This article presents tests of the role of money in the price revolution (1525–1618). The hypothesis is that American specie drove European prices, and that the mechanism was the quantity theory of money buttressed by the specie-flow mechanism. Specie entered Spain, increasing Spanish prices, and then spread over Western Europe as a result of the Spanish balance-of-payments deficit, enlarging European monetary bases and price levels. Empirical verification is achieved through Granger-causality tests.

We use annual information on apprenticeships in England between 1710–1805 to estimate the dynamic supply-responsiveness in this market in the presence of the increasingly powerful technological shocks as the Industrial Revolution proceeded apace. Using both an Instrumental Variable method and a dynamic Vector Autoregression framework (VAR) system to identify the long-run response functions, we find evidence of an elastic supply, sufficiently high as to allow quantities to rise considerably in response to demand shocks. This finding lends support to the view that Britain's apprenticeship institution was the source of its advantage in skilled mechanical labor, so critical to its economic success.

The American workers' quest for an eight-hour day finally came to an end around 1919. I argue that the most important factors behind the rapid decline in manufacturing hours in the decade before 1919 include the rapid expansion of the economy, which increased wages and drew new participants into the manufacturing sector; the reduction of immigration during the war; the growth in organized labor's strength; federal and state legislation that mandated reduced work weeks; and the electrification of the manufacturing sector.

This article examines the geographic integration of U.S. labor markets from 1870 to 1898, using previously unexploited wage and price data for 23 occupations in 12 major cities. In contrast to the increasing nationalization found in other markets at that time, the labor market was characterized by large and persistent real wage differentials both within and between regions, leaving little doubt that late nineteenth-century labor markets remained far from completely integrated. The differentials, however, owed as much to substantial variations in labor demand growth as to the lack of labor market integration.

Occupation charges paid by France to Nazi Germany represent one of the largest international transfers and contributed significantly to the German war effort. We employ a neoclassical growth model that incorporates essential features of the occupied economy to assess the welfare costs of the policies that managed the payments to Germany. Our lower bound estimates show that occupation payments required a severe cut in consumption. A draft of labor to Germany and a reduction of real wages added to this burden. Management of the accumulated domestic debt required large budget surpluses; but post-Liberation inflation slashed the real debt.

We describe the transfer of patents in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Germany using a new database containing information on 20,000 transactions. The number of transactions shows an upward trend, in total numbers and as a share of patents in force. About 8 percent of patents were transferred at least once during their existence. Many transactions involved the transfer of patents with an above-average quality from individual inventors to firms and to newly created firms. In addition, valuable patents were transferred between firms. About two-thirds of all transfers occurred during the first three years of a patents’ existence.

Can learning by doing be held to have played a significant part in raising productive efficiency during the early growth of manufacturing industries in the United States? If there is indeed an adequate basis for regarding technical progress during the pre-Civil War period as an endogenous process depending crucially upon the accumulation of practical experience, what sorts of ‘learning functions” best describe the forms in which that process manifested itself? And, in evaluating the impact of national commercial policies—be they historical or contemporary—what implications flow from the existence and the characteristics of learning effects in young industries, and possibly also in not-so-young industries?

We use a standard metric from international finance, the currency risk premium, to assess the credibility of fixed exchange rates during the classical gold standard era. Theory suggests that a completely credible and permanent commitment to join the gold standard would have zero currency risk or no expectation of devaluation. We find that, even five years after a typical emerging-market country joined the gold standard, the currency risk premium averaged at least 220 basis points. Fixed-effects, panel-regression estimates that control for a variety of borrower-specific factors also show large and positive currency risk premia. In contrast to core gold standard countries, such as France and Germany, the persistence of large premia, long after gold standard adoption, suggest that financial markets did not view the pegs in emerging markets as credible and expected that they devaluation.

Whether anthropometric-mortality risk relationships as found in present day populations also characterized past populations is disputed. This article finds U-shaped body mass index (BMI)-mortality risk relationships among nineteenth-century men that were similar to such relationships as found in twentieth-century men. No relationship between height and mortality could be detected. This article infers from the socioeconomic homogeneity of the sample that the BMI-mortality risk relationship, although apparently invariant with respect to time, is driven by noneconomic factors.

I study the mobility and economic outcomes of European immigrants and their children in nineteenth-century Argentina, the second largest destination country during the Age of Mass Migration. I use new data linking males across censuses and passenger lists of arrivals to Buenos Aires. First-generation immigrants experienced faster occupational upgrading than natives. Occupational mobility was substantial relative to Europe; immigrants holding unskilled occupations upon arrival experienced high rates of occupational upgrading. Second-generation immigrants outperformed the sons of natives in terms of literacy, occupational status and access to property, and experienced higher rates of intergenerational mobility out of unskilled occupations.

Almost without exception interpretations of the remarkable growth of the German economy before the First World War stress the role of the German banking system, in general, and that of the universal or Kreditbank, in particular. The most subtle and penetrating view of this question is that developed in Alexander Gerschenkron's essays, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective” and “Prerequisites of Modern Industrialization.” According to this view, “backward” countries which experience successful industrializations do so by making institutional “substitutions” which enable them to compensate for or even to turn to their advantage their initial deficiencies of productive factors. The institution which is “substituted” in Germany to perform this function is the Kreditbank. This interpretation places special emphasis on the growth-inducing character of these banks, but is also open to the possibility that an industrialization led by such institutions might have entailed certain costs. In fact, Professor Gerschenkron explicitly invites help in assessing these costs in commenting: “it would be a fruitful undertaking in research to explore and perhaps to measure and compare the difficulties, the strains, and the cost which were involved in the various processes of substitution ….” Thanks to the work of Ekkehard Eistert, who has constructed a reliable set of statistics on the German banking system in this era, it is now possible to attempt such a “fruitful undertaking.” Making use of these data, an econometric model has been constructed to test the hypothesis that the manner in which the Kreditbanken allocated credit contributed to the growth of German non-agricultural output. Our findings strongly suggest that the credit allocation policy of these banks was inhibiting rather than stimulating the German economy in the period for which data are available and that previous interpretations are in need of serious revision. It appears that, in Gerschenkron's terms, the “cost” of bank-led industrialization was far greater than anyone has previously suggested.

Using a new data set, this article presents new evidence on inequality in Latin America for the nineteenth century and studies the effects of factor endowments and trade on inequality. Recent research has highlighted the link between the colonial origins of inequality and its persistence in Latin America. We find that inequality varied substantially throughout the century and across the region. We identify the impact of changing factor endowments and trade on inequality using a simple theoretical framework. This work suggests that the role of initial colonial origins has been overemphasized as important changes took place during postcolonial times.

Per capita agricultural output sharply declined in the “Confederate States” between 1860 and 1880. This article asserts that the decline in agricultural output was partially the result of increased disease (hookworm) brought about by substandard living conditions suffered by the Southern population during the Civil War. Skeletal remains and mortality data, ubiquitous hookworm symptoms among the Southern population, and regression analysis support this hypothesis. The econometric results strongly suggest that emancipation and increased hookworm infection were responsible for the income decline while an increase in the percentage of sharecropping tenancy arrangements increased southern productivity.

Economists and historians have raked over the economic experience of Europe like a family ransacking the town dump for a diamond ring inadvertently dropped into the trash. Now and then they run hurriedly over the whole field. Most of the time they are digging deep in one corner or rushing anxiously from one spot to another, picking up the objects they find there, examining them closely and then discarding them. The results are a junk collector's delight. But they do not necessarily include any diamonds.

Study of ante-bellum economic development of the United States has been hampered by an acute shortage of reliable statistical data. Studies of the early capital markets are no exception to this general rule. For the years after 1856, Frederick Macaulay's excellent study provides sufficient quantitative basis for general research; but, in the earlier years, only Bigelow's single unsupported interest series provides the economic historian with statistical information on the condition of the credit market.

The new sectoral estimates of industrial production in 1871, 1881, 1901, and 1911 are regionally allocated using census labor-force data. The regional aggregates suggest that the “industrial triangle” emerged over these decades out of a traditional surplus-recycling economy. The concomitant change in the industrial rankings argues against attributing the regions' different paths to their different initial conditions; surprisingly, too, overall growth does not seem closely tied to industrial development. The disaggregated estimates suggest in turn that the industrial structure of the various regions remained relatively similar, as if comparative advantages were generically industrial rather than sector-specific.

The central fact of the demographic history of early North America is rapid growth. Both Canada and the white population of the English colonies experienced increases of 2½ percent per year during the eighteenth century. Seventeenth-century rates, beginning from a low base and more influenced by immigration, were even higher. In contrast, the expansion of population in early modern Europe rarely exceeded 1 percent per annum over an extended period. Since Franklin and Malthus, interpretations of early American demography have centered on the high fertility associated with near universal marriage for women at a low average age. The extremely youthful population, high dependency ratio, and one of the largest mean census family sizes ever recorded all follow from the high level of fertility.

This article examines the role of creditor protection in the development of the U.K. corporate bond market. This market grew rapidly in the late nineteenth century, but in the twentieth century it experienced a reversal, albeit with a short-lived post-1945 renaissance. Such was the extent of the reversal that the market from the 1970s onwards was smaller than it had been in 1870. We find that law does not explain the variation in the size of this market over time. Alternatively, our evidence suggests that inflation and taxation policies were major drivers of this market in the post-1945 era.

The Spanish Monarchy pursued a rational policy of price discrimination among its Castilian currencies while financing its early-seventeenth-century wars. Large-denomination gold and silver coins circulated internationally, forcing the Monarchy to act more competitively and not seek additional short-run revenue. In contrast, petty coinage was a local monopoly. The Monarchy raised seigniorage rates and issued large quantities, generating large revenues. The nominal petty money stock grew rapidly, then fluctuated. The real petty money stock grew, then varied little as petty currency depreciation dampened nominal changes.