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Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: Public Policy and Patient Autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

Tracy E. Miller
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Extract

The issuance of do-not-resuscitate orders was one of the first dilemmas scrutinized by lawyers, health care professionals and philosophers in the field of bioethics. In 1983, the President's Commission articulated the basic principles that should guide decisions about CPR: respect for the choices of patients capable of deciding for themselves, recognition of family members as appropriate surrogates for decisionally incapable patients and the importance of an open dialogue with the physician as a predicate to informed consent.

Six years have passed since the President's Commission issued its landmark report. More than a decade of discussion and written commentary has clarified the ethical and social questions presented by resuscitation decisions. In many states, judicial decisions and legislation have addressed some of the legal uncertainties associated with do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders. Nonetheless, the gulf between recognized ethical principles and clinical practice remains broad and resistant to change. Nowhere is this gap more evident than in decisions about cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for competent patients.

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Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , Fall 1989 , pp. 245 - 254
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1989

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References

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