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AIDS and the Limits of Discrimination Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2021

Wendy E. Parmet
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Extract

Throughout history, disease has been associated with bigotry and prejudice. Since biblical times the leper has been shunned and treated as an outcast. In the Middle Ages, the arrival of the plague brought with it violent social upheaval and persecution of the Jews. In the earlier part of this century, prostitutes thought to have venereal disease were quarantined en masse.

Given this sorrowful history, it is not surprising that the AIDS epidemic has brought with it mistreatment of persons associated with AIDS, the term I shall use for people who either have or are thought to have AIDS, AIDS-related complex (ARC), or antibodies to the virus that causes the disease. Indeed, considering that AIDS is a sexually transmitted disease that has in this country primarily afflicted homosexual men and intravenous (IV) drug abusers, it is perhaps surprising that overt acts of prejudice have not been more common.

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Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 15 , Issue 1-2 , Summer 1987 , pp. 61 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1987

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References

The author wishes to thank Judith Olans Brown, Ronald Lanoue, and Mary O'Connell for their thoughtful comments and constructive criticism, and Jean Barstow for her diligent research assistance.Google Scholar
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