Political trust is a cornerstone of political survival and development. This paper makes use of data from the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey to examine the level of political trust in Hong Kong and Taiwan. It finds that the people of Hong Kong have a high level of trust in their government and judiciary, but a relatively low level of trust in their legislature. In contrast, the Taiwan people have a lower level of trust in all of their executive, judicial, and legislative branches, reflecting a serious problem with political confidence in Taiwan. A further analysis shows that institutional factors such as ratings of government performance, life satisfaction, and satisfaction with democratic rights and freedoms, and cultural factors such as interpersonal trust, post-materialism, and traditionalism have varying degrees of effect on the different domains of political trust in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but institutional factors appear to be more powerful than cultural factors in explaining the experiences of both societies.

Drawing on five months of ethnography among rank-and-file Soka Gakkai members, this article takes issue with the conventional view of Komeito and Gakkai political socialization as one of group identity. It uses interviews and primary sources from Gakkai socialization practice to document how the two organizations appeal to Gakkai members by promoting the Komeito policy agenda, and how Gakkai members use the same arguments in search of non-Gakkai votes for the party. Social ties remain important, but they are vehicles for this policy message, not a justification for supporting Komeito. This makes Komeito leadership far more constrained in its political choices than is currently recognized. The article finishes by showing how this theory explains variation in Komeito electoral support better than a social identity alternative.

Over the past few decades, cooperation between Korea and Japan has increased and deepened, but frictions continue to persist. Which direction is the relationship between Korea and Japan heading? This is the question that this article attempts to address.

From an analytical standpoint, this article applies contemporary international relations theories – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – to the pattern of cooperation and conflict in Korea–Japan relations. After reviewing both optimistic and pessimistic positions drawn from diverse perspectives, the author makes a synthesis, where he suggests the case for cautious optimism.

What we find in reality is long-term progress in an upward movement, interrupted by recurring frictions in the short term. Empirical evidence supports the case that Korea–Japan relations are making steady progress towards deeper, heightened, and multilayered cooperation. However, such issues as historical controversy and territorial disputes are the hurdles that both nations need to overcome. Whether Korea and Japan can maximize the effects of optimism, while they effectively minimize the impacts of pessimism will determine the nature of the ties between the two countries.

Cooperation between the two countries is not necessarily guaranteed, but we find irreversible trends of improved cooperation over time. However, lingering suspicions, submerged nationalist sentiments, and sporadic surges of extremism remain. They should be carefully managed by the leaders of the two countries.

In the fall 2007 Diet session, the largest opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) showed strong opposition against the government's proposal to continue the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) refueling operations to support maritime inspections in the Indian Ocean. In order to evaluate this parliamentary confrontation, the article compares the handling of this issue with the six past major post-Cold War national security policies. The DPJ constantly presented its own legislative proposals in order to participate in Diet deliberation. DPJ's counter proposals, however, were not always cooperative with the government. This different attitude by the DPJ could not be explained by the public and media opinions or the position of the supporting organization but by DPJ's political calculation.

This article discusses the effects of executive leadership on fiscal policies and performance. I propose that executive leadership, as a political entrepreneur who provides collective goods for organization, has incentives to maintain fiscal discipline so that he or she can stay in office by developing his or her party's reputation and leading party legislators to electoral success. This article argues that executive leadership with stronger public support is more likely to restrain fiscal expenditure and maintain fiscal discipline. I demonstrate this argument by showing that the prime minister who receives higher public support is more likely to restrain fiscal expenditure in Japan.

The Barisan Nasional (BN) which won a landslide in 2004 was returned to power in 2008 elections with reduced majority and the loss of five state assemblies. Dissatisfied with unfulfilled promises, the electorate protested by voting for a strong opposition. BN additionally was characterized by factionalism. Three opposition parties joined hands and, using alternative media, unexpectedly won 82 seats in the parliament. A strong responsible opposition bodes well for Malaysian democracy.

Current world migration is disrupting conceptual boundaries of national democratic polities. One area where the traditional sense of political community is being challenged concerns electoral rights for non-resident citizens and non-citizen residents. With the right to vote being an ultimate expression of political membership in a democratic nation-state, any debates about these two groups’ suffrage rights constitute a critical source of empirical insights into how democracies re-imagine themselves away from fixed identities under the pressure of globalization. In view of this, this paper examines the understudied case of South Korea, utilizing the most systematic theoretical framework currently available: one developed by Rainer Bauböck. It provides direct empirical evidence that undermines the conventional wisdom that Koreans define their polity purely on the basis of their ethnicity. Contrary to our expectations, a close scrutiny of the Korean debates in question reveals ample references to the civic ideals of political community. The line of reasoning that emphasizes duties towards the welfare of the polity has produced powerful justifications for denying political franchise to overseas compatriots, while granting limited electoral rights to qualified resident foreigners. A broader implication of this empirical finding is that it highlights a fundamental limitation of Bauböck's theoretical framework: it conceives political franchise only as an expression of people's rights in regard to law-making. The case of South Korea, thus, suggests that Bauböck's scheme should be modified to address both the rights-based logics and the somewhat obsolete duty-based logic of franchise extension.

The paper explores the dynamics of the phenomenon of Development Induced Displacement and the theoretical, legal, and policy level issues which have impeded the fluent process of implementation of development projects in India. Modern India has found itself embroiled in this tussle between the development plans of the State at the macro level and their undesirable consequences for the specific project affected people. Though the exigencies of time and the logic of the liberalization policy demand the continuous articulation of development projects, it is equally imperative to transcend the disempowering effects of displacement on its people. Despite recent initiatives by the government, concrete policy statements and laws governing the issues of compensation and resettlement are found wanting. The paper argues that there is an urgent need for the state to reach a necessary balance between its efforts to augur development and to make it sustainable, just, and equitous. The problems encountered in the allocation of compensation and resettlement in such projects form the focus of the article. The experiences of dam-induced displacement at the Sardar Sarovar Project in the Narmada River Valley Project in Gujarat in India are highlighted to serve as illustrations.

The delineation of constituency boundaries and variations in vote distribution across districts often favor certain parties at the expense of others. Applying a hitherto under-utilized formula (Brookes, 1959; Johnston et al., 1999), this study investigates whether the mechanism translating votes into seats in Japan's single-member districts results in systematic partisan advantage that may influence election outcomes. Simulations are conducted for the 2003 and 2005 general elections under two scenarios: where the governing coalition and the main opposition party receive equal vote shares, and where their vote shares are reversed from the actual results. Components of electoral bias are then disaggregated into size and distribution effects, and the impact of malapportionment, electorate size, turnout, and the role of third party/independent candidates on overall electoral bias is examined. Results show that while partisan bias exists, disadvantages toward one party in some components are likely to cancel out benefits derived from others, producing a relatively small net effect. Furthermore, electoral bias in Japan is found to award sectoral rather than partisan seat bonuses.

This paper considers the efficiency of the political market in the California State legislature. I analyzed the property tax limitation voter initiative, Proposition 13. I found that districts which supported Proposition 13 more strongly were more likely to oppose the incumbents regardless of whether the incumbents had the different preferences for property taxes from their districts. I also studied how legislators voted on the bills adopted after the passage of Proposition 13 to finance local governments. I found that legislators tended to follow the constituents’ will after they received the voters’ tax-cutting message expressed by the passage of Proposition 13.

The article focuses on the issue of patterns of religious engagement among Indian Hindus during last decade. It tries to look at both the issue of private religion practiced in the form of offering puja at home and public religion seen in terms of participation in Katha, Satsang, Bhajan-Kirtan etc. by Indian Hindus. Sizeable numbers of Indian Hindus offer puja every day; sizeable numbers of them are also engaged in public religious activities. This is more prevalent among the urban, educated, upper-caste, upper-class Hindus compared to their counterpart. Along with factors, which influence religious practices, is gender. Hindu women are more religious compared to the Hindu men. Similarly, upper-caste Hindus practice religious activities more regularly compared to other Hindus. There is hardly any change in patterns of engagement in religious activities among Hindus over the last five years. The levels of engagement in religious activities also have an impact on voting behavior. The higher the engagement in religious activities, the greater is the support for the BJP and vice versa. Between the 2004 and 2009 Lok Sabha elections, there had been a decline in the vote share of BJP due to its declining popularity amongst all the Hindu voters, but the decline in the support for the BJP is much sharper amongst highly religious Hindus compared to those who are not so religious. Along with other factors, this may be one of the important factors that led to the defeat of BJP in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. The article draws evidence from the National Election Study 2004 and 2009 conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies during these two elections.

Winston Churchill once asserted ‘democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’. In this conception, democracy is ‘a lesser evil’, something that is not good but is less bad than its alternatives. This study offers a rigorous test of this concept in the context of East Asia. Analysis of the East Asia Barometer surveys conducted in five new democracies in the region reveals that small minorities of these countries actually perceive the current democratic regime as a lesser evil. A large majority of these ‘lesser-evil perceivers’, moreover, refuse to support democracy fully. On the basis of these findings, we argue that the Churchillian lesser-evil notion of democracy has limited utility as an alternative paradigm for the study of democratization among ordinary citizens.

Federal arrangements have been considered by some thinkers as a panacea for containing ethnic nationalism in the ethnically defined regions. This article challenges this view by arguing that federal institutions may enable ethnic nationalists in the ethnically defined regions to consolidate their power through the guarantees that they receive from the federal centre. Although the post-Soviet Russian leadership under Boris Yeltsin sought to use federalism as a tool for containing ethnic nationalism, Russia's this experiment with federalism demonstrates that federalism may serve not to contain but to strengthen ethnic nationalism. Disillusioned with Yeltsin's failed use of federalism in containing ethnic nationalism, the overwhelming majority of the Russian people supported Vladimir Putin's anti-federalist reforms since 2000 which made federalism redundant in Russia. While undermining the basis for Western style democracy in Russia, Putin's centralism proved to be more effective than Yeltsin's federalism in containing ethnic nationalism.

Little is known about health of the growing subpopulation of the working poor in Japan. We aimed to evaluate health status and healthcare utilization in relation to income among Japanese working adults. We conducted a one-month prospective cohort study using a health diary in working adults from a nationally representative random sample in Japan. Based on the government criterion, the working poor group was defined as earning an equivalent annual income of less than 1.48 million Japanese-yen. For health status, we measured symptomatic episodes and health-related quality of life (HRQOL). For healthcare utilization, we measured frequencies of visits to a physician or pharmacy, and use of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM). We constructed multiple linear regression models for these measures adjusted for age, gender, and co-morbidity, using annual equivalent income as a 4-level categorical variable.

Of 3,568 participants originally enrolled in the study panel, 3,477 completed the survey (response rate 97%). For the purpose of the study, of the 3,568 participants, we analyzed 1,406 working adults who were 20–65 years old (mean age, 40.8 yr: 58.4% men). There were 106 (7.5%) working poor: 56 men (6.8% of working men) and 50 women (8.5% of working women). Compared to the highest income group, the working poor reported the greater number of symptomatic episodes and a slightly lower score of physical component of HRQOL (PCS8). The numbers of symptomatic episodes among the working poor and the highest income group during the 1-month study period were 9.79 (SD, 8.77) and 7.01 (SD, 7.34), respectively (p < 0.01). The PCS8 among the working poor was 48.71 (SD, 7.05) and it was 50.34 (SD, 6.55) among the highest income group (p < 0.01). There was no difference of healthcare utilization by the different levels of income.

We concluded that the working poor (7.5% of all working adults) more frequently report symptomatic episodes and show slightly poorer physical health status, compared to the highest income group. Healthcare utilization is not affected by income.

Jean-Marc Coicaud's article begins by stressing the contemporary importance and the current trend of political apology. Recent political apologies offered in Australia and Canada to their indigenous populations form a significant part of this story. He then analyzes a number of intriguing paradoxes at the core of the dynamics of apology. These paradoxes give meaning to apology but also make the very idea of apology extremely challenging. They have to do with the relationships of apology with time, law and the unforgivable. The most intriguing of these paradoxes concerns apology and the unforgivable. Indeed, the greater the wrong, the more valuable the apology. But, then, the more difficult it becomes to issue and to accept an apology. This latter paradox is namely examined in the context of mass crimes, taken from Europe, Africa and Asia. As a whole these paradoxes are all the more intriguing considering what apology in a political context aims to accomplish, for the actor who issues the apology, for the one who receives it, for their relationship, and for the social environment in which this takes place. Jean-Marc Coicaud concludes his article by outlining what the rise of apology means for contemporary political culture.

This paper is one of the few attempts made by social scientists to measure social capital via psychometric approach, and is the only one of such kind to base its evidence on the AsiaBarometer survey data. After first reviewing the history of social capital, including its conceptual emergence and recent literatures, we expose the issue of difficulty in the measurement of social capital despite its topical popularity. We tackle this measurement issue by applying psychometric procedures to the AsiaBarometer survey data of 2004, 2005, and 2006, focusing on questions pertaining to social capital of ordinary individuals residing in the 29 survey societies. This paper is significant in two aspects. First, using simple statistical procedures, it extracts various dimensions of social capital without first knowing what dimensions to extract. In short, it does not try to measure social capital using some kind of pre-defined concepts such as those outlined in the historical review of our predecessors. Rather, it succeeds in manifesting key factors of social capital – altruism, utilitarianism, communitarianism, and concordance with prevailing regime – by mechanically processing collective responses by individual respondents towards survey questions oriented with social capital. Though the paper does not aim to establish its methodology as a widely held consensus on how to measure social capital, it does give credence and recognition to psychometric approaches as effectives means to measure social capital, which, by its very definition, calls for ‘objective’ approaches using collective data to measure ‘subjective’ notions of individual actions within networks. Second, this paper is the first systematic empirical analysis of social capital in all the subregions of Asia, i.e. East, Southeast, South, and Central. It builds on our earlier works, including the 2006 paper on social capital in Central and South Asia, and gives empirical credence to important concepts on Asian political culture.