Recent models of herding suggest that speculators may rationally trade on information unrelated to fundamentals when their trading horizons are short. This study provides an empirical example where this appears to be the case. Johnson Redbook's weekly retail sales figures predicted bond returns for a short time after a significant number of bond traders began purchasing and trading on the data. The significant relationship between the data and bond returns disappeared just after the Wall Street Journal started to report it. Meanwhile, there was little or no change in the relationship between the data and retailers' stock returns, perhaps because the data have long been followed by retail stock analysts, Johnson Redbook's original investor clientele.

The primary objective of this paper is to derive a multi-factor equilibrium model using a mean-variance approach. The results of this derivation provide greater insight into the nature of the resulting factors than does APT. There are several important implications for empirical tests of any a priori defined multi-factor model.

Given the exogenous price process of some assets, we constrain the price process of other assets that are characterized by their final payoffs. We deal with an incomplete market framework in a discrete-time model and assume the existence of the equilibrium. In this setup, we derive restrictions on the state-price deflators. These restrictions do not depend on a particular choice of utility function. We investigate numerically a stochastic volatility model as an example. Our approach leads to an interval of admissible prices that is more robust than the arbitrage pricing interval.

The relationship between the rate of inflation and the interest rate has been a topic of research for quite some time. A breakthrough in the analysis occurred years ago with Irving Fisher's hypothesis that the nominal interest rate fully reflects the available information concerning the possible future values of the rate of inflation. Others have extended Fisher's original insight to explain further the interaction between the rate of interest and inflation. For example, Mundell [26] uses the Pigou real-balance effect to hypothesize that the real rate of interest is inversely related to the rate of inflation.

The objective of this paper is to carry out tests of the general hypothesis, most recently urged by Scherer [14, pp. 100–102] and Weston and Brigham [17, p. 689], that the cost-of-equity capital of small industrial corporations is greater than that of large industrial corporations. The paper denotes this cost as ke and defines it as the expected rate of return on the stock of a company when the current price of the stock is in equilibrium. A common designation of ke of course is the equity capitalization rate. It will be noted that this definition of the cost-of-equity capital abstracts from the flotation costs that are usually incurred when companies sell new stock. Archer and Faerber [2] have already shown that these costs are inversely related to the size of companies.

Using a natural experiment to identify the causal effect of an increase in default risk on firm actions, I find little evidence managers shift risk to corporate pension plans following an exogenous shock to the firm’s long-term liabilities. The finding is robust to focusing on firms where the incentive to engage in risk shifting is arguably the greatest, such as financially vulnerable firms and firms with fewer agency conflicts. This study casts doubt on the risk-shifting hypothesis and shows managers do not take risk-shifting actions that would increase shareholder value even when those actions pose little threat to managerial utility.

The liquidity-coverage ratio (LCR) requires banks to hold enough liquidity to withstand a 30-day run. We study the effects of the LCR on broker-dealers, the financial intermediaries at the epicenter of the 2007–2009 crisis. The LCR brings some financial-stability benefits, including a significant maturity extension of triparty repos backed by lower-quality collateral, as well as the accumulation of larger liquidity pools. However, it also leads to less liquidity transformation by broker-dealers. We also discuss the liquidity risks not addressed by the LCR. Finally, we show that a major source of fire-sale risk was self-corrected before the introduction of postcrisis regulations.

We model and test the relations between the team management of mutual funds, managers’ ability, performance, and holdings. Our model predicts that team-managed funds perform better and behave more conservatively than single-manager funds. However, the effect of team management is masked in equilibrium because high-ability managers rationally self-select into single-manager funds. Consistent with the model’s prediction, we find that team-managed funds perform better and deviate less from their benchmark allocations than single-manager funds with the same characteristics. These differences are marked after we control for the endogenous self-selection of managers.

Historically, preferred stock ranks well below common stock and bond issues as a source of financing in the private capital market. Relative to issuance of bonds, the issuance of preferred stock burdens the issuer with a fixed financing cost without benefitingthe issuer with the tax deductability associated with interest payments.

The implicit contract theory explored by Azariadis [2] suggests that wage rigidity and underemployment are explained by the microeconomic optimizing behavior of each agent in the labor market. In this theory, the former phenomenon is interpreted as risk-sharing arrangements between firms and workers, whereas the latter may occur when workers have the opportunity to use leisure or unemployment insurance benefits.

Using the mean-variance model, Sharpe [5] and Lintner [4] have derived an equilibrium model for price determination under uncertainty. Jean [2] has tried to generalize this model so that other moments of the distribution will be taken into account. The purpose of this note is to show that unlike the Sharpe-Lintner model, Jean's results make no economic sense.

In recent years, corporations have repurchased increasing amounts of their own common shares. The dollar value of repurchases increased from approximately $600 million in 1960 to $1.7 billion in 1964. To put these figures in better perspective, corporate repurchases were more than 50 percent of the net purchases of pension funds and twice the net purchases of mutual funds. From the viewpoint of the individual company, General Motors is a. striking example. Repurchases by General Motors accounted for over 20 percent of the total trading volume in that stock in 1963.

Academic literature, practitioners, courts, and regulators routinely assert that both private and subsidiary targets sell at discounts relative to public targets. However, the empirical evidence to support this conclusion is thin. Our work alters the methodology from prior research to avoid biases due to both one-sided sample truncation and Jensen’s inequality. Following these changes, we find no evidence that unlisted targets sell at discounts. Our results hold under a number of different approaches and after controlling for known determinants of acquisition pricing.

When managing risk, frequently only imperfect hedging instruments are at hand. We show how to optimally cross-hedge risk when the spread between the hedging instrument and the risk is stationary. For linear risk positions we derive explicit formulas for the hedge error, and for nonlinear positions we show how to obtain numerically efficient estimates. Finally, we demonstrate that even in cases with no clear-cut decision concerning the stationarity of the spread, it is better to allow for mean reversion of the spread rather than to neglect it.

We investigate whether external industry tournament incentives influence the design of executive-compensation contracts. Using staggered negative mobility shocks as exogenous disruptions to tournament incentives, we show that firms treated by these shocks act to restore their executives’ diminished implicit risk-taking incentives by increasing compensation vega. On average, post-shock compensation vegas increase by approximately 10%. These effects are considerably larger for treated executives with strong tournament incentives and high ex ante mobility. Mobility shocks have no impact on compensation delta or total pay. Our results shed light on how explicit risk-taking incentives are optimized with respect to executive career concerns.

This paper investigates investor disagreement and clientele effects in performance evaluation by developing a measure that considers the best potential clienteles of mutual funds. In an incomplete market under law-of-one-price (LOP) and no-good-deal conditions, we obtain an upper bound on admissible performance measures that identifies the most favorable alpha. Empirically, we find that a reasonable investor disagreement leads to generally positive performance for the best clienteles. Performance disagreement by investors can be significant enough to change the average evaluation of mutual funds from negative to positive, depending on the clienteles.

In this paper, we propose a nonparametric estimator of the short rate diffusion process using observations of a panel of yields. The proposed estimator can greatly reduce the bias of the nonparametric estimator proposed in Stanton (1997) that uses a single time series of short rate observations. Simulations confirm that the new method significantly attenuates the spurious nonlinearity of the drift function as documented in Chapman and Pearson (2000). We apply the method to estimate the U.S. short rate process using a panel of six Treasury yields. With 42 years’ daily observations of the panel of yields, the proposed drift function estimator achieves the same efficiency as the Stanton (1997) estimator based on 145 years of daily short rate observations. Finally, we show that the proposed estimator also has significant economic implications on the pricing of bonds and interest rate derivatives.

We study a financial market where risk-neutral traders are endowed with a signal that perfectly reveals the direction (but not the exact amount) of the liquidation value of a normally distributed risky asset. The impact of order flow on prices is nonlinear with a bullish/bearish information structure, which is broadly consistent with empirical evidence. Also, private information is revealed quicker than in a strategic oligopoly.

We reconsider whether hedge funds’ time-varying risk factor exposures are predictive of superior performance. We construct an overall measure (BA) of fund managers and present evidence that top beta active managers deliver superior long-term out-of-sample performance compared to top alpha active managers. BA captures the time-varying nature of beta exposures and can be interpreted as a common factor of both systematic risk (SR) and (1 - R2) measures. BA also compares favorably to extant measures of market timing, capturing the explanatory power of such measures of hedge fund performance.

S-L have derived a simultaneous equation CAPM to offer a robust test for the interdependent assumption of the single equation CAPM. However, their empirical results are subject to the multicollinearity problem associated with 2SLS. For improving their results, several alternative estimation methods are used to estimate a seven-equation system for the oil industry. In accordance with both the multicollinearity criterion and residual analysis, it is found the modified 2SLS is the most appropriate method to be used to estimate the S-L model. From the results obtained from the modified 2SLS, it is shown that the market rate of return still is a relatively important factor in predicting the movement of capital market in the simultaneous equation CAPM.

After applying a better estimation method to the S-L simultaneous equation CAPM, it is shown that the S-L model has given us the interesting interrelationship of capital asset pricing within a particular risk class.