This article has two goals. The first is to contrast two widely used definitions of risk aversion. The second is to establish the feasibility of plunging behavior, in the sense that a possibly large number of risk averse investors will not be diversifiers.

The application of linear programming techniques to the problem of capital budgeting has repeatedly been proposed in the literature. However, while the potential of linear programming models for this important area of business decisions is generally recognized, practical applications still face some severe limitations. This note focuses on one particular problem peculiar to the application of programming techniques to capital budgeting, namely the mutual dependence between the optimal solution of the linear programming model and the discount rate used to calculate the coefficients of its objective function.

Is liquidity better when a trade counterparty’s brokerage firm is unknown (anonymous) or known (transparent)? We examine a quasinatural experiment where some firms switched from transparent to anonymous trading and then, 1 year later, switched back. Our results for inside spread, price impact, and limit order book depth suggest that liquidity improves when anonymous post-trade reporting is introduced and liquidity worsens when anonymous post-trade reporting is reversed.

Prior research documents that asset growth is negatively associated with future firm performance. In contrast, we show that growth financed by product market stakeholders (i.e., “operating growth”) is positively associated with future firm performance. Investors and security analysts underestimate the positive effects of operating growth on future performance, resulting in return predictability and overly pessimistic earnings forecasts for firms with high operating growth. Future stock returns largely concentrate around subsequent earnings announcements with declining magnitudes, consistent with the error-in-expectation explanation. Results from cross-sectional tests further support the hypothesis that operating growth signals high future performance but investors underreact to it.

Virtually all commercial banks in the United States are supervised by one of the three Federal bank regulatory agencies. Although these agencies share the objective of identifying banks with financial difficulties that may lead to their failure under adverse conditions, they have never reached an agreement as to a uniform approach to capital adequacy. Under these circumstances and because of its critical value to bank regulation, the issue of capital adequacy has been extensively investigated by both practitioners and academicians. Those efforts have tended in recent years to concentrate on characterizing problem banks by using multivariate discriminant analysis. Typical examples are studies by Dince and Fortson [10], Sinkey [25, 26], and Sinkey and Walker [27], which use this method to identify the most indicative financial ratios for bank soundness and compare the ability of different formulas to predict bank failure.

In this paper we confront two well-known models for pricing options. It shows how the two models, one derived in a discrete time framework by Boness, the other derived in a continuous time framework by Black and Scholes, can be made consistent. In doing so, we find the implicit, discrete period, discount factor for the call option. Several characteristics of the discount factor are analyzed and compared to the characteristics of the instantaneous expected rate of return on the call.

This study considers a model in which a corporate manager has private information and engages in i) anonymous trading on personal account in the secondary market, and ii) the corporate issuance of new shares in the primary market. The paper examines the equilibrium tradeoff of insider trading profits against the manager's share of the corporate consequences of the primary issue. In the resulting equilibrium, managers, acting in their own best interests, seem to behave according to differing objective functions. In some cases, they seem to maximize intrinsic value, in others, insider trading profits seem to dominate, and still others seem to be concerned with both. Hence, the presence of anonymous trading around corporate financings brings into question the use of corporate objective functions with exogenously fixed weights.

We use the 2015 Chinese stock market crash to study the effects of government stock purchases. The Chinese government purchased stocks to stabilize the markets through state-owned financial institutions known as the “National Team.” We find that the intervention led to reduced volatility and price informativeness. These impacts are driven by the disclosure of government portfolios. Consistent with investors having a stronger incentive to acquire government intervention information instead of fundamental news, we find reduced information production and information asymmetry following intervention disclosure. The article suggests that government stock purchases involve a trade-off between stability and informational efficiency.

The capital asset pricing model specifies that relative risk is a sufficient descriptor of security risk. This result holds under both the Sharpe-Lintner version,

and the more general Black version of the model,

where

= expected rate of return on asset i,

Rf = riskless rate of interest,

= expected return on the market portfolio,

= expected return on any “zero-beta” asset or portfolio of such assests, and

= relative risk of asset i in the market portfolio of assests.

In recent years, a number of studies have been published evaluating alternative bond portfolio strategies. These studies basically simulate risk-return characteristics for a variety of strategies designed for use by financial institutions. Typical strategies considered include portfolios of bonds that have laddered or barbell (dumbbell) maturity structures. In laddered strategies, bonds are spaced evenly among a number of consecutive maturities, while in barbell strategies, bonds are concentrated in short and long maturities. The results of these studies tend to differ and conflict. For example, in a recent article in this journal, Fogler, Groves, and Richardson (FGR) conclude that “dumbbell portfolio strategies are not as efficient as indicated by previous analyses.” Among the previous studies to which they refer is one by Watson, who concluded that “portfolios split between a spaced group of short maturity bonds and a longer investment security” (barbell portfolios) are most efficient. Similar results are reported by Wolf and by Bradley and Crane.

This paper demonstrates that the impact of the existing tax law is not uniform across projects with different variances of payoffs. A bias exists against projects with greater uncertainty of payoffs, which leads to an underinvestment in high risk projects. The bias against higher variance projects offers a theoretical justification for such tax incentives as the research and development tax credit.

The purpose of this paper is to indicate that the opportunity to obtain information regarding the probability distribution of the return on a risky asset, such as a portfolio or a mutual fund, may cause a risk-averse decision maker to accept a single-period actuarially unfair gamble. This behavior is the same as that implied by utility functions that have convex segments, as originally considered by Friedman and Savage [2] and by Markowitz [12], but the utility function derived is not convex on any interval, since it is the envelope of a finite set of strictly increasing, strictly concave functions. Similar utility functions have been obtained, by Fleming [1] because of transactions costs, by Hakansson [4] by imposing a borrowing restriction on an investment-consumption model, and by Masson [14] in the context of an imperfect capital market. In this paper acceptance of single-period actuarially unfair gambles by an individual risk averse with respect to future wealth levels results from the opportunity to acquire information. The acquisition of information creates a set of conditional decisions each of which the individual may treat in an optimal manner, and that set of conditional decisions may induce risk-taking behavior.

The problem of cash management, in its simplest form, is to formulate decision rules which control the level of a firm's cash balance to meet its demands for cash at minimum total discounted cost. Control is achieved by transacting securities for cash. The cost of control is the commission expense [13]. Optimality depends on balancing excess opportunity costs of holding balances which are too large and having excess buying and selling costs (to meet cash obligations) of balances which are too small.

We examine the empirical results from implementation of portfolio insurance strategies employing currency spot and futures options. Hypotheses are generated from Ogden and Tucker's (1988) generalizations concerning the relative values of American spot currency options and currency futures options. We find that protective puts using futures options are generally dominated by both protective puts that use options on spot currencies and by fiduciary calls on futures contracts. This suggests that the prices of puts on foreign currency futures contracts are too high, relative to foreign currency futures calls and to puts on spot currencies.

To learn about investors' information processing, we examine the issuances of trust preferred stock, a leverage-neutral hybrid security. Specific benefits of trust preferred stock issuance have become focal points for issuers. These focal benefits include tax and financial distress avoidance, for example. We find these benefits are associated with short-run stock price misreactions. For those issuers that do not have a focal issuance benefit, mean short-run abnormal returns tend to be negative but long-run abnormal returns tend to be positive. Unanticipated changes in long-run profit opportunities, not short-run operating profits, appear to be the key to the misreaction.

While corporate social responsibility by firms aims at improving welfare for different social groups, whether it achieves this is often difficult to measure. After Apr. 2018 protests, Starbucks enacted policies that anybody could sit in their stores and use the bathroom without making a purchase. Using anonymized cellphone location data, we estimate this led to a 7.0% decline in attendance relative to other nearby coffee shops. The effect is 84% larger near homeless shelters and larger for Starbucks’ wealthier customers. The average time spent per visit declined by 4.1%. Public urination citations decreased near Starbucks locations, but other minor crimes were unchanged.

U.S. equity exchanges have experienced a dramatic increase in competition from new entrants, resulting in the fragmentation of trading across venues. While market quality has generally improved over this period, we show most of the improvements have accrued to the largest stocks. We then show this bifurcation in market quality is related to the fragmentation of trading. Theoretically, more exchange competition should reduce trading costs, yet it may also increase adverse selection for liquidity providers, leading to higher spreads. We document evidence of both effects (fragmentation improves market quality for large stocks while small stocks experience relatively worse quality).

In closed-end funds, a managed distribution policy (MDP) is a dividend commitment potentially requiring the liquidation of assets. We argue that MDPs lower managerial claims on fund assets and, when the fund is at a discount, increase shareholder value. This transfer of wealth can be rationalized by managers wishing to deter a challenge from activist shareholders through a costly proxy vote. We find strong empirical evidence that managers respond to the presence of activists using MDPs, that MDPs constitute an effective wealth transfer to shareholders, and that activists are less likely to challenge management when an MDP is in place.

This study exploits a new long-run data set of daily bid and offered exchange rates in spot and forward markets from 1919 to the present to analyze carry returns in fixed and floating currency regimes. We first find that outsized carry returns occur exclusively in the floating regime, being zero in the fixed regime. Second, we show that fixed-to-floating regime shifts are associated with negative returns to a carry strategy implemented only on floating currencies, robust to the inclusion of volatility risks. These shifts are typically characterized by global flight-to-safety events that represent bad times for carry traders.

Did the rise of Chinese import competition in the early 2000s affect banks’ credit supply policies? Using bank-firm-level data on the universe of Spanish corporate loans, we find that banks rebalanced their loan portfolios away from firms facing Chinese import competition and toward profitable firms in nonexposed sectors. Banks supplied more credit also to the construction sector, albeit independently of firms’ profitability. This was not due to banks’ exposure to the housing boom. Rather, the geographical concentration of the manufacturing industries competing with China left local banks with few alternatives other than local construction firms to rebalance their loan portfolios.