History will record the almost-frenzied pace with which negotiators from Mexico, the United States, and Canada have proceeded to draft a treaty that will change drastically the nature of economic relations among the three nations. Three nations with severe social and economic problems, declining competitiveness in the global economy, and virtually no plans for remedying their domestic shortcomings have rushed to drop their borders. Ironically, this act will further reduce their ability to provide domestic remedies for their current problems. It casts these three economies into the unpredictable winds of free trade precisely at a time when a truly-conservative policy would have dictated economic reform at home and efforts to resolve, first, the major domestic crises in each.

The problem of the brain drain—movement of highly skilled personnel across national borders—has been an object of increasing concern during the last two decades. International agencies, especially those linked with the United Nations, have seized the subject as one of the clearest manifestations of international imbalances in favor of the developed’ countries (United Nations, 1971; Kidd, 1967).

It is clear, despite variations across countries, that loss of professionals represents a significant cost for many nations, especially less developed ones. Recent data from three widely different countries may be used to illustrate such costs: from 1955 to 1968 Colombia lost 20,506 professionals to the United States; at an estimated cost of U.S. $8,000 for the training of each individual, Colombia made a contribution to the “development” of the United States of $164,048,000 during the period.

From early colonial times to the end of the nineteenth century, urban life in Brazil centered in half a dozen coastal enclaves, each containing an area of export-oriented agriculture, focused on a single dominant port city. Three such capitals topped the urban hierarchy—Salvador (Bahia), Rio de Janeiro, and Recife (Pernambuco; see Figure 1). All arose on an economic base of sugar plantations, producing for an international market; Rio added gold exports in the eighteenth century and coffee in the nineteenth. Until just before independence, the Portuguese colonial capital at Salvador held first rank in size, political importance, and commercial wealth. Rio de Janeiro, seat of the central government after 1763, became the national metropolis under the Empire (1822-1889) and the Old Republic (1889-1930); its hegemony was challenged only in the twentieth century by the rise of industrial São Paulo (Conniff et al., 1971; Cowell, 1973).

This article studies the processes of nomination and appointment to the Supreme Federal Tribunal in Brazil made by Presidents Sarney through Lula da Silva. It shows that in relations with the Senate, presidential anticipation prevails over presidential dominance. Brazilian presidents are successful appointers because they invest great effort in the moment of selection, when potential candidates are tested in the juridical and political communities. As a consequence, a uniform Senate approval of candidates coexists with a differential pattern of candidate recruitment. Sometimes presidents can select close candidates from their government; sometimes first-choice candidates are ruled out for lack of consensus. The type of coalition the president heads and the number of vacancies available affect the president's chances of imposing a candidate. The filter posed by center-right parties in the Senate induces the selection of nominees with centrist preferences.

Why do some candidates prefer to use clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters while others do not? Building on existing explanations that highlight the importance of voters’ demand for particularistic goods and parties’ capacities to supply goods and monitor voters, this article focuses on candidates’ political careers. It argues that how candidates begin mobilizing voters to participate in rallies and elections becomes crucial in explaining their preferences to use clientelism. Candidates who receive a salary based on their ability to mobilize voters—paid party activists—are more likely to use clientelism than candidates who are not paid for their political work, unpaid party activists.

The last two decades or so have seen academic interest in urban Latin American history mature to the point where questions of cultural realities have taken on greater complexity and importance. For reasons bound up with the socioeconomic factors usually studied first, the period between 1870 and 1930 seems fated to be especially attractive. That was the period, after all, when the neocolonial order came of age and, with it, the cultural possibilities born of greater wealth, a larger leisure class, an urban way of life in the expanding port and administrative centers, and the greater access to European cultural models through travel and luxury imports.

This article aims to analyze the impact of domestic politics and international changes that influence Brazilian positions regarding regional integration processes in South America, particularly the Southern Common Market, Mercosur. The dynamics of the international system and their impact on the evolution of the elite's perception of the role the country should play in the world are important variables for understanding these positions. The state's postures in relation to integration were and are based on a real interest, but this interest is also linked with the objective of ensuring better conditions for participation in other international arenas. Starting with the hypothesis that transformations in the international setting have strongly influenced Brazil's positioning, the elements of continuity and change in the country's behavior toward Mercosur are identified, with domestic politics as the main explanation.

The Process of the transition from authoritarianism to more representative forms of government has become a major subject of the scholarship on Latin American politics today (O'Donnell, et al, 1986; Malloy and Seligson, 1987; Stepan, 1989; Diamond et al, 1988-1990; Lowenthal, 1991). Given this interest, as expressed by the growing literature in this area, little attention has been paid to the transition process now going on in Paraguay, which is now emerging from one of Latin America's most long-standing authoritarian regimes.

A number of studies testify to the authoritarian nature of Paraguay's government and society. Johnson indicates that Paraguay ranked either 18th or 19th—out of 20 Latin American nations ... in 9 successive surveys of democratic development, carried out at 5-year intervals from 1945 to 1985 (Jonnson> 1988). A longitudinal study of press freedom found that Paraguay was invariably placed in the category of “poor,” or even “none,” between 1945-1975 (Hill and Hurley, 1980). When Palmer applied his 5 indicators of authoritarianism (nonelective rule, coups, primacy of the military, military rule, executive predominance) to the countries of Latin America, Paraguay consistently ranked first in its degree of authoritarianism (Palmer, 1977).

This study argues that the costs associated with El Salvador's dollarization clearly outweigh the benefits and that the decision to dollarize was prompted not only by the need to promote economic growth, but also by the impluse to serve the interests of the financial sector and the large entrepreneurs who control the ruling ARENA party. Although the policy facilitates investment and international financial transactions, it has a negative effect on the poor by increasing inequality. To develop this argument, the authors discuss the socioeconomic and political situation in El Salvador at the time of dollarization, examine the Law of Monetary Integration, and analyze die effect of the dollarization policy on the poor.

Conditional cash transfer programs may boost the electoral fortunes of incumbents among beneficiary groups, but do they also influence recipient attitudes toward state legitimacy? This article examines the relationship between Brazil's Bolsa Família program and recipients’ sense of the Brazilian state's political legitimacy, from 2007 to 2014. Using AmericasBarometer data and propensity score matching, this study provides evidence that targeted cash benefits correlate with citizens’ views of the state, but that this relationship is limited to increasing trust in core state institutions, local government, and incumbent political actors. Diffuse dimensions of regime legitimacy, including recipients’ sense of political community, support for regime principles, and retrospective perceptions of national economic performance, are largely unaffected by the receipt of targeted benefits. Over time, the evidence also suggests that the impact of program receipt on these measures of support remains largely unchanged.

Haitians have been migrating to the United States in significant numbers since the rise to power of Francois Duvalier over a quarter century ago. A few who have been able to meet the strict eligibility criteria of U. S. immigration law have entered as legal immigrants. Perhaps as many as 300,000 others have entered illegally, or have overstayed the terms of their temporary visas. A diverse population composed of professionals and businessmen, students and shopkeepers, journalists, small land holders, and illiterate peasants, it is impossible to capture their individual reasons for leaving Haiti and coming to the United States in a single all-inclusive phrase.

Haiti is the poorest country in this hemisphere. Nearly all who leave to come to the United States are aware that they are trading malnutrition, negligible educational opportunities, and a subsistence standard of living for the greater opportunities afforded by life in America.

Like many other Latin American business communities, Brazilian business leaders sharply increased their political mobilization in the 1980s. They were responding to the context of economic and policymaking uncertainty that emerged in the New Republic (1985), the regime following the end of military rule. Two broad concerns lay at the heart of their mobilizing efforts. First, business leaders had come to believe that Brazil needed a new strategic program for economic development. Import substitution industrialization was widely perceived as an exhausted model. Thus, a number of business leaders believed it was necessaty to begin a dialogue about the country’s developmental priorities. These business leaders, moreover, hoped to reverse the tendency under the Ernest0 Geisel administration (1964–85) to exclude business groups from policy making.

In the 1980s and 1990s, economic crisis produced ideological convergence in many Latin American party systems. Much scholarship explores how this convergence frequently provoked system change that enabled renewed ideological differentiation, but little research examines instances where convergence persisted without destabilizing the system. Through comparative historical analysis of Dominican continuity amid regional change, this study identifies factors that sustain or challenge party systems. Then, through analysis of Americas Barometer surveys, it assesses the causal mechanisms through which these factors shape support for the traditional Dominican parties. The findings demonstrate that maintaining programmatic and clientelist linkages facilitates continuity. In addition, the article argues that the threats political outsiders pose to existing party systems are constrained when people excluded from the system are divided and demobilized. In the Dominican case, Haitian immigration divides the popular sector while Dominicans abroad sustain ties to the parties, with both migration flows facilitating party system continuity.

A number of excellent studies of the U.S.-Mexican border have indicated that the border is occasionally a barrier but more often a permeable membrane through which goods, services, and people can filter. Employment practices and reciprocal trade across the border, together with tourism, have increased the need for policy cooperation among the jurisdictionally distinct but functionally integrated border communities. Our study represents an exploratory effort to find out how border cities are responding to this imperative of greater policy cooperation despite the presence of an international boundary. We selected the cities of Laredo and Nuevo Laredo for our first analysis of policy cooperation because our preliminary investigations of twin cities had persuaded us that relations between the Laredos were numerous, complex, and friendly. The two cities were obviously interdependent; the incentives to achieve a cooperative community appeared to be strong.

This article argues that civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only in terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a spectrum of roles and missions. It also argues that achieving effectiveness requires institutional development as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Currently in Latin America, the focus in civil-military relations remains exclusively on civilian control. While there is a growing awareness of the need for analysis beyond asserting control over the armed forces, so far nobody has proposed or adopted a broader analytical framework. This article proposes such a framework, and employs it to analyze differences among four major South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The explanation for the differences identified by use of the framework is found in the incentives of civilian elites in Chile and Colombia, who have recognized serious threats to national security and defense.

Throughout Latin America, democratic political structures reflect liberal conceptualizations of democracy. Since the election of Hugo Chávez, Venezuela has emerged as an exception, with President Chávez sponsoring initiatives designed to foster participatory democracy. This article draws on the Venezuelan case in an effort to gain insight on the malleability of citizens' definitions of and attitudes toward democracy. Two key findings emerge. First, in data gathered ten years into the Chávez presidency, the vast majority of Venezuelans still define democracy in liberal terms, whereas relatively few have embraced participatory conceptualizations. Second, although Venezuelans as a whole are highly supportive of democracy as a form of government, no evidence is found that either support for Chávez or defining democracy in terms of participation corresponds with higher favorability toward democracy. Together, these findings suggest that Venezuela's political transformation has produced little or no discernible effect on mass sentiment regarding democracy.

The central purpose of this paper is to show that the character of Peruvian national politics changed substantially during the century after independence from Spain and that a focus on the shifting relations between the central government and social and economic power in the private sector is crucial for appreciating the significance of these political developments and for comprehending their sources. Clearly a wide variety of forces conditioned the organization and exercise of political power in nineteenth-century Peru, but historical interpretations that stress the roles of economic elites (e.g., Bourricaud, 1970), foreign interests (Yepes del Castillo, 1972) or leaders’ personalities (Pike, 1967) obscure the magnitude of these political changes and do not adequately explain them.

Segmentation in the labor markets refers to the fact that a single homogeneous market for labor, as assumed by conventional theory, does not exist. Its definition varies according to different authors. This article will refer to the concept as it is used in the discussion of economic development in Latin America: that is, that created by the type of development which generates a segmentation of the productive structure and, in turn, of the labor markets.

The European Union’s attempts to strengthen ties with Latin America relate to a broader international strategy of demonstrating that it is a “global player” and attaining the image of a “civilian power.” Yet many observers suspect that European aid is simply instrumental to trade and investment promotion and other interests. They question whether the EU’s strong position as a donor in Latin America means that Latin America is strongly important to the EU. This article reviews the history, context, and latest trends in EU aid to Latin America, then looks at the prospects for a biregional partnership.

The Peru-Ecuador boundary issue is the oldest continuing border dispute in the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore,

In 1942, four such friendly nations brought Peru and Ecuador together, after a short but bitter war between them, to settle their differences once and for all by signing a treaty of “Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries,” known as the Rio Protocol. These four countries were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. Their representatives also signed that treaty, “as guarantors that the Protocol would be faithfully executed....” (McBride, 1949: 2-3).