Why do voters reward or punish the incumbent government? A number of studies show that economic performance often drives support, though the strength of this relationship is often conditional. This article suggests that economic voting may also be conditioned by the breaking and keeping of campaign promises. A number of presidents throughout Latin America have campaigned explicitly against neoliberal economic policies, only to pursue them aggressively once in office. This study argues that presidents who abandon their promises assert the executive's responsibility for the economy and raise the salience of economic issues in the next election. Consequently, voters respond rationally to these policy switches, rewarding them when they succeed and punishing them when they fail. Using data from 78 presidential elections across 18 countries, this study finds substantial evidence that broken promises exacerbate the consequences of poor economic performance and magnify the benefits of good economic performance.

Most accounts of the turmoil that shook Argentina in 2001–2 focused on the harmful impact of the financial environment, imprudent policymaking, and institutional weaknesses. These explanations paid little attention to the cultural frames and cognitive patterns that underlie the connection between civil society and political society. Based on a discourse analysis of Internet forums and presidential speeches, this article argues that the Argentine crisis cannot be fully grasped without considering the link between collective behavior and ingrained conceptions of national identity. The analysis finds that national myths and definitional questions of national purpose are key factors in the way citizens behave in the context of an economic and political crisis.

Brazil began the 1990s the same way it began the 1980s: in crisis. A decade ago, popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the political system was at an all-time high. As the legitimacy of the military regime installed in 1964 gradually dissipated, political and military elites turned their attention to the question of what kind of regime would be able to replace the one which was disintegrating. In one important aspect their vision coincided with the aspirations of the general population: the new political regime would have to be based on increased competition. Military elites would yield executive power, and the civilian politicians replacing them would agree to submit themselves to the popular verdict.

Scholars of Cuba have long linked Afro-Cubans' fate to the revolutionary government. As the government's influence on people's daily lives has declined over the past decade, the question arises of whether Afro-Cubans have sustained the gains they achieved in the revolution's first 30 years. This article uses survey data, collected in December 2000 from 334 Cuban families in Havana, to assess the impact of the post-1993 economic reforms on rising racial inequality in Cuba. It asks whether racial inequities occur in accessing dollars through state employment, self-employment, or remittances, and whether educational gains are tied to higher income. Results indicate that the structural means through which racial discrimination was once virtually eliminated through equal access to education and employment, and through which income levels became equalized according to educational level regardless of racial group, has lost its equalizing force in contemporary Cuba.

Mounting Anxieties, frustrations, and fears in Brazil effected a change of government by military force at the end of March of 1964. President Joáo Goulart fled to an Uruguayan exile. Congress, urged by the military, conferred supreme executive power on Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco. Many other sweeping changes followed. None was more complete than the about-face taken in foreign policy.

Castelo Branco spoke out early and unequivocally in his regime in favor of a return to more traditional policies. The graduation exercise of the foreign service school, the Instituto Rio-Branco, on July 31, 1964, provided the propitious place and moment for him to outline the foreign policy goals of his government. He paid homage to the ideals consecrated by tradition: world peace, disarmament, selfdetermination, non-intervention, and anti-colonialism. Moving into the more pragmatic realm of national interests, the president emphasized that his government's foreign policy aimed to increase national power through social and economic development.

This article addresses the relationship between institutionalized citizen participation at the municipal level and clientelism. It argues, contrary to what the literature has suggested, that the institutionalization of local citizen participation does not necessarily lead to the erosion of clientelism. Drawing on a comparative case study of participatory experiences in two Mexican municipalities, León and Nezahualcóyotl, this study argues that participation does matter, but that not all types of participation have the same effect on state-society relations. Institutional design is important in assessing the significance of popular participation in defining the relationship between the state and its citizens, but informal practices are even more important determinants of citizens' level of autonomy in institutionalized participatory mechanisms. This level of autonomy, in turn, determines the potential for such local institutions to become a means to overcome clientelism as the mechanism traditionally characterizing state-society relationships in Mexico.

This article shows that the institutional design of Argentine federalism allows for differences in the protective scope of the provincial domestic violence laws. It holds that the broad legislative capacities of subnational districts enable the working of political and social local factors, which, in turn, determine heterogeneity in these laws’ protective scope. It analyzes, compares, and measures 37 laws on domestic violence sanctioned between 1992 and 2009. It advances a methodology to measure their differences and it evaluates the impact local factors have on legal variations across jurisdictions. The article shows that the protective scope of these laws is determined by the intensity of the local electoral competition and by the strength of women's organizational capacity. Results also show that time matters insofar as it allows for the diffusion of more protective laws.

This article examines whether the free-market, open-economy model adopted by Chile's civilian, democratically elected administrations — of Patricio Aylwin (after March 1990) and Eduardo Frei (after March 1994) — has affected the country's distribution of income and degree of poverty and, if so, how. The free-market model was inherited from the military regime headed by General Pinochet (1973-1990) and adopted by his civilian successors almost without modification despite the fact that the post-1990 administrations were explicitly committed to making alleviation of poverty and reduction of inequalities in income a top priority. The article examines the extent to which the determinants of poverty and inequality have changed (if, indeed, they have changed at all) since the end of the military regime in 1990 — and if so, why.

In recent years, a violent social and political upheaval has been underway in Central America. A revolutionary regime has taken power in Nicaragua, and leftist guerrilla forces have begun to threaten the survival of the existing governments in El Salvador and Guatemala. Geographically surrounded by these three politically unstable countries, Honduras, in contrast, has remained remarkably free of serious internal revolutionary pressures. Although Honduras shares many of the problems of poverty, inequality, dependency, and authoritarian tradition that are associated with its neighbors, Honduran authorities have managed to maintain political order.

Polttical Conflicts between Bolivia and its peasantry over the production and distribution of the coca leaf during the 1980s is the focus of this essay. The first section describes several of Bolivia's comparative disadvantages (among Andean producer nations) for waging effective coca leaf control programs. Following is an analysis of the interplay and results of specific statepeasant conflicts during the 1982-1988 period of civilian democratic rule. To give a Bolivian contextual backdrop to these conflicts, aspects of the national political culture which shape the terms and conditions of the struggle over controversial drug-related issues are explained. A final section presents a brief analysis of the Chapare region's prospects for a successful coca leaf eradication program.

Explanations for the Bolivian government's ineffectual campaign against the coca leaf and cocaine industry range from its status as a weak state to its fragile and deteriorating economy (Healy, 1986). Bolivia's political system holds the world record for changes in government by way of the coup d'etat.

In contemporary Latin America whenever there are successive free elections turnover tends to occur at every opportunity. That is, incumbent parties or coalitions seldom win; if they do, they almost invariably show diminished electoral support compared to that of the previous election.

The frequency of incumbent defeat seems especially remarkable in view of the traditionally strong Latin American presidency. The history of some Latin American countries has been replete with continuismo (the perpetuation of a president or regime in office through manipulation of formal constitutional procedures). Even in those polities with a record of frequent adherence to constitutional norms, the president has tended to be “strong,” at least compared to other governmental institutions, such as legislatures, courts, and state or local governments. Unsatisfied with the term “presidential,” in the North American sense, Jacques Lambert calls Latin American governments “regimes of presidential dominance” (Lambert, 1967).

Unlike churches in the rest of Latin America, those in Cuba did not embark at the outset of the 1960s on a period of liberalization and innovation in theology, pastoral forms, lay participation and political strategies. Rather, the coming to power in 1959 of a revolutionary government and the initiation of substantial societal restructuring reinforced conservatism within the churches. Strong challenges to the legitimacy of the government by the churches from 1959 through 1961 were not effective due largely to institutional limitations and their identification as bulwarks of prerevolutionary structures. Hence, in spite of a marked increase in participation and contributions, the churches' counterrevolutionary stance had limited impact. Contributing to this was the exodus of many religious activists to the United States and Spain, and a turning in upon themselves by the churches which came to serve as refuges from change.

Do Latin America’s popular religions contribute to the formation of citizens and the development of civil society—the infrastructure of democracy—in ways that parallel the operation of the religious factor in the development of North American democracy as perceived by Tocqueville? Examining evidence prompting both negative and positive responses, this essay argues that Catholicism, Pentecostalism, and Afro-Brazilian Spiritism all contain tendencies that contribute to the development of pluralist democracy in the Latin American republics.

Although there is a substantial literature examining public confidence in the judiciary in developed nations, scholars have paid scant attention to analyzing judicial confidence in developing countries. Building on extant work regarding developed nations and introducing original hypotheses in the context of developing nations, this research explains influences on public confidence in Latin American judiciaries by developing a theory that focuses on the potential influences of institutional quality, experiences, and individual attitudes. The hypotheses are empirically tested with the rich individual-level data compiled by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 2006 survey. The results indicate that a variety of factors influence public confidence in Latin American courts; the role of context explains points of consistency and divergence with research on developed nations.

Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.

One of the most important developments in Latin America since the end of World War II, has been the rapid growth of all major cities, generally at a pace well beyond the rate of growth of the rural areas as well as the countries as a whole. The expansion due to normal growth (high birth rates coupled with declining death rates and increased longevity) is at times high. However, such growth has often been augumented sharply due to a seemingly irreversible flow of migrants from the rural areas. And among the many problems and difficulties raised by such migration, the very large squatter shantytowns are perhaps the most obvious as well as the most misunderstood developments that have resulted. Both popular journalists and academic social scientists have commented at length and in lurid terms about the "belts of mushrooming misery" and the "festering sores" which these squatter settlements supposedly comprise.

Over the past decade, drug consumption has increased in Colombia and Mexico, countries traditionally concerned with drug production and trafficking. Governments and observers have associated this growth with spikes in violence. Drawing on drug consumption surveys and fieldwork in four cities, this study argues that contrary to this perception, there is no automatic connection between domestic drug markets and violence. Violence depends on whether large drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) control low-level street dealers and on whether those DTOs have a market monopoly at the local level. When dealers are independent, violence might be sporadic, but when DTOs control dealers, violence can explode (given competition between DTOs) or implode (if one organization holds a monopoly). Control over dealers provides DTOs not only income but also informants and armed muscle. This article also shows that domestic drug markets are not new, and have grown incrementally in the past two decades.

The scope and intensity of political violence in a democratizing society are influenced particularly by regional opportunities arising from state weakness that favor the formation of coalitions against the state. The illicit market for coca in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley fostered a tactical alliance between Shining Path guerrillas and coca producers that funded Shining Path’s national presence. Falling coca prices in the 1990s, combined with key state-strengthening measures under the Fujimori government, destroyed that relationship and weakened the‘ guerrilla organization.

In a global context in which authoritarian regimes often hold elections, defeating dictators at the polls can play a key role in transitions to democracy. When the opposition is allowed to campaign for votes in such elections, there are strong reasons to believe that its efforts will be more persuasive than those of the authoritarian incumbent. This article examines the effect of televised campaign advertising on vote choice in the 1988 plebiscite that inaugurated Chile's transition to democracy. Using matching to analyze postelectoral survey data, it shows that the advertising of the opposition's no campaign made Chileans more likely to vote against dictator Augusto Pinochet, whereas the advertising of the government's yes campaign had no discernible effect. These findings suggest that the no campaign played an important causal role in the change of political regime.