This article analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel data set of Spanish provinces in 1880–1914, we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime's global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation.

In the United States a century ago, working children turned over almost all of their earnings to their parents. What incentives, then, did they have to work? Standard answers include altruism or the “sticks” wielded by parents and employers. This article argues that there were also “carrots”: working gave children greater influence in household decision making. Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Cost of Living Survey 1917–1919, this article shows that working children had higher clothing expenditures than did nonworking children and that clothing expenditures were increasing in the income a child brought into the household.

I examine prenuptial contracting behavior in early-nineteenth-centuiy Quebec to explore property rights within families and the efficacy of marital property laws. Drawing on a transaction cost framework, I examine the decision to sign a contract and couples' property rights choices. I find, for example, that couples signing contracts tended to choose joint ownership of property when wives were particularly important to the household. These findings illustrate the potential effects of legal institutions on individuals' behavior (such as the importance of family labor, human capital acquisition, and even mating decisions) and the value of a flexible legal environment.

Historians have long debated whether the American colonies on balance benefited or were hindered by British imperial regulation. George Bancroft thought the regulations worked a definite hardship on the colonies. George L. Beer believed these regulations nicely balanced and that the colonies shared in the general advantages. Lawrence Harper, in a now classic article, actually attempted to calculate the cost and found that British policies “placed a heavy burden upon the colonies.” Oliver Dickerson wrote that “no case can be made … that such laws were economically oppressive,” while Curtis P. Nettels, writing at the same time to the same point, stated: “British policy as it affected the colonies after 1763 was restrictive, injurious, negative.” It is quite evident that a difference of opinion exists among reputable colonial historians over this important historical issue.

Substantial regional differentials in mortgage rates persisted throughout the postbellum period. I find that these differentials reflected not only variations in lending risk, but also the costs incurred in transferring funds between markets and unexplained regional premia. The results are consistent with the traditional interpretation that capital markets were at least partially segmented throughout the late nineteenth century. The effects on home and farm mortgage rates in the South and West were substantial and suggest that market segmentation could have had a substantial impact on the regional pattern of urbanization as well as agricultural development.

This article reconsiders industrial growth in post-Unification Italy in light of a new set of sector-specific production estimates. Though still in part provisional, the new series confirm that the production of durables (and related materials) was dominated by the Kuznets cycle. A similar cycle is documented in the growth rate of the residual, excluding foodstuffs, and extended by reasonable assumption to foodstuffs as well. The new series thus support the traditional view of the 1880s as a period of widespread prosperity and above-trend consumption rather than the opposite, now dominant view.This article presents the first comprehensive results of a long-term research project that owes much to the constant encouragement of Pierluigi Ciocca and Gianni Toniolo, to extended exchanges with Giovanni Federico, to the kindness of the librarians at the Bank of Italy and the Istituto centrale di statistica, and not least, for their financial support, to the Ente per gli studi monetari, bancari e finanziari “Luigi Einaudi,” the National Science Foundation, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca Scientifica e Tecnologica. The usual disclaimer applies.

The market for joint stock shares in eighteenth-century England is often portrayed as an underdeveloped and flawed mechanism for resource allocation, which in turn is cited to explain the paucity of shares actually traded. This article questions that interpretation, both by inquiring whether the requisite institutions for a functional market were present, and by constructing a new time series of eighteenth-century share prices and exposing them to a test of the efficient markets hypothesis. Because the stock exchange is found to exhibit most of the conventionally defined characteristics of an effective market, the article concludes by outlining the case for skepticism with respect to a common theme in economic history: the idea that the purported superiority of market resource allocation over alternative non-market forms (in the absence of rigidities due to underdevelopment or government interference) is an unambiguous conclusion in every historical context.

I analyze the adult age at death of 115,650 European nobles from 800 to 1800. Longevity began increasing long before 1800 and the Industrial Revolution, with marked increases around 1400 and again around 1650. Declines in violent deaths from battle contributed to some of this increase, but the majority must reflect other changes in individual behavior. There are historic spatial contours to European elite mortality; Northwest Europe achieved greater adult lifespans than the rest of Europe even by 1000 ad.

Before the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933, several states established deposit guarantee funds. The key factor influencing the adoption of deposit insurance by a state was the structure of its banking industry. In states where small unit banks were dominant, there was strong support for guarantee funds to protect deposits; in other states there was more interest in branch banking. The failure to design the guarantee funds in accordance with sound principles of insurance brought about their demise and led to increased branch banking.

The records of the United States Army, which hired civilian workers in the nineteenth century, have produced a large sample of wage rates. New estimates of nominal daily wage rates from 1820 to 1856 are presented. There is no evidence of a long-term increase in the skill differential. The growth of real wages in the Northeast appears to have been slower and more erratic than previously thought. Regional trends in wages are consistent with other evidence on patterns of regional growth and internal migration.

Available evidence on interest rates and government borrowing during Britain's industrial revolution, while limited, does not support the idea that war spending crowded out private investment. This article demonstrates the importance of using data on net receipts from borrowing, rather than changes in government debt. Weaknesses of the crowding-out model concerning capital markets and investment, openness of the economy, and full employment are identified for the historical case. The case raises broader issues of whether conceptions of saving and investment based in neoclassical supply-constrained models are as appropriate as theories of capital accumulation.

The prudent peasant mitigated the risk of crop failures by scattering his arable land throughout his village, Deirdre McCloskey argued, because alternative risk-sharing institutions did not exist. But, alternatives did exist, this essay concludes. Medieval English peasants formed two types of farmers' cooperatives. Fraternities protected members from the perils of everyday life. Customary poor laws redistributed resources towards villagers beset by bad luck. In both institutions, the expectation of reciprocation motivated farmers with surpluses to aid neighbors with shortages.

What happened to the standard of life of the British working classes in the late decades of the eighteenth and the early decades of the nineteenth centuries ? Was the introduction of the factory system beneficial or harmful in its effect on the workers? These, though related, are distinct questions. For it is possible that employment in factories conduced to an increase of real wages but that the tendency was more than offset by other influences, such as the rapid increase of population, the immigration of Irishmen, the destruction of wealth by long years of warfare, ill-devised tariffs, and misconceived measures for the relief of distress. Both questions have a bearing on some political and economic disputes of our own day, and this makes it difficult to consider them with complete objectivity. An American scholar (so it is said) once produced a book entitled An Impartial History of the Civil War: From the Southern Point of View. If I seek to emulate his impartiality I ought also to strive to equal his candor. Let me confess, therefore, at the start that I am of those who believe that, all in all, conditions of labor were becoming better, at least after 1820, and that the spread of the factory played a not inconsiderable part in the improvement.

We estimate the extent of common land in England from 1475 to 1839, treating charity land as a sample. We find common was only 27 percent of land in 1600. Thus there was little common beyond what Parliamentary acts later enclosed. More tentatively, common was only one-third of land even in 1500. Further, common land in 1600 was mainly stinted, excluding those without formal property rights. Common waste, to which the landless poor did have access, constituted a mere 4 percent of land, and was mainly land of marginal value. Private property was thus the norm in England by 1600.

The economic historian is well aware of the philanthropic origins of savings banks. Both in Western Europe and the United States they were initially established by public spirited individuals as a depository for the funds of small savers. It is not so widely appreciated that such banks were encouraged officially as a part of social policy in England during the nineteenth century. In an age in which self-help and individual thrift were conceived as the only solutions for lower-class poverty and distress, a means of spreading such virtues was sure not to go unnoticed. Brought forward in those critical years at the end of the Napoleonic wars, “here was the first constructive and practical proposal for counteracting the growing pauperization of the community, restoring independence to the masses, stopping the growth of the poor rate, and giving the ordinary man and woman some interest in the financial stability of the country.”

Popular wisdom asserts, and life-cycle theories of human capital investment seem to imply, that older scientists are slower to accept new theories than are younger scientists. When this view is tested with evidence on the acceptance of cliometrics, however, the year-of-birth variable, although statistically significant, explains less than 10 percent of the variance in acceptance.

In 1878 the liberal parties lost enough votes to lose the majority in the parliament which they had defended in the general election just one year before. In this article, the questions of where the voters came from and why the voting changed so crucially within one year are reexamined. The analysis uses a new set of data and makes use of King's algorithm, a tool provided by modern political science. The main finding of this article is that the change towards protectionism was not caused by new, but by floating voters from the agricultural sector.

In both northern and southern cities of the United States, African-Americans faced a web of social constraints on such activities as housing, shopping, and everyday interpersonal interactions. These constraints had implications for the labor market as well. In particular, norms against white subservience to blacks played an important role in determining the racial composition of occupations. Close attention to the operation of such social norms can add much explanatory power to conventional economic analyses of discrimination based on human capital and taste for discrimination.

Recent revisionist treatments of nineteenth-century French economic growth are examined and reveal that the pattern of economic growth in France was indeed substantially different from the unusual pattern in Great Britain. Labor productivity in French industry was probably lower than in Britain, contrary to the claims of O'Brien and Keyder, and neither growth of per capita income nor the level of income in France in 1910 was remarkable. The article thus supports a position between that of early writers and that of the recent revisionists.

Britain's acquisiton of Lagos has already attracted considerable historical research, but it is examined here from a new perspective and with the help of unused sources. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the episode itself is reinterpreted to give prominence to changing property rights as both a cause and a consequence of annexation. Second, it is argued that the Lagos case can be placed in a broader framework of imperial expansion in which institutional change formed the centerpiece of a nineteenth-century development drive. Third, it is suggested that the study of African history might benefit from assigning higher priority to the analysis of property rights other than those embodied in slave-holding.