I am flattered by Michael Nelson's interest in my article (“Evolving To ward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in Thailand Today,” Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 3). He takes issue with my discussion of four levels of parliamentary games: the arenas of lead party in a coalition government versus lead party in the opposition camp; inter-party games in a coalition government; inter-factional games; and games between individual MPs themselves, the most micro-level. Nelson is right to suggest that “we really need a more realistic and comprehensive conceptualization of local-provincial-regional-national political linkages” in Thailand. However, that is not what I sought to do in my article. As I make clear, my focus is on the national level of analysis with regard to parties, factions, and coalition behavior in Thailand.

How do attachments to political parties among the mass publics of East Asia affect the process of democratization in the region? Analyses of the East Asia Barometer surveys reveal that partisanship motivates East Asians to endorse the democratic performance of their political system and embrace democracy as the best possible system of government. These findings accord, by and large, with the socialization, cognitive dissonance, and rational choice theories of partisanship.

This article examines Japan's evolving commitments to technology development and technology diffusion in Asia. It explores Japan's technology strategies in three areas—Internet protocol, open source software, and horology—focusing on the importance of technology standards. The development and diffusion of technology standards has become one of the core elements in establishing industrial competitiveness. The importance of technology standards encouraged the Japanese government and firms to pursue a regional policy to develop and diffuse new technological ideas and standards in Asia. Japan's commitments were accepted by its neighbors because they could obtain various benefits from collaboration with Japan, such as technological exchanges, technology transfer, and financial aid.

This article explains why, in the wake of South Korea's democratization, the US-Republic of Korea alliance has suffered a steady decline while avoiding an abrupt collapse. The author argues that democratization weakened this asymmetric alliance by increasing the political influence of nationalism in South Korea. New South Korean democratic elites, subscribing to nationalist ideals, demanded an autonomous, equal relationship with the United States regardless of the de facto power disparity between the two countries. These elites also deemphasized the security threat from North Korea—with which they perceived a shared national identity—and adopted an unconditional engagement policy with that nation. The United States, in turn, resented the apparently unrealistic policies of these elites and showed a decreased interest in the alliance. Democratization, however, did not cause an abrupt end to the alliance, for two reasons. First, North Korea's military strength preserved a significant strategic need in South Korea for allied support. Second, as the result of a measured transition process, old pro-alliance elites in South Korea retained enough political clout to proscribe a radical shift in foreign policy away from the alliance with the United States, while new elites had opportunities to reconcile their nationalist ideals with strategic realities.