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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 March 2016
I am flattered by Michael Nelson's interest in my article (“Evolving To ward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in Thailand Today,” Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 3). He takes issue with my discussion of four levels of parliamentary games: the arenas of lead party in a coalition government versus lead party in the opposition camp; inter-party games in a coalition government; inter-factional games; and games between individual MPs themselves, the most micro-level. Nelson is right to suggest that “we really need a more realistic and comprehensive conceptualization of local-provincial-regional-national political linkages” in Thailand. However, that is not what I sought to do in my article. As I make clear, my focus is on the national level of analysis with regard to parties, factions, and coalition behavior in Thailand.
1. “PDP Rebels Threaten New Chuan Government,” Bangkok Post , December 15, 1994, p. 1.Google Scholar
2. “Banharn Works Hard for Survival.” Bangkok Post , June 2, 1996, p. 1.Google Scholar
3. Nelson should not imply that only Sanoh Tienthong's faction ever wanted to leave Thai Rak Thai. Examples of other factions that threatened to depart include the faction of Prachuab Chaiyasan in 2003 (“‘Kamnan Poh’ faction threatens defection,” The Nation , April 23, 2003, http://www.nationmultimedia.com), and the Wadah faction in 2004 (“Wadah Faction Threatens to Leave TRT,” The Nation, March 26, 2004, http://www.nationmultimedia.com).Google Scholar