Scholars still disagree about why unions in different countries are radical or conservative. The differences between unions in France and America can be traced to the different requirements for success in strikes before 1914. In France radical unions could win large-scale strikes by involving state officials. In contrast, American unions, facing a more hostile government, avoided state intervention and learned to win strikes by providing financial support to small groups of critically positioned workers. The divergence between American and French union strategy reflected the greater success of American capitalists in winning state support against labor.

Clearly, private business is but one agent for the diffusion of technology. Yet it is an important one. In the normal pursuit of business, technological knowledge and skills pass over political boundaries and private enterprise takes part in the international diffusion of technology. In this paper I want to try to delineate the means by which private companies have shared in the international diffusion of technology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I will note briefly the “imitation lag” and then what I want to call the “absorption gap.” From generalizations, I will turn to some explicit examples and analysis. Finally, in conclusion, I want to return to my concept of the absorption gap and the role of private enterprise in bridging that gap.

Economists have emphasized supply-side learning when explaining long-term trends in racial income differences. This article demonstrates that learning also occurred on the demand side. Estimation of a state-dependence model of the sequence of racial employment outcomes of firms in Cincinnati, Ohio, during World War I shows that the introduction of black workers into a previously all-white firm generated new experiences within the firm, altering its future racial employment decisions.This suggests that more research should be done on how firms and labor markets processed information about workers and how that influenced worker opportunities.

When the Spaniards conquered the New World, they resorted to a form of native labor organization called the encomienda. The encomienda differed from slavery in that the Crown imposed inheritance, trading, and relocation restrictions on encomenderos. Such restrictions cost the Crown revenue by providing incentives for colonists to deplete more quickly the stock of native labor and by keeping native labour in areas of low-revenue productivity. This loss of revenue makes the Crown's Preference for the encomienda curious. The Crown opted for the encomienda, however, to secure its rule and to satisfy an ideological bias against slavery.

Although debate has raged ever since Marx and Engels openly condemned British capitalism in the 1840s, little hard evidence has been brought to bear on the issue of economic inequality. This paper estimates British earnings distributions for four years in the period 1827–1901. The evidence supports the view of increasing inequality up to mid-century and a leveling thereafter. Coupled with newly available evidence on British eighteenth- and nineteenth-century wealth and income distribution, these estimates equip us to search for explanations. A strategy for modeling British inequality history is suggested.

We investigate secular changes in the distribution of personal expenditure in Italy. To this end we present a new data set, consisting of 4,370 family-level budgets scattered over the years 1881–1961. Our methodology is innovative for this kind of study. Italy's secular trend proves to have been egalitarian, and to have accelerated in periods of fast output growth. Sectoral, residential, and demographic changes associated with “modern economic growth” account for a minor part of the observed changes in expenditure distribution, suggesting that other factors, such as wage differentials, play a dominant role in explaining the dynamics of inequality.

I investigate health as determined by nonsurvival in manuscript schedules of families matched in successive censuses. Losses were systematically greater for infants of the unskilled and of residents in large cities; for young children who lived on the frontier or had more young siblings; and for women who lived on the frontier or in the South. The findings have implications for fertility studies based on child-woman ratios, estimation of interregional migration, generality of regional mortality studies, slave-white differences in health, the modern rise of population, and wealth estimation from probate records.

This paper investigates the organization of southern agricultural enterprise in 1910, with special regard for the interrelations of race, land tenure conditions, and the allocation of resources. After surveying the distribution of farmers and land among the major racial and tenure classes, I seek to answer two main questions. First, what determined the distribution of farm rental contracts between share-rent and fixed-rent forms, and did the tenant's race influence the form of rental contract he obtained? Second, what effect did the race of the farmers and the form of their land tenure have on the determination of farm size? A concluding section raises some further questions and briefly explores the difficult problem of discovering the effects of racism on the southern economy.

The unemployment relief programs introduced by the federal government in the 1930s were the largest single factor in the growth of the federal budget over the decade. We develop a model that enables us to estimate the effects of the relief programs on private employment. Cross-sectional data bearing on the operation of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration rejects the hypothesis that the federal relief programs reduced private employment. Individuals did respond to the incentives of relief benefits, but only by moving between relief and non-relief unemployment.

Using the census survival method to calculate net flows across employment states between 1900 and 1910, we find that approximately one-fifth of all men who reached the age of 55 eventually retired before death. Many of these retirees appear to have planned their withdrawal from paid employment by accumulating assets, becoming self-employed, and then liquidating their assets to provide a stream of income to finance consumption in old age. This “modern” retirement behavior has important implications for the economic history of capital and labor markets, of saving and investment, of insurance and pensions, and of the family economy.

One of the first problems confronting a colonial power after establishing de facto or de jure sovereignty over a new territory is to set up procedures for settling disputes arising within the dominated society, and to establish a whole range of rights in relation to property and obligations of individuals and groups to one another and to the state.

Europeans stopped using servitude to finance passage to America sometime in the early nineteenth century, but exactly when and why immigrant servitude disappeared is a mystery. Hypotheses abound, but no consensus has emerged nor have scholars tested hypotheses. In this study, quantitative evidence for the final sixty years of immigrant servitude establishes when and why it disappeared. Servitude did not end because of insufficient demand, legal restrictions, or declines in passage fares. It ended because superior methods of financing migration developed. Chance historical events, however, determined the exact timing of the end.

We use a novel data set spanning 1820–1910 to assess the factors leading to the creation of formal bank supervisory institutions across American states. We show that it took more than a century for all states to create separate agencies tasked with monitoring the safety and soundness of banks. State legislatures initially pursued cheaper regulatory alternatives, such as double liability laws; however, banking distress at the state level as well as the structural shift from note-issuing to deposit-taking commercial banks and competition with national banks propelled policymakers to adopt costly and permanent supervisory institutions.

The poor performance of the Colombian economy in the world markets during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are attributable, in part, to the weakness of settlers’ property rights in frontier lands. To examine this issue, we collected data on production of agricultural exports at county (municipal) level in 1892, coffee production in 1925, and of public land allocation and land conflicts during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The quantitative analysis suggests that in the absence of land conflicts, the per capita production of agricultural exports would have been in 1925 at least twice as much as that observed.

Average annual earnings calculated from the census of manufactures are used to extend previous research on labor market integration in the United States. In contrast to earlier research examining occupational wage rates, census average earnings indicate that a well-integrated labor market had emerged in the Northeast and North Central regions as early as 1879. They also reveal substantial convergence within the South Atlantic and South Central regions, suggesting the emergence of a unified southern labor market. Large and persistent North-South differentials indicate, however, that a unified national labor market did not develop before World War I.

The Canadian economy, already wealthy, diverse, and relatively industrial at the dawn of the twentieth century, had not yet outgrown its reliance on resource-intensive production. Empirical evidence indicates that the exploitation of Canada's natural resource endowment made direct and indirect contributions to the size and efficiency of the twentieth-century domestic economy. I conclude that the concentration of capital and labor in resource industries did not constrain the rate of change of Canadian real GNP per capita between 1900 and 1999, and it appears to have had a substantial positive impact on the level of real GNP per capita.

Corporations have been the big basic units of recent American business; in the Venetian Republic the basic units of business life were family partnerships. To be sure, since a Venetian family partnership was not an organization formed for business purposes only, it did not correspond exactly to a corporation. There were in the Venetian economy during the Later Middle Ages some enterprises which required the use of so much capital that normally several families banded together to spread the risks and for such occasions they formed joint ventures. From some points of view these joint ventures, rather than the family partnerships, corresponded in Venetian economy to the corporation in modern economy; for they were organized for strictly business purposes, they involved large capitals, and their ownership was divided into shares. But the joint ventures lacked the permanence of the modern corporation and they had quite limited objectives. They lasted only for the duration of a voyage or until a cargo had been sold. Moreover, they did not have so large capital funds as did the family partnerships which created them. Venetian business enterprise, having been fathered by the state and mothered by the family, remained subordinated to these older and stronger institutions. This fact is not surprising, for when viewed in historical perspective the modern corporation appears a parvenu of uncertain future. In most societies, at most times, it has been the great family which by its wealth, power, prestige, and presumption of permanence has been the outstanding institution in private economic enterprise.

This article uses a new panel dataset to investigate the relationship between financial fragility and real activity on U.S. railroads during 1929–1940. Leverage had a negative effect on maintenance, within small firms only. Bankruptcy had a positive effect on maintenance and employment, within large firms only. Both leverage and bankruptcy effects were significantly larger during the worst depression years. Had all railroads been bankrupt during 1930–1933, GDP would have increased by 0.2 percent annually, and employment by 0.125 percent annually. Loans by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had no impact on maintenance or employment.

This paper examines price convergence and changes in the efficiency of wheat markets, covering the period from the mid-fourteenth to the early twentieth century and most of Europe. The analysis is based on a new data set of prices from almost 600 markets. Unlike previous research, we find that convergence was a predominantly pre-modern phenomenon. It started in the late fifteenth century, advanced rapidly until the beginning of the seventeenth century when it temporarily stalled, resumed after the Thirty Years’ War, and accelerated after the Napoleonic Wars in response to trade liberalization. From the late 1840s, convergence petered out and turned into divergence after 1875 as policy decisions dominated technological change. Our results point to the ‘Little Divergence’ between North-Western Europe and the rest of the continent as starting about 1600. Long-term improvements in market efficiency began in the early sixteenth century, with advances over time being as uneven as in price convergence. We trace this to differential institutional change and the non-synchronous spread of modern media and systems of information transmission that affected the ability of merchants to react to news.

The economics of David Ricardo and the contemporary evidence for the economic importance of information suggest that time of entry into an economy should be an important determinant of wealth. This hypothesis is validated for nineteenth-century Utah, since time of entry into the economy had a larger impact on the level of wealth than did occupation, birthplace, sex, region of settlement, or age. This finding suggests that the effect on wealthholding of variables often given a discriminatory interpretation such as foreign birth may be overstated if time of entry into the economy is ignored. It also helps to explain the increase in inequality as the settlement process continues.

returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favor to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all.