Questions have been raised in recent years concerning the interpretation of previous studies purporting to show that distributed earnings have had a consistently greater impact on equity prices than have retained earnings. Miller and Modigliani have convincingly argued that if capital markets are perfect and rational behavior of market participants is assumed, the price-earnings ratio of the shares of a firm with a given investment policy should be invariant to alternative earnings-payout ratios. They also point out, however, that with the present tax subsidy on capital gains and the existence of substantial brokerage fees and flotation costs, dividend policy might be expected to have an effect on share prices, even though the amount and direction of this effect is an empirical matter and not determinable a priori.

Firms falling short of earnings expectations are more likely to cite stakeholder-focused objectives in their public communications following earnings announcements. This behavior is consistent with managers preferring to be evaluated by subjective stakeholder-based performance criteria when falling short on objective shareholder-based measures. This increased use of stakeholder language is most evident among firms narrowly missing earnings estimates and appears unrelated to a firm’s actual environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related activity. Stakeholder language appears to influence the evaluation of CEOs; turnover–performance sensitivity is lower for managers citing stakeholder value. Collectively, our findings are consistent with concerns that stakeholder objectives reduce managerial accountability for poor performance.

We estimate a model for the term structure of discounted risk-adjusted dividend growth using prices of dividend futures for the Eurostoxx 50. A 2-factor model capturing short-term mean reversion within a year and a medium-term component reverting at the business-cycle horizon gives an excellent fit of these prices. Hence, investors update the valuation of dividends beyond the business cycle only to a limited degree. The 2-factor model, estimated on dividend futures data only, explains a large part of observed daily stock market returns. We also show that the 2 latent factors are related to various economic and financial variables.

Average cumulative abnormal returns around proxy statements containing “in-depth” disclosures of planning for CEO succession are significantly positive indicating that succession planning is a value-added undertaking. Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment based on a 2009 SEC ruling that induced more succession planning disclosures, we find that succession planning is not value-adding for all firms. Rather, succession planning is value-enhancing for larger, more complex, and more stable firms. Importantly, CEO succession planning appears to be value reducing for smaller, simpler, and less stable firms.

In a timely, comprehensive article in this journal, Joy and Tollefson (J & T hereafter) treated design and interpretation problems for linear multiple discriminant analysis (LMDA). Although the article is generally correct in treating a complex topic, it has two problems:

1. The (widely-used) split-sample validation technique that J & T used is an inappropriate method for establishing the efficacy of the estimated discriminant function.

2. J & T reach erroneous conclusions on the correctness of two methods for assessing the discriminatory power of individual variables.

This comment addresses these two problems.

In capital budgeting when the net present value method (NPV) is used and future cash flows are uncertain, the measurement of the standard deviation of the project's net present value (σNPV) is unusually difficult. Typically the investment life of the project is more than one year, and the cash flows of each period are correlated with each other. The difficulty in determining the exact inter-temporal correlation (ρt, t+l) of cash flows creates special problems in estimating the overall variance of the investment project. For example, see [5, pp. 125–131]. This paper attempts to isolate the possible impact of the inter-temporal correlation of cash flows upon the total risk of the project under the assumption that the standard deviations of cash flows for each time period of the project are known. It also provides upper and lower bounds of σNPV for a multi-period investment project where the degree of the inter-temporal correlation is not exactly known.

In Japan, it has long been a common practice among corporations to issue new shares at par value and offer them to shareholders without underwriting agreements. However, in January 1969, Nihon Gakki (a musical instrument maker) successfully offered new shares at the market price through underwriting agreements. Other corporations followed suit and the capital raised through this method in fiscal year 1972 amounted to ¥861 billion, accounting for more than 65 percent of the total capital raised during the year. At present, over 70 percent of Japanese corporations raise new equity capital at the market price via the negotiated underwriting method. Almost all underwriters employ a “firm commitment” agreement, in which the underwriter agrees to purchase the whole issue from the firm at a particular price for resale to the public. The agreement is normally signed on the day before the issue announcement, at which time the offering price to the public is specified. As soon as the offering price is filed with the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the underwriter is precluded from selling the shares above this price. Though the offering price initially was highly discounted, between 1970 and 1980 this discount rate gradually decreased from 15 percent to 5 percent of the daily stock price (see Table 1). The final settlement with the underwriter usually takes place fourteen to nineteen days after the registration statement becomes effective. At that time, the company receives the proceeds of the sale, minus the underwriter's fee. This fee, which is usually fixed at 3.5 percent of the money to be raised, consists of a compensation fee, a managing fee, a sales fee, and a brokerage fee, none of which can be separated on the contract.

We have discussed some of the effects of rate regulation in the property and casualty insurance industry. One consequence of the regulatory environment is that an optimal capital structure may clearly exist in this industry. If the rate of return to the insureds is generally deficient, we would expect that property and casualty stock companies would have an incentive to lever themselves to the maximum extent permissible by selling insurance. The classic monopoly of the economic literature finances its lucrative investment opportunities in a competitive capital market. The stock insurance company invests in that market, but the relative distribution of the return earned there may be less than equitable due to the process and standards of rate regulation.

This paper addresses both how best to incorporate forecasts of future excess market returns into a market-timing strategy and what additional return to expect as a consequence. In contrast to the work of Jensen [8] and Grant ([4], [5], and [6]), the results specifically consider and measure the attractiveness to a risk-averse investor of the positively skewed distribution of portfolio returns expected from a market-timed portfolio. The usual mean and variance characterization of a risky portfolio is not sufficient in the case of a markettimed portfolio, and a simple utility model is employed to measure the incremental value of a market-timing strategy. The results are given as a function of the relative volatility of the market, the quality of available forecasts, and the risk attitude of the investor.

This paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of traditional securities by well-established firms. Standard moral hazard models predict that equity, debt, and warrants are almost never optimal financing instruments. I show that issuing these securities is, nevertheless, nearly optimal: the issuer would gain very little by using non-traditional securities instead. Combined with equity, one debt issue (without multiple layers of seniority) and one warrant issue (without multiple exercise prices) suffice to achieve near optimality. The near optimality of traditional financing depends crucially on the issuer's ability to use warrants in addition to debt and equity.

This paper (1) constructs a signaling model with a weaker existence condition than in most signaling models, (2) demonstrates that, using a popular model of innovation under uncertainty, an equilibrium signaling schedule exists for a broad range of boundary conditions and parameter values. These results are derived in a model of a firm possessing private information about an investment opportunity, where the firm issues new equity to finance the investment. The proprietary information cannot be explicitly disclosed to potential investors without also disclosing it to potential competitors, but if investors are unaware of the firm's prospects, shares will have to be issued at a price less than their “intrinsic” value.

Our analysis explains how vulture investors (vultures) can maintain and exploit their reputations for toughness. Vultures leverage their reputations to extract concessions from stockholders in debt restructurings. To profit from these concessions, vultures must first acquire debt from incumbent bondholders. Buying only the tranches most likely to render them marginal creditors maximizes vulture leverage in debt-purchase negotiations. Vulture profits are proportional to the degree of uncertainty regarding the identity of the marginal debt class.

The literature of Index numbers contains much discussion of the relative merits of geometric and arithmetic averages of prices and quantities. The controversy on this subject dates from the middle of the nineteenth century and is fully described by Crowe [2], In recent times both types of averages have been applied to security price relatives to measure the performance of groups of securities over time. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the properties of these security indexes and to show the relationships between them and an index based upon a more general type of average called the power mean. The concluding section of this paper contains the proof of an interesting and important limit property which provides the conceptual link between geometric and arithmetic security indexes.

We use the introduction and subsequent removal of the flash-order functionality from NASDAQ as a natural experiment to investigate the impact of voluntary disclosure of trading intent on market quality. We find that flash orders significantly improve liquidity in NASDAQ. Furthermore, overall market quality improves (deteriorates) when flash functionality is introduced (removed). This result can be attributed to increased competition among liquidity suppliers across competing trading venues. Alternatively, flash orders attract responses from reactive traders immediately after the announcement, attracting more “hidden liquidity” and lowering risk-bearing costs for the overall market.

Empirical studies and much marketplace opinion have it that the spread between private money market rates and the U.S. Treasury bill rate of comparable maturity is due to differential default risk, liquidity risk, and relative supplies. This paper presents an argument and empirical evidence that the bulk of the systematic and medium-term differential between privates rates—in this case, domestic CDs, commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and Eurodollar CDs—and the T-bill rate is due to the exemption of interest on Treasury securities from state and local taxation. In the case of Eurodollar CDs, the additional and major systematic factor explaining the spread (vis a vis T-bills) is the exemption of Eurodollar CDs from the Federal Reserve's “tax” via reserve requirements. An empirical section confirms the role of standard default risk, liquidity risk, and market “absorption” variables in determining short-term deviations from tax-adjusted parity. The taxadjusted parity condition, however, remains the major systematic and medium-term determinant—certainly more important than has been suggested previously in the literature.

This paper develops an equilibrium asset pricing model to explain the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle by allowing for both market frictions and informational asymmetry. The paper argues that much of the high equity premium in the Mehra and Prescott (1985).sample period can be explained by informational asymmetry among investors and the inability of many investors to diversify their portfolios. With admissible relative risk aversion coefficient γ, the model matches various key statistics quite well. The paper implies that with the development of mutual funds, the equity premium should decline as has been the case since the 1950s.

Using a Monte Carlo simulation, this study addresses the question of how traditional risk measures and immunization strategies perform when the term structure evolves in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton (1992) manner. The results suggest that, for immunization purposes, immunization strategies and portfolio formation strategies are more important than interest rate risk measures. The performance of immunization strategies depends more on the transaction costs and the holding period than on the risk measures. Moreover, the immunization performance of bullet and barbell portfolios is not very sensitive to interest rate risk measures.

I examine whether firms’ use of alternative work arrangements, particularly temporary agency workers, affects their cost of equity. Exploiting a major labor-market deregulation in Japan that induced manufacturing firms to increase their employment of temporary agency workers, I show that the cost of equity decreased in manufacturing firms, relative to nonmanufacturing firms, after the deregulation. Further analysis using variations within manufacturing firms provides corroborating evidence. The rigidity in labor expenses and the cost of debt also decreased in manufacturing firms. Overall, alternative work arrangements increase the flexibility in labor costs, leading to lower operating leverage and cost of capital.

The familiar two-parameter model for portfolio decisions, attributed to Markowitz [11], has individuals maximizing an objective function, ϕ [E(Y), V(Y)], of mean and variance of end-of-period wealth, subject to a constraint imposed by initial wealth. In the usual version there is an arbitrary number, n, of risky assets with stochastic end-of-period values (price plus dividend) represented by the vector X with exogenously given mean vector μ and nonsingular variance matrix σ. There is also one riskless asset, whose certain end-of-period value per dollar invested is p. Final wealth, as constrained by initial wealth, W, is given by Y = WP + a' (X – OP), where a and P are vectors of risky asset quantities and prices. Assuming ϕE > 0 (wealth preference), ϕV < 0 (risk aversion), and that the Hessian of $ is negative and semidefinite, portfolio optimum calls for ϕE(μ − OP) + 2ϕVσa = 0, or

This paper develops a methodology for term structure estimation from a no-arbitrage condition in markets with frictions. The methodology unifies existing estimation procedures, such as the regression and linear programming approaches, and substantially broadens the class of useful estimation techniques. The estimators derived in this way are capable of reflecting actual market conditions, such as the asymmetry in the tax treatment of long and short positions and the higher financial cost of establishing a short position. The methodology is derived by applying the conjugate duality theory of mathematical programming.