Students may need to decide whether to invest limited resources evenly across all courses and thus end with moderate grades in all, or focus on some of the courses and thus end with variable grades. This study examined which pattern of grades is perceived more favorably. When judging competency, people give more weight to positive than negative information, in which case heterogeneous grades would be perceived more favorably as they have more positive grades than homogeneous moderate grades. Furthermore, high school students are told to demonstrate their passion in college applications. Nonetheless, people generally overweigh negative information, which can result in a preference for a student with homogeneous grades lacking extremely negative grades. The college admissions decisions in particular may also involve emphasis on long-term stable, consistent, and responsible character, which the homogeneous grades may imply. Study 1 found that laypeople, undergraduate students, and admissions officers preferred to admit a student with homogeneous grades to a college than a student with heterogeneous grades even when their GPAs were the same. Study 2 used a heterogeneous transcript signaling a stereotypic STEM or humanities student, and found that while undergraduate students were more split in their choices, laypeople and admissions officers still preferred a student with homogeneous grades. Study 3 further replicated the preference for a student with homogeneous grades by using higher or lower average GPAs and wider or narrower range of grades for the heterogeneous grades. Possible reasons and limitations of the studies are discussed.

Understanding whether preferences are sensitive to the frame has been a major topic of debate in the last decades. For example, several works have explored whether the dictator game in the give frame gives rise to a different rate of pro-sociality than the same game in the take frame, leading to mixed results. Here we contribute to this debate with two experiments. In Study 1 (N=567) we implement an extreme dictator game in which the dictator either gets $0.50 and the recipient gets nothing, or the opposite (i.e., the recipient gets $0.50 and the dictator gets nothing). We experimentally manipulate the words describing the available actions using six terms, from very negative (e.g., stealing) to very positive (e.g., donating) connotations. We find that the rate of pro-sociality is affected by the words used to describe the available actions. In Study 2 (N=221) we ask brand new participants to rate each of the words used in Study 1 from “extremely wrong” to “extremely right”. We find that these moral judgments can explain the framing effect in Study 1. In sum, our studies provide evidence that framing effects in an extreme Dictator game can be generated using morally loaded language.

We conducted two studies using a sample of students (Experiment 1, N=84) and the general public (Experiment 2, N=412) to assess the relative and unique effects of factors suggested by three major theories of law obedience: a utility-theoretic deterrence theory (Becker, 1968), the general theory of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), and the legitimacy model (Tyler, 1990). Six different types of low-level crime were considered. The probability of breaking the law increases with factors predicted by each of these theories, namely detection probability, expected fine, self-control, and legitimacy. All four factors uniquely contribute to predicting law obedience, effects are mainly additive, and no stable interaction effects are observed. The relative influence of the investigated factors varies between types of low-level crimes. This indicates that an integrative theory of why people obey the law needs to consider factors from various theories and allow for the relative influence of factors to differ among crimes. We observe systematic deviations from a basic utility-theoretic approach to law breaking. Individuals’ tendency to obey the law is much higher than predicted by an approach taking into account detection probability, expected fines, and benefits only. The robust effects of interindividual differences concerning legitimacy and self-control as well as the finding that the tendency to break the law decreases with increasing benefit of the crime also conflict with a basic utility-theoretic approach to law-obedience.

Birnbaum and Quispe-Torreblanca (2018) presented a frequentist analysis of a family of six True and Error (TE) models for the analysis of two choice problems presented twice to each participant. Lee (2018) performed a Bayesian analysis of the same models, and found very similar parameter estimates and conclusions for the same data. He also discussed some potential differences between Bayesian and frequentist analyses and interpretations for model comparisons. This paper responds to certain points of possible controversy regarding model selection that attempt to take into account the concept of flexibility or complexity of a model. Reasons to question the use of Bayes factors to decide among models differing in fit and complexity are presented. The partially nested inter-relations among the six TE models are represented in a Venn diagram. Another view of model complexity is presented in terms of possible sets of data that could fit a model rather than in terms of possible sets of parameters that do or do not fit a given set of data. It is argued that less complex theories are not necessarily more likely to be true, and when the space of all possible theories is not well-defined, one should be cautious in interpreting calculated posterior probabilities that appear to prove a theory to be true.

Schizotypy refers to the continuum of normal variability of psychosis-like characteristics and experiences, often classified as positive schizotypy (‘unusual experiences’; UE) and negative schizotypy (‘introvertive anhedonia’; IA). Here, we investigated the link between schizotypy and cognitive processing style and performance. A particular focus was on whether schizotypy is associated more with Type 1 (automatic/heuristic) than Type 2 (reflective/effortful) processes, as may be expected from findings of impaired top-down control in schizophrenia. A large sample (n = 1,512) completed online measures pertaining to schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences; O-LIFE), thinking style (Rational Experiential Inventory-10, Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale), and reasoning performance (Cognitive Reflection Test). Higher positive (UE) and negative (IA) schizotypy were associated with more pronounced Type 1 processing, i.e. greater self-reported Faith in Intuition (FI), lower Need for Cognition (NFC), lower Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT), and lower cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores. Canonical correlation analysis confirmed a significant association between UE and increased FI, lower AOT and lower CRT performance, accounting for 12.38% of the shared variance between schizotypy and thinking dispositions. IA was more highly associated with reduced NFC. These findings suggest that schizotypy may be associated with similar thinking dispositions to those reported in psychosis, with different patterns of associations for positive and negative schizotypy. This result informs research on reasoning processes in psychosis and has clinical implications, including potential treatment targets and refinements for cognitive therapies.

The anchoring effect, the assimilation of judgment toward a previously considered value, has been shown using various experimental paradigms. We used several variations of the sequential anchoring paradigm, in which a numeric estimate influences a subsequent numeric estimate on the same scale, to investigate how anchoring is influenced by multiple anchors, a comparison question, and by a newly introduced debiasing procedure. We replicated the anchoring effect using the sequential anchoring paradigm and showed that, when two anchors of opposite directions are presented, the second seems to influence a subsequent judgment somewhat more. A comparison of a target with another object before the numerical estimate was not sufficient to elicit anchoring, but it might have increased the sequential anchoring effect. The debiasing procedure, based on providing reference points on the numerical scale, prevented the sequential anchoring effect. The results are in accord with the scale distortion theory of anchoring, but other theories may also account for the observed findings with additional adjustments.

A substantial body of evidence suggests that favoring reason over intuition (employing an analytic cognitive style) is associated with reduced belief in God. In the current work, we address outstanding issues in this literature with two studies examining the relationship between analytic cognitive style (as measured by performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test) and belief in God. First, prior research focused on Judeo-Christian cultures, and it is uncertain whether the results generalize to other religious systems or beliefs. Study 1 helps to address this question by documenting a negative correlation between CRT performance and belief in God, r = −.18, in a sample of 513 participants from India, a majority Hindu country. Second, among 150 participants from the United Kingdom, Gervais et al. (2018) reported the first and (to date) only evidence for a positive relationship between CRT and belief in God. In Study 2, we assess the robustness of this result by recruiting 547 participants from the United Kingdom. Unlike Gervais et al., using the same items, we find a negative correlation between CRT and belief in God (r = −.19). Our results add further support to the argument that analytic thinking undermines belief in God.

The recently proposed integrated coherence-based decisions and search model (iCodes) makes predictions for search behavior in multi-attribute decision tasks beyond those of classic decision-making heuristics. More precisely, it predicts the Attraction Search Effect that describes a tendency to search for information for the option that is already attractive given the available evidence. To date, the Attraction Search Effect has been successfully tested using a hypothetical stock-market game that was highly stylized and specifically designed to be highly diagnostic. In three experiments, we tested whether the Attraction Search Effect generalizes to different semantic contexts, different cue-value patterns, and a different presentation format than the classic matrix format. Across all experiments, we find evidence for information-search behavior that matches iCodes’s information-search prediction. Therefore, our results corroborate not only the generalizability of the Attraction Search Effect in various contexts but also the inherent process assumptions of iCodes.

When people have invested resources into an endeavor, they typically persist in it, even when it becomes obvious that it will fail. Here we show this bias extends to people’s moral decision-making. Across two preregistered experiments (N = 1592) we show that people are more willing to proceed with a futile, immoral action when costs have been sunk (Experiment 1A and 1B). Moreover, we show that sunk costs distort people’s perception of morality by increasing how acceptable they find actions that have received past investment (Experiment 2). We find these results in contexts where continuing would lead to no obvious benefit and only further harm. We also find initial evidence that the bias has a larger impact on judgment in immoral compared to non-moral contexts. Our findings illustrate a novel way that the past can affect moral judgment. Implications for rational moral judgment and models of moral cognition are discussed.

Stastny and Lehner (2018) compared the accuracy of forecasts in an intelligence community prediction market to comparable forecasts in analysis reports prepared by groups of professional intelligence analysts. To obtain quantitative probabilities from the analysis reports experienced analysts were asked to read the reports and state what probability they thought the reports implied for each forecast question. These were called imputed probabilities. Stastny and Lehner found that the prediction market was more accurate than the imputed probabilities and concluded that this was evidence that the prediction market was more accurate than the analysis reports. In a commentary, Mandel (2019) took exception to this interpretation. In a re-analysis of the data, Mandel found a very strong correlation between readers’ personal and imputed probabilities. From this Mandel builds a case that the imputed probabilities are little more than a reflection of the readers’ personal views; that they do not fairly reflect the contents of the analysis reports; and therefore, any accuracy results are spurious. This paper argues two points. First, the high correlation between imputed and personal probabilities was not evidence of substantial imputation bias. Rather it was the natural by-product of the fact that the imputed and personal probabilities were both forecasts of the same events. An additional analysis shows a much lower level of imputation bias that is consistent with the original results and interpretation. Second, the focus of Stastny and Lehner (2018) was on the reports as understood by readers. In this context, even if there was substantial imputation bias it would not invalidate accuracy results; it would instead provide a possible causal explanation of those results.

We examined the trade-off between the cost of response redundancy and the gain in output quality on the popular crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk, as a partial replication of Kosinski et al. (2012) who demonstrated a significant improvement in performance by aggregating multiple responses through majority vote. We submitted single items from a validated intelligence test as Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) and aggregated the responses from “virtual groups” consisting of 1 to 24 workers. While the original study relied on resampling from a relatively small number of responses across a range of experimental conditions, we randomly and independently sampled from a large number of HITs, focusing only on the main effect of group size. We found that – on average – a group of six MTurkers has a collective IQ one standard deviation above the mean for the general population, thus demonstrating a “wisdom of the crowd” effect. The relationship between group size and collective IQ was characterised by diminishing returns, suggesting moderately sized groups provide the best return on investment. We also analysed performance of a smaller subset of workers who had each completed all 60 test items, allowing for a direct comparison between a group’s collective IQ and the individual IQ of its members. This demonstrated that randomly selected groups collectively equalled the performance of the best-performing individual within the group. Our findings support the idea that substantial intellectual capacity can be gained through crowdsourcing, contingent on moderate redundancy built into the task request.

Prospect Theory (PT: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) of risky decision making is based on psychological phenomena (paradoxes) that motivate assumptions about how people react to gains and losses, and how they weight outcomes with probabilities. Recent studies suggest that people’s numeracy affect their decision making. We therefore conducted a large-scale conceptual replication of the seminal study by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where we targeted participants with larger variability in numeracy. Because people low in numeracy may be more dependent on anchors in the form of other judgments we also manipulated design type (within-subject design, vs. single-stimuli design, where participants assess only one problem). The results from about 1,800 participants showed that design type had no effect on the modal choices. The rate of replication of the paradoxes in Kahneman and Tversky was poor and positively related to the participants’ numeracy. The Probabilistic Insurance Effect was observed at all levels of numeracy. The Reflection Effects were not fully replicated at any numeracy level. The Certainty and Isolation Effects explained by nonlinear probability weighting were replicated only at high numeracy. No participant exhibited all 9 paradoxes and more than 50% of the participants exhibited at most three of the 9 paradoxes. The choices by the participants with low numeracy were consistent with a shift towards a cautionary non-compensatory strategy of minimizing the risk of receiving the worst possible outcome. We discuss the implications for the psychological assumptions of PT.

This paper explores how context influences the evaluation of risky and ambiguous bets in the classic two-colour Ellsberg task. In three experiments context was manipulated via the presence/absence of additional bets against which the risky and ambiguous bets could be compared. In Experiment 1, three bets were added that were ‘intermediate’ in the sense that the information they yielded regarding the proportion of coloured balls lay between that provided by the risky and ambiguous bets. The presence of these intermediate bets reduced the price gap between the risky and ambiguous bets – and hence ambiguity aversion – by reducing the pricing of the risky bet relative to a condition in which only the risky and ambiguous bets were presented. In Experiment 2, we examined the individual effect of each of those intermediate bets on the valuations and found that the specific type of additional bet did not significantly affect the extent of the respective price gap. Finally, in Experiment 3, we explored the impact of the presence of ‘filler’ bets that were not necessarily in between the risky and ambiguous bets in terms of the information they yield. We found that having these filler bets also reduced ambiguity aversion. Overall, the findings suggest that the presence of additional bet(s) changes people’s valuations, and narrows the well-documented gap between the risky and ambiguous bets of the Ellsberg task, regardless of whether these additional bet(s) yield relatively more or less information.

Recent research on charitable donations shows that donors evaluate both the impact of helping and its cost. We asked whether these evaluations were affected by the context of alternative charitable causes. We found that presenting two donation appeals in joint evaluation, as compared to separate evaluation, increased the perceived benefit of the cause ranked as more important (Study 1), and decreased its perceived cost, regardless of the relative actual costs (Study 2). Finally, we try to reconcile an explanation based on perceived cost and benefit with previous work on charitable donations.

Following up on a recent debate, we examined advice taking in dyads compared to individuals in a set of three studies (total N = 303 dyads and 194 individuals). Our first aim was to test the replicability of an important previous finding, namely that dyads heed advice less than individuals because they feel more confident in the accuracy of their initial judgments. Second, we aimed to explain dyads’ behavior based on three premises: first, that dyads understand that the added value of an outside opinion diminishes when the initial pre-advice judgment is made by two judges rather than one judge (given that the dyad members’ opinions are independent of each other); second, that they fail to recognize when the assumption of independence of opinions does not hold; and third, that the resistance to advice commonly observed in individuals persists in groups but is neither aggravated nor ameliorated by the group context. The results of our studies show consistently that previous findings on advice taking in dyads are replicable. They also support our hypothesis that groups exhibit a general tendency to heed advice less than individuals, irrespective of whether the accuracy of their initial judgments warrants this behavior. Finally, based on the three assumptions mentioned above, we were able to make accurate predictions about advice taking in dyads, prompting us to postulate a general model of advice taking in groups of arbitrary size.

Bar-Hillel, Noah and Frederick (2018) studied a class of riddles they called stumpers, which have simple, but curiously elusive, solutions. A canonical example is: “Andy is Bobbie’s brother, but Bobbie is not Andy’s brother. How come?” Though not discussed there, we found that the ability to solve stumpers correlates significantly with performance on items resembling the CRT (Cognitive Reflection Test) but not with performance on items from the CRAT (Compound Remote Associates Test). We report those results here.

Previous research has reported that the gambler’s fallacy could be detected in goalkeepers’ behavior during penalty shootouts. Following repeated kicks in the same direction, goalkeepers were more likely to dive in the opposite direction on the next kick. We employ here a unique data collection approach and accurately measure the exact location of each ball when crossing the goal plane. This allows us to analyze how different definitions of the goal center width affect the results, and we show that this width indeed affects whether a gambler’s fallacy in goalkeepers’ diving behavior exists. We further augment the data with additional kicks from top international competitions and analyze the extended dataset. We also question whether previous treatments of kicking sequences adequately represent what goalkeepers consider as a run of consecutive kicks to the same side. A different representation of kicking sequences is provided and applied to the data. Overall, we find some evidence for the gambler’s fallacy after sequences of two or three kicks to the same side.

Despite its controversial status, the lie detection test is still a popular organizational instrument for credibility assessment. Due to its popularity, we examined the effect of the lie-detection test feedback on subsequent moral behavior. In three studies, participants could cheat to increase their monetary payoff in two consecutive phases. Between these two phases the participants underwent a mock polygraph test and were randomly given Deception Indicated (DI) or No Deception Indicated (NDI) assigned feedback. Then, participants engaged in the second phase of the task and their level of dishonesty was measured. Study 1 showed that both NDI and DI feedback (but not the control) reduced cheating behavior on the subsequent task. However, Study 2 showed that the mere presence of the lie-detection test (without feedback) did not produce the same effect. When the role of the lie detector as a moral reminder was cancelled out in Study 3, feedback had no effect on the magnitude of cheating behavior. However, cheaters who were given NDI feedback exhibited a lower level of physiological arousal than cheaters who were given DI feedback. These results suggest that lie detection tests can be used to promote honesty in the field, and that, while feedback type does not affect the magnitude of cheating, NDI may allow people to feel better about cheating.

Long-term thinking and voluntary resource sharing are two distinctive traits ofhuman nature. Across three experiments (N=1,082), I propose a causal connection:Sometimes people are generous because they think about thefuture. Participants were randomly assigned to either focus on the present orthe future and then made specific decisions in hypothetical scenarios. In Study1 (N=200), future-focused participants shared more money in a public dictatorgame than present-focused participants (+39%), and they were willing to donatemore money to charity (+61%). Study 2 (N=410) replicated the positive effect offuture-focus on dictator giving when the choice was framed as public (+36%), butfound no such effect when the choice was framed as private. That is, focusing onthe future made participants more generous only when others would know theiridentity. Study 3 was a high-powered and pre-registered replication of Study 1(N=472), including a few extensions. Once again, future-focused participantsgave more money to charity in a public donation scenario (+40%), and they weremore likely to volunteer for the same charity (+17%). As predicted, the effectwas mediated by reputational concern, indicating that future-orientation canmake people more generous because it also makes them more attuned to the socialconsequences of their choices. Taken together, the results suggest that focusingon the future promotes reputation-based generosity. Bystimulating voluntary resource sharing, a central function of human foresightmight be to support cooperation in groups and society.

The objective of this study was to adapt the Pre-Adolescent Decision-Making Competence Test to Turkish, which was originally developed in English by Weller, Levin, Rose and Bossard (2012) for assessing decision-making competence of children between the ages of 9 and 14. For this purpose; a) the test and instructions were translated into Turkish, b) the Turkish test was administered to a group of 398 students as a pilot, c) retest was administered to a group of 97 students, and finally, d) a group of 382 students was subject to a norm study. The Confirmatory Factor Analysis model created by the data of the pilot administration was well adapted, and one-factor model was verified for construct validity. As the construct of the test was altered, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis was performed on the data obtained from the norm study. A construct similar to that acquired from the data of the first test administration and the results obtained have even relatively better fit indices. Although the reliability values were less than what was expected, Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of internal consistency was similar to the results obtained from the original test.