Public health emergencies have occurred throughout history, encompassing such events as plagues and famines arising from natural causes, disease pandemics interrelated with wars (such as the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919), and industrial accidents such as the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, among others. Law and legal tools have played an important role in addressing such emergencies. Three prime U.S. examples are Congressional authorization of quarantine as early as 1796, legally mandated smallpox vaccination upheld in a landmark 1905 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, and the President's 2003 executive order adding SARS to the federal government's list of “quarantinable communicable diseases.”

The public health emergencies of the present — both actual and potential — pose equally serious threats but do so in the context of greatly magnified expectations that stem directly from the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the immediately following anthrax attacks.

This paper is unusual for this journal because most readers do not deal professionally with animals. Information from primatology, however, is relevant to consideration of violence between people. I will focus mainly on aggression and peacemaking among nonhuman primates, but will address related topics as well. I do not use the term “aggression” to refer only to violent behavior, but to any overt conflict between individuals. Although I am a professor of psychology, I am a biologist by training. When I was a student many years ago, the major scholarly work on this topic was Konrad Lorenz’s On Aggression. It set into motion contemporary research on aggression from a biological perspective by making the controversial claim that aggression is an instinct not only in animals, but also in human beings. My own research and that of others suggests a slightly different view, namely, that aggression between individuals is a last resort when conflict resolution fails.

Many current abortion regulations represent an over-medicalization of abortion or a corruption of abortion's true medical nature, with disproportionate consequences to women with lower incomes and lesser means. This article explores the effects of unnecessary and harmful abortion restrictions on women living in poverty. A brief summary of the major abortion rights cases explains how the Constitution, as currently interpreted, vests the government and sometimes the medical profession with the power to protect women's health, rather than granting this power to women themselves. The article then argues for a new approach for protecting women's health and respecting their dignity by reframing reproductive rights as health rights that women themselves can assert.

The issuance of do-not-resuscitate orders was one of the first dilemmas scrutinized by lawyers, health care professionals and philosophers in the field of bioethics. In 1983, the President's Commission articulated the basic principles that should guide decisions about CPR: respect for the choices of patients capable of deciding for themselves, recognition of family members as appropriate surrogates for decisionally incapable patients and the importance of an open dialogue with the physician as a predicate to informed consent.

Six years have passed since the President's Commission issued its landmark report. More than a decade of discussion and written commentary has clarified the ethical and social questions presented by resuscitation decisions. In many states, judicial decisions and legislation have addressed some of the legal uncertainties associated with do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders. Nonetheless, the gulf between recognized ethical principles and clinical practice remains broad and resistant to change. Nowhere is this gap more evident than in decisions about cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for competent patients.

Throughout history, disease has been associated with bigotry and prejudice. Since biblical times the leper has been shunned and treated as an outcast. In the Middle Ages, the arrival of the plague brought with it violent social upheaval and persecution of the Jews. In the earlier part of this century, prostitutes thought to have venereal disease were quarantined en masse.

Given this sorrowful history, it is not surprising that the AIDS epidemic has brought with it mistreatment of persons associated with AIDS, the term I shall use for people who either have or are thought to have AIDS, AIDS-related complex (ARC), or antibodies to the virus that causes the disease. Indeed, considering that AIDS is a sexually transmitted disease that has in this country primarily afflicted homosexual men and intravenous (IV) drug abusers, it is perhaps surprising that overt acts of prejudice have not been more common.

Global health is a concept which in recent years has evoked a lot of interest from both academics, politicians, celebrities, and the media. The term “global health” implies a globally shared responsibility to provide health as a public good through an expansive number of initiatives. This emerging era of consciousness about our international interdependence, regardless of a problem’s geographic location or type of disease, may be a good moment for exploring the strengths and weaknesses of an international law approach to global health challenges: a global health convention.

The most prominent global health initiatives are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 2005 Paris Declaration Process on Aid Effectiveness on the need for alignment and coordination (PDP), and the 2008 Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (AHLF). These instruments have yet to prove their value, and the funds annually disbursed, approximately $25 billion in 2009, could have better effect if the negotiated principles from the PDP and the AHLF were followed.

The efficacy of pre-exposure prophylaxis, PrEP, with antiviral agents for prevention of HIV infection has been demonstrated in multiple randomized controlled trials and demonstration projects. These trials have studied prevention at the individual level. The effectiveness of PrEP as a public health intervention to reduce HIV incidence at community and population levels is being actively evaluated but is less well described. In reviewing the available data on PrEP as a public health intervention, three significant examples have demonstrated success, and all have been among communities of gay, bisexual and other men who have sex with men (MSM).

We have previously addressed the use of race in health care generally. Subsequent developments have made the issue even more pointed. Given the recent Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of BiDil as a result of a clinical trial limited to participants identifying themselves as African-American, this Symposium could not be more timely as an effort to further advance the dialogue on the issue of race in medical research. While this dialogue has informed our own analysis, we believe our distinctive contribution concerns the extent to which the law does and should constrain such use of race. Even in legal academic circles – somewhat notorious for considering problems of little practical significance – the issue has been given little thought. This piece, therefore, attempts to analyze extant legal regimes against the backdrop of medical and scientific developments.

Returning genomic research results to family members raises complex questions. Genomic research on life-limiting conditions such as cancer, and research involving storage and reanalysis of data and specimens long into the future, makes these questions pressing. This author group, funded by an NIH grant, published consensus recommendations presenting a framework. This follow-up paper offers concrete guidance and tools for implementation. The group collected and analyzed relevant documents and guidance, including tools from the Clinical Sequencing Exploratory Research (CSER) Consortium. The authors then negotiated a consensus toolkit of processes and documents. That toolkit offers sample consent and notification documents plus decision flow-charts to address return of results to family of living and deceased participants, in adult and pediatric research. Core concerns are eliciting participant preferences on sharing results with family and on choice of a representative to make decisions about sharing after participant death.

Often advocates for persons with disabilities are resistant to what might appear to be the banal truism that, at bottom, disability is a decrement in health. Disability advocates have long objected to the “medicalization” of disability, when that means focusing entirely on a person’s underlying impairments and ignoring all of the manifold obstacles in his or her environment — e.g., physical, human-built, attitudinal, social, political, and cultural — that makes living with those impairments at least disadvantageous and socially devalued. Over-medicalization is another and well understood problem that people with disabilities are justifiably concerned about. Yet it is somewhat of a mystery why anyone with an impairment would ever deny, or feel uncomfortable being told, that their impairment is a health problem. Surely, people with disabilities are unhealthy, by virtue of their impairments and to the degree according to the severity of those impairments. How could it be otherwise?

Supply-side interventions such as prescription drug monitoring programs, “pill mill” laws, and dispensing limits have done little to quell the burgeoning opioid crisis. An increasingly popular demand-side alternative to these measures – now adopted by 38 jurisdictions in the USA and 7 provinces in Canada — is court-mandated involuntary commitment and treatment. In Massachusetts, for example, Part I, Chapter 123, Section 35 of the state's General Laws allows physicians, spouses, relatives, and police officers to petition a court to involuntarily commit and treat a person whose alcohol or drug abuse poses a likelihood of serious harm. This paper explores the ethical underpinnings of this law as a case study for others. First, we highlight the procedural and substantive standards of Section 35 and evaluate the application of the law in practice, including the frequency with which it has been invoked and outcomes. We then use this background to inform an ethical critique of the law. Specifically, we argue that the infringement of autonomy and privacy associated with involuntary intervention under Section 35 is not currently justified on the grounds of a lack of evidenced benefits and a risk of significant of harm. Further ethical concerns also arise from a lack of standard of care provided under the Section 35 pathway. Based on this analysis, we advance four recommendations for change to mitigate these ethical shortcomings.

The genetic testing industry is in a period of potentially major structural change driven by several factors. These include weaker patent protections after Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (the “Myriad decision”) and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.; a continuing shift from single-gene tests to genome-scale sequencing; and a set of February 2014 amendments to the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) regulations and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. This article explores the nature of these changes and why they strain existing regulatory frameworks for protecting patients, research subjects, and other consumers who receive genetic testing.

Oversight of genetic testing has, at least to date, had two major thrusts: (1) privacy and ethical protections and (2) traditional consumer health and safety regulations. Examples of the first are the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which after 2013 amendments expressly protects genetic privacy as well as other medical privacy.

This paper discusses the role of the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) in monitoring inmate deaths in custody on a national basis. It also provides a descriptive overview of Australian Indigenous and non-Indigenous inmate deaths in custody during the eighteen-year period between 1980 and 1998.

In October 1987, the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC) commenced investigating the deaths of Australia's Indigenous people in custody throughout Australia between January 1, 1980 and May 31, 1989. RCIADIC's task was to examine the circumstances of the deaths; the actions taken by authorities; and the underlying causes of Indigenous deaths in custody, including social, cultural, and legal factors. The investigation found that the major factor contributing to the high number of Indigenous deaths in custody was the disproportionately higher rates at which Indigenous people come into contact with the criminal justice system. RCIADIC concluded that the most significant reason for this contact was the severely disadvantaged social, economic, and cultural position of many Indigenous people.

Despite growing advances in medical technologies, health status inequalities continue to increase across the globe. Developing countries have been faced with declining expenditures in health and social services, increasing burdens posed by both communicable and non-communicable diseases, and economic systems poorly geared to fostering sustainable development for the poorest and most marginalized. Under such circumstances, the challenges facing health practitioners in countries in transition are complex and diverse, and require the balancing of many conflicting imperatives. This is particularly so in relation to the development of public health policy, where equity, redress of past inequalities, and the god of social justice may seemingly be pitted against macroeconomic adjustments required for national economic development in an increasingly globalized economic order.

For example, pressures to deregulate as part of a market-oriented development philosophy will increase the risks from occupational hazards in populations desperate for paid employment.

The issuance of do-not-resuscitate orders was one of the first dilemmas scrutinized by lawyers, health care professionals and philosophers in the field of bioethics. In 1983, the President's Commission articulated the basic principles that should guide decisions about CPR: respect for the choices of patients capable of deciding for themselves, recognition of family members as appropriate surrogates for decisionally incapable patients and the importance of an open dialogue with the physician as a predicate to informed consent.

Six years have passed since the President's Commission issued its landmark report. More than a decade of discussion and written commentary has clarified the ethical and social questions presented by resuscitation decisions. In many states, judicial decisions and legislation have addressed some of the legal uncertainties associated with do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders. Nonetheless, the gulf between recognized ethical principles and clinical practice remains broad and resistant to change. Nowhere is this gap more evident than in decisions about cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for competent patients.

Among the many new forms of human reproduction, none raises more problems of public policy and of law than the practice of what is known, rather inaccurately, as surrogate motherhood or surrogacy. The central policy issue is settling on the paradigm that should govern surrogate motherhood, a model of family relations (adoption) or of contractual relations (sale of a product or service). And the central legal issue is whether any restrictions on personal choice that follow from the policy selected—and especially from a rejection of the contractual model with its implication of free choice—are constitutionally permissible.

We conclude that surrogate mother arrangements should be handled from the perspective of adoption. As recent judicial decisions have demonstrated, existing law on parents and children is largely adequate, and the emergence of surrogacy as a social practice does not require major law reform efforts. Furthermore, neither these rulings nor legislation proposed in many jurisdictions to ban commercialized surrogacy intrude impermissibly on the range of choices about reproduction protected by the Constitution of the United States.

Organ transplantation has been a favorite topic of health lawyers since its inception. Organ procurement was addressed with the adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in all fifty states, and “brain death” has been recognized both judicially and legislatively across the country. Nonetheless, it is now apparent that the major problems in organ transplantation are not legal and thus neither are their solutions. Heart and liver transplants are extreme and expensive interventions that few individuals can afford and few hospitals can offer. In an era of economic scarcity, how (if at all) should organ transplant procedures and other extreme and expensive treatment he introduced into the health delivery system?

Although it seems reasonable to expect federal leadership to establish a limited number of high-quality transplant centers, federal efforts to date have focused almost exclusively on trying to help the scattered organ procurement agencies become more efficient.

The unsustainable growth in U.S. health care costs is in large part attributable to the rising costs of pharmaceuticals and medical devices and to unnecessary medical procedures. This fact has led health reform advocates and policymakers to place considerable hope in the idea that increased government support for research on the comparative effectiveness of medical treatments will eventually help to reduce health care expenses by informing patients, health care providers, and payers about which treatments for common conditions are effective and which are not. Comparative effectiveness research (CER) has shown in some cases that expensive but commonly used treatments are significantly less effective than relatively inexpensive alternatives. Critics warn, however, that CER will homogenize patient care, limit patient choices, and lead to improper health care rationing and even to the denial of lifesaving treatments.

In vitro fertilization (IVF) is now a well-established practice in the field of assisted reproduction. In 1995, over 41,000 IVF cycles were done in the United States, at a cost of more than $300 million. The overall success rate has risen to 22.8 deliveries per 100 egg-retrieval procedures (19.6 deliveries per initiated cycle). As the field has matured, the attention of policy-makers has shifted from questions about the ethical and legal status of human embryos to concerns about providing access and protecting consumers.

Three such concerns have emerged. One is the danger that IVF programs will disseminate misleading information about their success rates in order to attract patients. This problem, however, may be alleviated by the publication in late 1997 of the first of annual national and clinic specific reports, based on randomly audited data, by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), and RESOLVE, pursuant to the federal 1992 Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Laboratory Certification Act.