International relations (IR) is both a science and an art, i.e. the unity of object and subject. Traditional international relations theories (IRT) have probed the laws of IR, in an attempt to become the universal science. IRT have developed into a class doctrine that defends the legitimacy of the western international system as a result of proceeding from the reality of IR, while neglecting its evolving process, and overlooking the meaning of art and the presence of multi-international systems. In other words, IRT have turned into what Karl Marx might have deemed as the vulgar international relations theories (VIRT). For this reason, we declare the end of international relations theories. This phenomenon can only be negated by the so-called Chinese School, which will set the sustainable and harmonious relations among nations, between state and non-state actors, and within states and non-state actors (in one word ‘global-society’) in five life-forces of economy, politics, military, culture, and religion. Consequently, this will bring about a real regression of nationality and compatible development of various international systems.

After being at the periphery for decades, India's proactive engagement with East and Southeast Asia has gradually transformed it into an active participant in Asian regional organizations and multilateral processes. This paper examines early Indian attempts at forging pan-Asian unity and assesses the motivations and impact of its Look East Policy. It evaluates India's changing role towards regional cooperation in South Asia and sub-regional groupings, the impact of domestic politics, and discusses how China has influenced Indian perceptions and strategy towards Asian regionalism. After a long gap, India is again contributing ideas on Asian integration and stresses that the broader East Asian integration process should remain open and inclusive.

On 30 June 1994 the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ, formerly the Japan Socialist Party) joined its historic enemy, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to form a coalition government in a Japanese equivalent of Italy's ‘historic compromise’. Competition between the conservative LDP and the progressive socialists had defined the Japanese party system since 1955. In this paper we analyze voter reactions to this and other confusing events surrounding the end of the LDP's 38-year dominance. We find, first, that the Japanese electorate was able to make sense of these events. The political space reflected in public opinion mapped the political space reflected in the mass media remarkably well. Secondly, our findings support the idea that attitudes toward political parties are endogenous to the political process: strategic moves by political actors alter the political space within which they maneuver. Coalitions of strange bedfellows force voters to revise their perceptions of political space and reevaluate their attitudes toward the actors involved. Strange bedfellows seemed less strange, friendlier after they had been seen in bed together.

In profiling Asian societies, such classical authors as Hegel, Marx, and Wittfogel have had considerable influence on the subject. They adopted power-centered approaches in characterizing Asian societies. This manuscript adopts the evidence-based approach with a bottom-up angle in constructing a people-centered typology of Asian societies. People's daily life satisfaction in 29 Asian societies is factor-analyzed with varimax rotation, society by society. Using the first two dimensions of factor analysis for each society, five types of Asian society are constructed: Ab, Ac, Ba, Bc, and Ca, where A means materialism in the primary, b means postmaterialism in the secondary, B means postmaterialism in the primary, a means materialism in the secondary, c means public sector dominance in the secondary, and C means public sector dominance in the primary. Ab societies include: Afghanistan, Indonesia, Japan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Ac societies include: China, South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Mongolia. Ba societies include: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Kyrgyzstan. Bc includes Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kazakhstan. Ca societies include: Singapore and the Maldives. Responses to questions about lifestyle priorities are also provided to corroborate and reinforce the above typology. Applicability of this method is open to non-Asian as well as Asian societies.

This paper compares Japanese and Chinese infrastructure development strategies in post-Soviet Central Asia (CA) by analyzing the similarities and differences in the approaches of the two Asian economic powers. This paper develops several arguments with respect to the Japanese and Chinese approaches to infrastructure development in CA. This paper argues that the discourse of mutually exclusive interests in China and Japan's development of various infrastructure-related projects in CA is empirically unproven. Most of the Chinese engagements emphasize the creation of energy and transportation infrastructure (construction), while Japan's main areas of focus are the maintenance, modernization, and rehabilitation of current infrastructure. Thus, this paper suggests that China positions itself as CA's leading economic partner, while Japan is CA's leading assistance provider. These two roles have different implications. Furthermore, the current infrastructure engagements of Japan (from assistance to partnership) and China (from exploitation to contribution to the region) in CA demonstrate both countries’ attempts to adjust and search for new opportunities.

During 1980–90, Japan's annual real GDP growth rate was 4.6%, but which declined to 1.2% in the 1990s. While the drop in itself is a problem, at the same time it exacerbated many other problems, namely inequality, budget deficits, and the increasing burden of an aging society.

Society is not concerned about income distribution when the economy is growing, but begins to worry about inequality when an economic slump shows no signs of ending. Moreover, prolonged recession magnifies inequality. With the employment situation surrounding young people worsening, there arose an inequality between those finding jobs and those unemployed. And, the prolonged recession led to a huge budget deficit and the accumulation of government debt. Tax revenue shrank, and the government repeatedly increased public investment in the form of economic stimulus measures, but the Japanese economy did not recover in a sustained fashion.

Japan's low growth has already continued for 20 years. Incomes of the younger and middle-aged segments of the population have not increased. Additionally, Japan is an aging society. The aged need pensions, and medical treatment and care, costs which must be borne by younger and middle-aged segments of the population, in fact those who have not experienced Japan's prosperous times.

This paper discusses issues relating to the Great Recession, inequality, and the budget deficit and burden of an aging population.

Japan's Great Recession is basically explained by monetary shocks. Just the bubble and its bursting are not solely responsible for the prolonged slump. There is no empirical evidence for the assertion that certain structural problems lessened the efficiency of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. TFP (total factor productivity) in the 1990s did not decline compared with the early 1980s. Fiscal policy and the diminution of the financial intermediary function can only explain the Great Recession in small part.

The absence of any real monetary policy hampered economic growth through the channels of stock prices and improvement in bank balance sheets. Using vector autoregressive models, the exchange rate was not found to be an important channel of monetary policy, but there is some evidence that it significantly affected output.

On inequality problems, that among younger generations is important since it will increase inequality in the future. Japan's economy will stagnate for a long time if the young are not employed and cannot garner skills.

Another important point is that the way of maintaining social stability and alleviating inequality in Japan is extremely inefficient. To construct useless dams, roads, ports, and airports is extremely costly just to give jobs to the unemployed. It would be much better to give direct assistance to those in need.

There is some reason to think that a budget deficit is not so serious a problem as generally believed, and that the important thing is to cut wasteful government expenditure and not raise government revenue. While I admit this argument carries some weight, there is nevertheless good reason to think that it is necessary to reduce the budget deficit.

Before the global financial crisis, Japan's budget deficit was controlled, and declining, but subsequently became uncontrollable. Additionally, and more importantly, an aging population demands more social security expenditure, which causes serious budget problems, but Japan does not seem ready to cope with such problems.

The selection of these topics is subjective, but I believe that these are reflected in the Japanese concerns now. Japanese academic circles do not necessarily respond to the interests of the society, but I have tried to select papers on these topics to the extent possible.

This article investigates the efficacy of a form of electoral innovation unique to the island-state of Singapore, the Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme, and its impact on democratic governance, in light of the changing political landscape. A comparative perspective will be employed and broader conclusions on electoral engineering will be reached, especially for democratizing countries. Contrary to conventional scholarly wisdom, I argue that the NMP scheme can actually boost democratic representation in the country, considering the changing political landscape in the state previously dominated by a hegemonic party. This is via two ways: firstly, NMPs could better represent the voices of the people at the margins of society and, secondly, they could be better positioned to raise issues that are deemed too ‘sensitive’ to be raised by opposition parties. NMPs can enhance democratic governance by promoting deliberation, accountability, and representation.

This attempts to explain the limited political incorporation of Latin American Nikkeijin (Japanese descendants) (LAN) in Japan 1990–2004. A 1990 reform provides Nikkeijin a renewable visa that has enabled some 300,000 LAN to emigrate to Japan on the basis of Japanese blood descent or ethnicity.1 Long-term marginalized minority groups, such as Zainichi Koreans and Chinese,2 are comparatively better incorporated in Japan's political system and their demands increasingly recognized as more legitimate. I argue Japan's changing ethnic citizenship regime, political opportunity structure, and structure of civil society combined with LAN language difficulties, newness of residence, small size, low minority status, and powerful myth of return limits their immigrant political incorporation in Japan.

A fundamental component of liberal democracy – citizen knowledge – has only recently been examined in Japan; rarer still are assessments of the impact of media consumption on political awareness. In this paper, we utilize two recent sources – the Japanese Election Studies III (JESIII) and GLOPE2005 – to address two related questions: (1) what factors influence Japanese political knowledge? and (2) is the changing media environment in Japan having an influence on what citizens know about political affairs? With regard to the first question, we find, in line with previous studies in the US context, that knowledge is explained by education, gender, and politically impinged employment as base factors, with interest, efficacy, and civic duty playing a role as second-stage behavioral factors. Evidence of other traits presumed to distinguish the more informed Japanese – dissatisfaction with politics and community mobilization context (living in urban areas, districts with higher voter turnout, and having larger social networks – remains mixed. Regarding the second question, we find that the effects of media exposure on knowledge vary. Where the GLOPE2005 finds an influence of regular newspaper reading, the JESIII indicates that watching a TV news program ‘often’ also boosts knowledge. The JESIII results reveal further that, ceteris paribus, regular exposure to NHK contributes to higher levels of knowledge at a rate that is comparable to a one unit increase in educational attainment. Conversely, we find that softer news programs (e.g., Fuji TV's Super News) have a depressive effect that appears to decrease knowledge as exposure accumulates. The direction of the causal arrow is not entirely clear. At the same time, our findings lend credence to previous work that raises concerns about the ‘infotainization’ of Japanese (and US) news programming (e.g., Taniguchi, 2007; Prior, 2005). Rather than demystifying or democratizing Japanese politics, softer programs may simply be perpetuating extant gaps between elites and the public.

This article examines the ways that new communications technologies change the organization of politics as well as the content of news. Changes in the media lead to changes in the mediators, the persons who choose and interpret the news for the public. When new mediators convey different news stories or offer different interpretations from the previous regime, they redistribute control of politics and culture.

As media get cheaper, faster and harder to control, state regulation of content becomes less effective. This provides new opportunities for citizens to monitor their leaders and alters the ways that leaders – whether they are democratic or authoritarian – demonstrate accountability.

Political leaders are always trying to control the agenda by limiting information available to the public and convincing the public that they know more and know best. New forms of media, such as the commercial television, cable and satellite television, and the internet change political competition by providing new opportunities for insurgent politicians to challenge their elders. I consider these changes within the context of past innovations, including the rise of the printing press, the telegraph, the newspaper, and radio.

Chinese public hearings or consultations have been subject to numerous debates, doubts, and scepticism about the existence of Chinese deliberative democracy. More empirical evidence, however, is required about these debates before we can offer any meaningful account of the nature, characteristics, and direction of Chinese deliberation. In addition, although there have been many case studies on grassroots deliberative democracy, such studies are intellectually isolated from each other in the sense that they do not comprise a statistical unit. To overcome this deficiency, we developed a new research method for studying grassroots deliberation by collecting and validating the existing case studies, thereby making them a statistical unit. This paper aims to offer a big-picture perspective and the national statistical trend behind the uneven development of grassroots deliberative democracy. It develops an intellectual framework to assess whether grassroots deliberation is democratic. By collecting, validating, and coding 393 cases of Chinese grassroots deliberations, we have assessed Chinese grassroots deliberation, confirmed the cases’ democratic attributes, and provided a solid statistical result. Although there is strong evidence to support the claim that these grassroots deliberation experiments are democratic, there remain some variations, nuances, and shortcomings. The full picture is not simple, but instead provides a mixed perspective.

Democratic transitions in Asia have received widespread interest in the political science literature since the 1990s. The Thein Sein-led government that came into power in 2010 in Myanmar has undertaken wide ranging reforms that has altered the country's political landscape. They include evolving a working relationship with the political opposition, freeing political prisoners, and the granting of amnesty to political exiles to encourage their return, the negotiation of ceasefire agreements with almost all of the ethnic insurgent armies and the inauguration of the Myanmar Peace Centre. Nonetheless, the county continues to suffer from ongoing developments that retard the process of democratization as well. A confluence of interest between the NLD, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations also prompted attempts to change the 2008 Constitution and its by-laws that prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from running for the country's presidency. That attempt and the potential for reform were scuttled by the August 2015 ‘coup’ against Thura Shwe Mann. The NLD's overwhelming victory in the November elections has significantly strengthened Suu Kyi's position and all major political actors including those from the military have been conciliatory towards the election outcome and there is cause for cautious optimism. After 6 months in power, the policy priorities of the new government are also clearer.

In recent years much has been said about how new democracies are backsliding or have regressed since the turn of the century when hope and optimism about the future spread of democracy was widespread. However, ideas that democracy would spread were based on institutional and governance indicators rather than from the perspective of everyday citizens. When we look at public attitudes towards democracy during this period, we can see that such optimism was perhaps misplaced or premature. Drawing on findings from the AsiaBarometer and the World Values Survey, this research finds that public attitudes during this time were not overly convinced by democracy and certainly not yet satisfied with their government's performance in terms of providing basic democratic freedoms and independence.

Motivated by a previous finding that single-party cues have no effect in Japan and by the increasing ‘presidentialization’ of Japanese politics, the present study examined whether the use of prime minister cues in place of single-party cues helps Japanese voters form policy preferences. In addition, to probe the effect of party cues that are unique to multiparty systems, the effect of multiple-party cues, which indicate that a policy is supported by multiple rather than single ideologically distinct parties, was investigated. The results of a survey experiment showed that while prime minister cues are not utilized by the supporters of incumbent parties, the supporters of opposition parties demonstrated significantly reduced approval of a policy when there was an indication that the prime minister supported it. The effect of prime minister cues on opposition supporters was stronger than that of Liberal Democratic Party cues, suggesting that leader cues are effective in Japan. Furthermore, a cue indicating that ideologically distinct parties support a policy enhances approval for that policy among the public, which suggests that multiple-party rather than single-party cues are informative in multiparty systems. Theoretical implications are discussed.

We research the political impact of how users access the Internet. Recent research suggests that Internet usage may promote political participation. Internet usage is proposed to be beneficial because it increases activity in diverse politicized social networks and through greater access to information. Even though Internet usage may begin as a non-political activity, we outline several reasons to believe that it may spark later political participation. This impact, however, is likely to be non-existent in new forms of Internet browsing such as through mobile phones, where users do less full-scale browsing. The more difficult browsing interface of mobile phones reduces activity in chat rooms and in-depth browsing of online sources of information which promote participation. To test these ideas, we use nationally representative survey data from Japan, a country which has more pronounced usage of mobile phone browsing. Using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model, we also show that the chief determinants of using PC's over mobile phones for Internet browsing are age and education. We then show that PC-based Internet activity correlates with increased political participation, but mobile phone usage correlates with less participation.

Current world migration is disrupting conceptual boundaries of national democratic polities. One area where the traditional sense of political community is being challenged concerns electoral rights for non-resident citizens and non-citizen residents. With the right to vote being an ultimate expression of political membership in a democratic nation-state, any debates about these two groups’ suffrage rights constitute a critical source of empirical insights into how democracies re-imagine themselves away from fixed identities under the pressure of globalization. In view of this, this paper examines the understudied case of South Korea, utilizing the most systematic theoretical framework currently available: one developed by Rainer Bauböck. It provides direct empirical evidence that undermines the conventional wisdom that Koreans define their polity purely on the basis of their ethnicity. Contrary to our expectations, a close scrutiny of the Korean debates in question reveals ample references to the civic ideals of political community. The line of reasoning that emphasizes duties towards the welfare of the polity has produced powerful justifications for denying political franchise to overseas compatriots, while granting limited electoral rights to qualified resident foreigners. A broader implication of this empirical finding is that it highlights a fundamental limitation of Bauböck's theoretical framework: it conceives political franchise only as an expression of people's rights in regard to law-making. The case of South Korea, thus, suggests that Bauböck's scheme should be modified to address both the rights-based logics and the somewhat obsolete duty-based logic of franchise extension.

This paper examines the mechanisms of deliberation and conflict resolution in Chinese urban middle-class residential communities. Along with the rise of private home ownership and urban middle-class residential estates, disputes and conflicts have risen between the residents, resident self-elected organization (homeowner associations), real estate developer and property management companies, and the local government. Through the lens of deliberation in middle-class neighborhoods, this paper analyzes (1) how and to what extent deliberation is introduced and employed as an instrumental tool by the local government to achieve their goal of maintaining social stability. (2) In what ways and to what extent deliberation has served as part of governance strategies. And (3) whether and how the state and non-state actors interact with each other during this process to produce more democratic governance under the Party-state's authoritarian rule. This paper adopts a systemic approach to examine authoritarian deliberation as a neighborhood governance strategy. The findings suggest that (1) deliberation has become an instrumental tool for conflict resolution introduced by the local government to middle-class neighborhoods. Residents’ Committees, on behalf of the state, has become key coordinator and mediator during the deliberation process. (2) The systemic approach of authoritarian deliberation includes a mix of deliberative elements and other features of political culture, traditions, strategies, and institutions. The dynamic interactions between deliberation and authoritarianism, between deliberative and non-deliberative features, and between formal deliberative meetings and informal deliberative talks all contribute to a functional deliberative system.

Employing a two-level game framework, this study examines the decision-making process of the Hatoyama government on the replacement of the US Marine air base in Futenma, Okinawa. Before reaching the final decision to revert to the existing plan of relocating it to Nago City, the cabinet members explored different possible alternatives. Prime Minister Hatoyama simultaneously pursued different international and domestic goals. Misperception and miscommunication between Tokyo and Washington were at play. A two-level game framework provides a clear picture of what Hatoyama tried to pursue and why he failed.

The current efforts of Moscow and Tokyo to unblock the territorial impasse are complicated by some barriers of a socio-psychological character, including mutual mistrust and contradictory images of past events. Public opinion surveys reveal predominant vectors in Russo-Japanese relations, which the authors believe strongly correlate with the evolution of the contradictory images. Apparently, these images surprisingly exhibit interrelated ‘mirror’ dynamics connected with the independent variable – events happening in bilateral relations. Apparently, these images surprisingly exhibit interrelated ‘mirror’ dynamics connected with the independent variable – events happening in bilateral relations. The authors also investigate how public opinion has a real impact on politics and relations between states. In the authors’ opinion, Russia and Japan definitely do not have major unresolved problems in their bilateral relations, with the exception of the territorial problem. However, why is the public so suspicious of Russia? Can the territorial dispute be the only reason? It is far from that. The analyzed arguments give grounds to believe that it is very difficult for Japan and Russia to find a mutually acceptable solution, as their relations are not free from suspicion and mutual mistrust which are deeply rooted in the history of their relations. It will be much easier to overcome the mistrust and, accordingly, to reach agreement on the territorial issue when they manage to calmly analyze the historical grudges, understand their nature and origin, and realize that this is history, which has no contemporary value.

The ‘keep it simple, stupid’ slogan, or the KISS principle has been the basic guideline in agent-based modeling (ABM). While the KISS principle or parsimony is vital in modeling attempts, conventional agent-based models remain abstract and are rarely incorporated or validated with empirical data, leaving the links between theoretical models and empirical phenomena rather loose. This article reexamines the KISS principle and discusses the recent modeling attempts that incorporate and validate agent-based models with spatial (geo-referenced) data, moving beyond the KISS principle. This article also provides a working example of such time and space specified (TASS) agent-based models that incorporates Schelling's (1971) classic model of residential segregation with detailed geo-referenced demographic data on the city of Chicago derived from the US Census 2010.