Political parties are widely seen as “a sine qua non for the organization of the modern democratic polity and for the expression of political pluralism.” The manner in which parties articulate political interests largely defines the nature of electoral competition, the representation of citizen interests, the policy consequences of elections—and ultimately the functioning of the democratic process.

The failure of Japanese electronics firms to participate fully in the Internet-fueled growth of the global electronics industry during the late 1990s triggered a period of questioning among top executives. This article examines Japanese managerial responses to the organizational model “value chain modularity,” which was deployed by the US electronics firms driving the creation of the Internet. While there were partial but significant steps taken in the direction of this new US model—increased specialization, outsourcing of low-end products, and shared factory investments in Japan—wholesale restructuring was resisted. This evidence is consistent with larger patterns of gradual institutional change in Japan. I argue that the result of this process will likely be increased, not diminished, institutional diversity over time. While globalization has accelerated the pace of change by opening new avenues for organizational experimentation and institutional layering, the drag on organizational change exerted by existing institutions slows the process enough to allow institutional and organizational innovations to develop into coherent systems with distinct characteristics. The result, inevitably, will be a uniquely Japanese approach to the challenges posed by globalization.

Most of the contemporary policy debate regarding economic interdependence and peace has focused on devising responses either in favor of or in opposition to the prevailing notion that trade is positively and unconditionally correlated with peace. The China and Taiwan case—noteworthy for the simultaneous presence of an ever-increasing economic interdependence and an adversarial political relationship—provides an interesting counterexample to the leading positions in the literature. What is missing in the literature is a model that studies states' decisions to trade and initiate conflict as a function not only of their own utility but also of their perceptions about how their opponent will respond. States' decisions to trade depend on the likelihood that their prospective trade partner will initiate a conflict, and decisions to initiate a conflict depend on perceptions of the likelihood that the target will concede. In this article, the authors develop a model that expands the domain of the trade-peace analysis by endogenizing and analyzing states' decisions to trade and initiate conflicts.

Over the past two decades, numerous East Asian states have undergone transitions to democracy. One of the most distinctive aspects of democratization has been the way East Asian democracies have sought to manage political change by institutional innovations that aim to influence the development of the region's party systems. These reforms have typically tried to promote more centrist and stable politics by encouraging fewer, and hence larger, political parties. The result is an increasing evolution of the region's electoral and party system constellations toward more majoritarian elections and, in some cases, nascent two-party systems.

The alignment of parties within a party system shapes the nature of electoral competition, the process of representation, and potentially the legitimacy of the system. This article describes the distribution of parties and the levels of party polarization in the party systems of East Asian democracies. We examine the public's perceptions of party positions on a left-right scale to map the pattern of party competition. The evidence is based on two waves of surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. We describe considerable variation in the polarization of Asian party systems, which has direct implications for the clarity of party choice and the behavior of voters. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings.

South Korea's economic takeoff in the 1960s triggered a scholarly debate over the causes behind its economic growth. Neoclassical economists and “statist” scholars focused on government policies toward the industrial sector, but as this article shows, they have neglected to consider the political economy behind the government's targeting of the agricultural and livestock sectors for export promotion. In fact, the South Korean government's support of export-led growth—aimed at the rural sector as well as industry—transformed the nation's agricultural and livestock institutions from instruments of development and export promotion into protectionist mechanisms. This article discusses how complete market liberalization would have resulted in more efficient resource allocation and reveals how political considerations affected the institutional arrangement in the South Korean countryside and the subsequent liberalization of agricultural and beef markets.

This article considers the problem of North Korea's collective farms from a micro-institutional perspective. It begins with an analysis of the collective farming system introduced in 1958, the changes in 1966 that allowed for sub-work teams, and the further reform of 1996 that permitted a new work squad system. The normalization of North Korea's agriculture is not just a technological problem; rather, it requires reform of the collective farms and their incentives: the removal of the inefficient elements in the shorter term and the promotion of family farming in the medium to longer term.

A stable and effective party system depends on consistent and enduring support from social groups. Using the Lipset-Rokkan paradigm as a point of departure, this article tests the relationship between social structure and party support in four East Asian democracies (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan) and two Western democracies (Australia and New Zealand) using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Using Australia and New Zealand as a reference point, the results show that the four Lipset-Rokkan social cleavages are only loosely related to party support in the four East Asian nations, mainly through center-periphery and urban-rural divisions. The absence of an owner-worker cleavage is explained by the suppression of labor-based parties in these countries. More generally, the results suggest the importance of the socializing experiences associated with the democratic transitions in each of the four newer democracies.

This article examines how the social transformation in many East Asian democracies is altering the value priorities of their publics, and how these values are affecting party choice. Our analyses are based on the newest wave of the World Values Survey. We find that the emergence of an authoritarian-libertarian value cleavage is clearly associated with level of development, but these values emerge well before what prior research indicated. In addition, we show that party loyalty among the East Asian citizenry is shaped by a mix of social values, economic issues, left-right ideology, distrust in governmental institutions, and proclivities to engage in protest activities.

Post-1997 Thai politics have been shaped by the effects of two momentous events that occurred almost at the same time: the introduction of far-reaching structural changes by the 1997 constitution, and the appearance of a singularly overbearing and centralizing political leader—Thaksin Shinawatra. To political analysts, this situation has provided uniquely rich opportunities to observe over a number of years whether constitutional engineering had the envisaged effect of restricting the politicians' “undesirable” actions, and whether the intended institutional change was realized. However, the coincidence of constitutional change and the occurrence of Thaksin has also made it necessary to distinguish the effects of structural changes from the effects of the new form of political leadership.

This article compares partisanship across East Asian nations, with four indicators reflecting different dimensions of the concept. Across these indicators, partisanship in East Asian nations was found to be relatively weak compared with most Western democracies, reflecting the less institutionalized nature of their party systems. This could be caused by insufficient time to develop partisanship through mechanisms such as electoral experience and parental socialization. Further breakdowns of income, gender, age groups, and educational levels of partisans showed that more advanced democracies share a relatively uniform pattern across demographics, while young democracies in East Asia showed a more skewed distribution of partisan identifiers, unevenly distributed across income and gender groups. This pattern suggests partisanship is likely to start its development from certain segments of the population and then spread into other segments of the society as a party system becomes more institutionalized.

I have written elsewhere: “Where there exists a critical mass of scholars working on similar sets of questions—critiquing and building on one another's work—knowledge accumulation is more likely to occur.”1 It is with this statement in mind that I proceed with my response to Michael Nelson's thoughtful critique on my previous article (see Allen Hicken, “Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rack Thai,” Journal of East Asian Studies 6, no. 3 [2006]: 381–407). Rather than a point-by-point rebuttal, I will focus on three of the most interesting and challenging of Nelson's theoretical critiques. The first substantive issue concerns the charge of omitted variable bias—specifically, in reference to the omission of local political groups from a macro-institutional account. The second and third criticisms are more methodological. First, can we or should we ascribe motives to political actors? Second, how can we use counterfactuals to solve problems of observational equivalence?

This article assesses the relative importance of partisanship in explaining level of citizens' political engagement within a multivariate framework. In particular, we examine if the relative worth of partisan attachment in explaining civic engagement differs systematically between East Asian emerging democracies and established democracies. We find that partisanship in East Asia exerts just as much influence on citizens' engagement in politics as in established democracies. The global trend in which interest associations and social movements are becoming vigorous competitors to parties for the opportunity to represent and mobilize citizens in democratic process has also spread to East Asia.

I am flattered by Michael Nelson's interest in my article (“Evolving To ward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in Thailand Today,” Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 3). He takes issue with my discussion of four levels of parliamentary games: the arenas of lead party in a coalition government versus lead party in the opposition camp; inter-party games in a coalition government; inter-factional games; and games between individual MPs themselves, the most micro-level. Nelson is right to suggest that “we really need a more realistic and comprehensive conceptualization of local-provincial-regional-national political linkages” in Thailand. However, that is not what I sought to do in my article. As I make clear, my focus is on the national level of analysis with regard to parties, factions, and coalition behavior in Thailand.