Scholarship on the American Slave South generally agrees that John Eliot Cairnes’s The Slave Power provided a highly biased interpretation of the functioning and long-term viability of the southern slave economy. Published shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War, its partisanship is partly attributed to its clearly stated goal to shift British support from the secession states to the states of the Union. Thus, it is generally agreed, Cairnes sifted his sources to obtain the desired outcome. A more balanced use of the sources at his possession would have provided a very different outcome. This paper will challenge this general assessment of Cairnes’s book by examining in some detail two of Cairnes’s most important sources: Frederic Law Olmsted’s travelogues on the American Slave South and James D. B. De Bow's compilation of statistical data and essays in his Industrial Resources, etc., of the Southern and Western States (1852–53). By contrasting De Bow's use of statistical evidence with Olmsted's travelogues, my final purpose is to question the weight of evidence on the American Slave South. Cairnes aimed, I will argue, much more to balance the evidence than is generally acknowledged, but it is misleading to think that balancing a wide range of evidence washes out bias if this evidence itself is politically skewed, as is the rule rather than the exception.

Friedrich Hayek’s business cycle theory withered throughout the 1930s as he admitted that its underlying model of Böhm-Bawerkian roundaboutness was incomplete and inadequate. In 1934, Hayek started a two-volume book on capital theory, completing only one volume in 1941. Curiously, Hayek ([1941] 2009) cites John Hicks’s (1939) Value and Capital but not the financial measure of roundaboutness that Hicks suggested as a substitute for Böhm-Bawerkian roundaboutness. In 1967, in “The Hayek Story,” Hicks criticized the inexplicable lags. Hayek maintained his view that consumption was sticky and responded to Hicks with a mound-of-honey analogy. Nevertheless, Hayek maintained that his business cycle theory was fundamentally correct and continued to hope that others might someday discover a capital structure theory to undergird it. Toward fulfilling Hayek’s hope, we suggest augmenting the canonical stages of production with a sequestered-capital stage where products are invented, productized, and inventoried prior to launch, uncoordinated by observable prices.

The aim of this article is to explore whether there is a relevant impact of the Russian case and of Russian economic thought on the twentieth-century Western debate on economic development. It is argued that things Russian continued to have an impact on this notion, similar to the one we have found for the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Russia’s historical experience provided an important standpoint from which to think and rethink the meaning of economic development. As in the previous centuries, Russia’s paradoxical presence—between Europe and Asia, backward but also modern, an “apprentice” who now claimed the position of a teacher—helped to spark new thinking. The resistance of some of her intellectuals and policy makers to accept the certainties of the mainstream of the economic science contributed to raise doubts regarding the validity of Western conceptual frameworks.

We explore disciplinary boundary-making in geographical economics or “the new economic geography” with attention to the approaches taken by, and attempts at communication among, scholars with primary affiliations in economics, geography, and regional science. The Dixit-Stiglitz general equilibrium approach to monopolistic competition and increasing returns was applied to agglomeration and location by Paul Krugman, who had previously pioneered the “new trade theory” building on the Dixit-Stiglitz model, and, independently and slightly earlier, by Masahisa Fujita and his student Heshem Abdel-Rahman, starting from regional science, a tradition with its own departments, doctorates, conferences, and journals distinct from economics and geography. Economic geography, as studied by geographers, had already taken a quantitative and theoretical turn in the 1960s, reviving an earlier tradition of German location theory overshadowed within geography after World War II by areal differentiation. Another strand of economic geography pursued by geographers was influenced by economic theory but by non-neoclassical Marxian and Sraffian economics. Debates between these scholars raised questions whether these analyses were multidisciplinary, drawing on distinct disciplines, or crossed disciplinary boundaries (as when geographical economics in the style of economists is undertaken in geography departments) or transcends disciplinary boundaries, or involved the emergence of a new discipline.

This work presents the elements of economic analysis of law that occur in the thought of Gaetano Filangieri. In the pages of La Scienza della Legislazione the Neapolitan writer develops a utilitarian and economic investigation that pays attention to the judgments individuals make over social phenomena at the margin point. A proof of this development can be found in the explanation of the principle of decreasing marginal utility, argued in Head XXXI of Book III, which represents one of the most effective demonstrations that can be found before the end of nineteenth-century literature. The most remarkable fact is that, of all the five parts that compose the Filangierian work, the most rich in economic arguments is dedicated to “Criminal Laws.”

This article will point out this and other innovative results of the Filangerian analysis, and will also offer a reconstruction of the economic theory on crime and punishment presented in La Scienza della Legislazione. Filangieri’s criminal doctrine represents a significant example of the Enlightenment antecedents of “law and economics,” as well as the better known contributions made by Beccaria and Bentham.

A standard reading in the history of economic thought sets the classical stream of economists drawing upon the influence of Adam Smith (Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, etc.) in opposition to a “black box” of social thinkers (Louis Blanc, Fourierism, Saint-Simonianism, Jean de Sismondi, Robert Owen). This article, however, argues that, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Saint-Simonians and the liberal economist Jean-Baptiste Say can be seen to adopt convergent views during the famous controversy about commercial gluts.

First, we show that the Saint-Simonians and Say both see undersupply and lack of industry as causes of gluts. Next, we assert that their intellectual affinities are also visible in their belief that increasing production remains an appropriate solution for gluts. Finally, this convergence is explained by their common belief in industrialism: Saint-Simonianism is embedded in a French industrialist tradition for which Say can be taken as representative. We argue that their common belief in industry explains their convergence.

Since Moses Abramovitz's “classic” paper on “Catching-Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind” (1986) economists have become increasingly aware again of the significance of “social capability” for processes of economic change. During the past twenty years much research has been done on “soft” determinants of development and growth. Especially some of the so-called new institutionalists and evolutionary economists have now returned to the roots of the institutional research program by acknowledging that “ideas matter” in the process of institutional change. However, it is still often overlooked in the literature that the cognition of social reality is deeply intertwined with the general world-view prevailing in a given society. Certainly, such general world-views are partly determined by the level of economic and technological development, but they are also a reflection of deeply rooted cultural traditions. In particular, the highly divergent outcomes of economic and political transition in the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have brought the connection between culture, ideas, and institutions to the fore again (see, for example, Winiecki 2004). Therefore it is all but an accident that it is one of the leading transition experts who has recently called on economists to “seek a better understanding of the role of values and norms in shaping both ideas and institutions” (Roland 2004, p. 128).

Many historians of economic theory have studied how John Maynard Keynes developed his theory from A Tract on Monetary Reform through A Treatise on Money (hereafter the Treatise) to The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (hereafter the General Theory or GT). After the pioneering studies by Moggridge (1973) and Patinkin (1976, 1982), there followed Dimand (1988), Amdeo (1989), Clarke (1988, 1998), Meltzer (1988), Moggridge (1992), Skidelsky (1992), Laidler (1999), and others. This is no wonder, for the Keynesian Revolution remains the most singular phenomenon that economic theory and policy have ever seen. Although the objective of our entire project has been to shed new light on this important and interesting phenomenon, examining and analyzing the processes of theory-building and rebuilding which constitute Keynes's intellectual journey (see Hirai 1997–99), the present paper focuses solely on one chapter in the long story of the transition through his three major works. The very fact of addressing the questions, “How did Keynes maintain the theory developed in the Treatise after its publication (October 1930), and for how long?” narrows the period under study to approximately two years which span roughly from October 1930 through October 1932. Our scrutiny will range over the original texts and primary material such as manuscripts, lecture notes, and correspondence produced over this period, and our findings will rest on the meticulous analysis of material of crucial importance for a clear understanding of Keynes's theoretical situation. We will also offer our comments on the earlier efforts insofar as they relate to the period in question.

This paper explores archival material concerning the reception of Leonard J. Savage’s foundational work of rational choice theory in its subjective-Bayesian form. The focus is on the criticism raised in the early 1960s by Daniel Ellsberg, William Fellner, and Cedric Smith, who were supporters of the newly developed subjective approach but could not understand Savage’s insistence on the strict version he shared with Bruno de Finetti. The episode is well known, thanks to the so-called Ellsberg Paradox and the extensive reference made to it in current decision theory. But Savage’s reaction to his critics has never been examined. Although Savage never really engaged with the issue in his published writings, the private exchange with Ellsberg and Fellner, and with de Finetti about how to deal with Smith, shows that Savage’s attention to the generalization advocated by his correspondents was substantive. In particular, Savage’s defense of the normative value of rational choice theory against counterexamples such as Ellsberg’s did not prevent him from admitting that he would give careful consideration to a more realistic axiomatic system, should the critics be able to provide one.

While most scientists and philosophers of science privilege scientific knowledge, and have sought demarcations of science from non-science to justify the privilege, sociologists of science, small numbers of philosophers of science, anthropologists, and some scientists themselves have been attracted to a new way of talking about science. Prefigured by Ludwik Fleck (1935/1979) and Gaston Bachelard (1934/1984), nurtured by the controversies over Thomas Kuhn's work, and instantiated in the Edinburgh School's Strong Program, the naturalistic turn portrays science as a human activity, part of the woof and warp of culture itself. Yet curiously historians of science have been less involved in this recent reconceptualization of both science and scientific knowledge.

In my note on dissent (2004), I emphasized that heterodoxy and dissent had to be defined socially. Given that crucial elements of the social context differ from one society to another, it follows that the meaning and significance of dissent may vary too. Barnett (2006) has pointed out a conclusion I should have drawn explicitly: that my suggestions for thinking about dissent make sense only in Western economics. In the former Soviet Union, as he points out, dissent in economics could not be understood apart from the political situation. The examples he cites illustrate some of the ways in which dissent in Soviet economics differed from that in the West, where there was no officially sanctioned orthodoxy comparable to Marxism-Leninism (or rather to what the Soviet authorities chose to call by that name) from which economists wished either safely to signal their dissent or to which they wished, despite their dissent, to be seen to adhere. We see here, it might be argued, a simple difference between two types of society.