Many existing explanations of electoral volatility have been tested at the country level, but they are largely untested at the individual party level. This study reexamines theories of electoral volatility through the use of multilevel models on party-level data in the lower house elections of 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2012. Testing hypotheses at different levels, it finds that irregular institutional alteration increases electoral volatility for all the parties in a country, but the effect is more significant for the presidential party. At the party level, the results show that while a party that is more ideologically distinctive than other parties tends to experience lower electoral volatility, party age is not a statistically significant factor for explaining party volatility.

The persistence of long-term poverty among sectors of the urban and rural population in less-developed countries (LDCs), as well as in the so-called developed world, has resulted in the formulation of a diversity of interpretations by theoreticians and policy-makers seeking to comprehend the life of the poor, and for political, economic, and moral reasons to develop solutions to alleviate poverty. Recognition of the failure of the Accelerated Growth Model to produce adequate redistribution of resources and income throughout society through the “filter down” effect has led to changes in emphasis in poverty-related research during the past two decades. There has been a shift in focus away from measurements of absolute poverty, the insufficiency of basic needs to ensure survival, toward the clarification of the determinants of relative poverty, the social inequality experienced by those in the bottom segment of the income distribution within a given society.

While financial globalization has created powerful incentives for Latin American governments to privatize old age pension systems, reliance on short-term capital flows has also constrained the ability of cash-strapped governments to enact that reform. Analysis of the technocratic process of pension reform in Argentina and Brazil provides evidence. Instead of simply generating unidirectional pressures for structural pension reform, financial globalization has created a double bind for Latin America's capital-scarce governments, fostering long-term incentives to privatize pension systems while heightening the risk of punishment in the short term.

The Caribbean Basin surged into political prominence shortly before the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981. Growth throughout the region had collapsed under the weight of the second round of oil price hikes, recession in the United States and other industrialized countries, falling commodity prices, and rising interest rates. Public policy responses in most countries compounded these difficulties by failing to adjust rapidly enough to the external situation or to adopt the structural reforms needed to ensure broadly based growth on a sustainable basis. In the eyes of the administration, improving the economic situation was central to defusing the security threat it perceived in the political developments of several countries in the region.

Scholars debate whether the recent conversion of millions of Latin Americans to evangelical Protestantism bodes well for democratic participation or reinforces authoritarian culture and practices. Using a resource model, this study examines the link between participation in religious organizations, political engagement, and political participation in Brazil and Chile. Survey data indicate that religious organizations, particularly Protestant ones, can provide skills that members can transfer to political activity; and that different religions can result in different politics.

During the past twelve years almost half a million Cubans have sought refuge in Miami. Among them were over 14,000 unaccompanied children between 6 and 18 years of age. This article tells for the first time the story of how the children's exodus began. It covers the period between the middle of November 1960, when we first became aware of the need, and 1 February 1961, when I met with the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare to brief him on the plight of the unaccompanied children among the refugees. Two days later, President Kennedy announced a government aid program for Cuban refugees which included money for the care of unaccompanied children, “the most troubled group among the refugee population.”

About 4:30 p.m. on 26 December 1960, Pan American World Airways Flight 422 from Havana touched down at Miami International Airport. There were few passengers, if any, on that flight who did not experience a real sense of relief as they descended from the airplane. Events in Cuba were rapidly moving toward a climax and those who could were joining the increasing exodus to Miami.

Events Since 1979 have steadily softened the long-dominant tone of rivalry in Brazilian-Argentine relations; and the two countries have established mutual levels of confidence, and institutional mechanisms, sufficient to support increased degrees of cooperation. The mutual understanding, formally confirmed during a landmark visit, in May 1980, by Brazilian President Joâo Figueiredo to Argentine President Jorge Videla, in Buenos Aires, is attributable to the pragmatic perception, in both capitals, that accumulated, but unaddressed, small grievances could mount into major, unnecessary points of attrition capable of sapping more important efforts.

One of the most significant developments in Latin American democracies since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization is the rise to power of political outsiders. However, the study of the political consequences of this phenomenon has been neglected. This article begins to fill that gap by examining whether the rise of outsiders in the region increases the level of executive-legislative confrontation. Using an original database of political outsiders in Latin America, it reports a series of logistic regressions showing that the risk of executive-legislative conflict significantly increases when the president is an outsider. The likelihood of institutional paralysis increases when an independent gets elected, due to the legislative body's lack of support for the president and the outsider's lack of political skills. The risk of an executive's attempted dissolution of Congress is also much higher when the president is an outsider.

For much of the twentieth century, Third World economies that were based upon import-substitution industrialization (ISI) were dominated by authoritarian regimes. When economic liberalization began to overtake many of these countries, however, as happened in recent years, the question arose as to whether authoritarian rule had not become anachronistic in mediating the relations between state and economy in the Third World.

The experience of Mexico strongly suggests that authoritarian rule remains a potent force in this era of economic change. Although Mexico's authoritarian government continued to retain power even in the presence of a liberal economic agenda, adopted during the early 1990s, it did find it expedient to make some adaptations in the system. The most significant of these, by far, was to make alterations in the ruling coalition that had governed the country since the early 1930s, rather than to embark upon a transition to democracy. These changes represented the regime's most critical initiative in attempting to meet, if not reconcile, the conflicting claims of authoritarianism on the one hand with the demands of economic liberalization on the other.

Brazil has an “African-origin” population that is proportionally more than four times larger that of African Americans in the United States, but white Brazilians mostly dominate electoral politics. How do ordinary citizens explain this phenomenon? Drawing on a large-sample survey of public opinion in the state of Rio de Janeiro, this article explores perceived explanations for nonwhite underrepresentation in the political arena. It also examines attitudes toward a particular black candidate, Benedita da Silva, to discern the state of negro identity politics. Most Brazilians in Rio de Janeiro cite racial prejudice to explain nonwhite exclusion, although whites do this less than nonwhites. Indicators of a racial undercurrent in political preferences suggest the importance of allegiances based on perceived common racial origins. Class is robustly associated with voting preferences, suggesting that, in contrast to the United States, class differences among nonwhites in Brazil could attenuate the success of negro identity politics.

Brazil, during the past thirty years, has undergone extensive social and economic change, amounting to a Brazilian “Industrial Revolution”. It is always somewhat arbitrary to assign dates to broad historical events, but, if establishment of a starting point for the Industrial Revolution would aid in its understanding, the best date is probably 1930. In the economic field, it is true, World War One represented a first step; in the cultural field, the Week of Modern Art (1922 in Sao Paulo) was the first significant manifestation of a really Brazilian culture. But in both cultural and economic fields, and especially in the political field, the Revolution of 1930 (when Getúlio Vargas came to power), and the world depression beginning in 1929, are the most important events. The phase that many sociologists, economists, and historians call either the National Revolution or the Industrial Revolution, the stage that W. W. Rostow prefers to call the take-off period, began at that time in Brazil.

In recent years, many Latin American countries (LACs) have embarked upon trade liberalization drives. This article reviews the radical changes in trade policy which this has entailed, together with the current and foreseeable results, and offers some policy recommendations regarding complementary measures.

The first sustained experience with trade liberalization in recent decades was in Chile, which launched a process in the 1970s that, by the end of that decade, had made its economy one of the most open in the world.

Like the reports of Mark Twain's death, the claims of a wave of democratization sweeping Latin America may be exaggerated. Yet the resurgence of electoral politics and the receding of military rule since the 1980s are trends that hold significance both for the future of Latin America and for inter-American relations. The transitions from bureaucratic-authoritarian rule in South America, and from the oligarchy-military alliances in Central America, have been a major focus of recent US policy attention. From the human rights approach of the Carter administration to the Reagan rollback doctrine, US policy became more actively engaged in controversial attempts to define and impose “democracy” in the region. After the end of the Cold War, US action or inaction remained key factors in the events surrounding the 1989 elections in Panama and the 1990 elections in Haiti and Nicaragua.

The Growth of the illegal, psychoactive drug industry has had a dramatic impact on Colombia. Most studies of the financial effects of this industry — mainly cocaine and its by products, but extending also to marijuana, quaaludes, other psychoactive substances, and, more recently, heroin — have focussed upon trying to estimate its size and determining its impact on the national economy. On the whole, the conclusion of most observers has been that its effects on the latter have been more negative that positive (Kalmanovitz, 1989; Reyes, 1990; Sarmiento, 1990; Urrutia, 1990; Thoumi, 1987).

Venezuela, once the most governable democracy in Latin America, is now a very fragile democracy. This article describes the formula that made Venezuela governable in the 1970s, traces its development in the 1960s, and explains why it broke down in the 1980s, leaving the democratic regime in danger in the 1990s. This historical perspective is necessary for anyone seeking to understand the prospects for democratic govemability in the Caldera government, for this administration will be expected to provide an alternative to the old formula. At the same time, it will be judged by comparison with the achievements of the old formula. If Caldera's democratic alternative is judged a failure, many Venezuelans will be inclined to give the nondemocractic alternative a second look. The historical perspective is also useful in deriving lessons that can be applied to other Latin American democracies. First, because Venezuela's formula worked well for a while, it helps to identify the elements of democratic govemability.

Voters’ ideological stances have long been considered one of the most important factors for understanding electoral choices in Chile. In recent years, however, the literature has begun to call this premise into question, due to several changes in the Chilean political landscape: the current crisis of representation, the high programmatic congruence between the two main coalitions, the decline in the political relevance of the dictatorship, and the rise of nonprogrammatic electoral strategies. In addition to these transformations, Chile switched to voluntary voting in 2012. This article studies whether ideology still informs electoral choices in Chile in an era of voluntary voting. It implements a conjoint survey experiment in low-to-middle-income neighborhoods in Santiago, where voters would be expected to be less ideological. It shows that candidates’ ideological labels are crucial for understanding the electoral decisions of a large part of the sample, particularly among likely voters.

In Nicaragua in July 1979, the Sandinista popular revolutionary movement finally succeeded in overthrowing the dictatorship of the Somoza family, which had been placed in power and then supported for many years by the U.S. government. Analysis of the revolution, even in conservative U.S. government sources (LeoGrande, 1979; Montgomery, 1980), has noted the greed and corruption of the Somoza dynasty and the poverty, illiteracy, and poor health of Nicaragua's masses. More liberal sources (Koeppel and Harvey, 1980; Burbach and Draimin, 1980) comment favorably on the democratic and social justice orientation of the new revolutionary government. Coverage of the revolution, however, has barely mentioned the east coast, an isolated, ethnically complex, and fascinating part of the country.

Why has the Cuban government been so successful in its system of social control, and why might that system's effectiveness now be on the wane? This study argues that Cuba combines formal and informal systems of control that simultaneously emphasize openness and rigidity. The formal system is geared to block all antihegemonic acts, particularly those that, if left unchecked, could become symbolic acts encouraging similar behavior that the authorities deem undesirable. The system favors reactive rather than proactive approaches, as exemplified by the rapid action brigades. Noninstitutionalized collective behavior is also taking place, as is the emergence of civil society.

The victory of the FMLN in El Salvador's presidential elections of March 2009 has been considered remarkable, given the dominance of ARENA in four consecutive presidential races from 1989 to 2004. Using individual-level data, this article examines the determinants of electoral support for both parties over the past 15 years. Several statistical models illuminate some of the factors that led to ARENA's dominance and ultimate defeat. A combination of variables associated with different theoretical models of voting helps explain the choices made by Salvadoran voters over the years. The most consistent predictors of vote have been voters' self-reported ideology and their evaluation of the incumbent government's performance. The 2009 turnaround relates to fundamental changes in the national and international context, and also to the selection of candidates.