories that orient our research. It argues that if we fail to do this, then we risk becoming gatekeepers of the status quo.