The Caribbean Organization, a new organization for economic and social cooperation in the Caribbean area, was created under an agreement signed by representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Netherlands in Washington, D. C, on June 21, 1960. The new organization was to supercede the Caribbean Commission founded in 1946 by the same four signatory powers, which was in turn the successor to the wartime Anglo- American Caribbean Commission. The Caribbean Organization, reportedly set up as the result of the wishes of the people of the area and in light of their new constitutional relationships, was designed to remove the taint of colonialism attached to the paternal structure of the Caribbean Commission. Although the four signatories of the agreement were members of the Caribbean Commission, only France, representing the three French Overseas Departments of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique, was eligible for membership in the new organization. Membership in the Caribbean Organization was to be open to the following: the Netherlands Antilles, Surinam, the Bahamas, British Guiana, British Honduras, the British Virgin Islands, the British West Indies, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States, in addition to France. Any of the eligible prospective members could accede to membership in the organization by notifying the Secretary- General of the organization or the Secretary- General of the Caribbean Commission. The statute of the organization, annexed to the agreement for its establishment, included in the purposes of the organization social, cultural, and economic matters of common interest to the Caribbean area, particularly in the fields of agriculture, communications, education, fisheries, health, housing, industry, labor, music and the arts, social welfare, and trade.

Reports on the United Nations by three United States groups, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, the President's Commission, and the United Nations Association of the USA, are summarized and compared. They reveal informed concern about United States participation in the UN at a time when Congress and the executive exhibit negativism and neglect. Conclusions are drawn on (1) differing priorities for the UN system and their interdependence, (2) the special capabilities of the United States for setting examples, (3) alternative models for UN problem solving, (4) United States contributions to the UN, and (5) generating political will for creative United States involvement in the UN. Concern is expressed about efforts to cut United States assessments for UN budgets and failure of the reports to adequately consider the political consequences of the fact that “maintenance of international peace and security” is not considered the most important UN task by all members. If congressional and executive neglect are to be overcome, public participation and involvement must be extended.

Following a decision of the Rubber Study Group at its fourth meeting, a Permanent Secretariat with headquarters in London was established by the Management Committee in 1947, with A. G. Pawson as secretary and W. G. G. Kellett as senior statistician. The secretariat's primary activity was to be to provide the Group with information on the statistical situation and general world economic conditions as related to rubber.

Major LOS controversies over navigation concern access to the waters of archipelagoes, the scope of coastal authority over passage through the territorial sea and straits, and navigation through ocean areas adjacent to the territorial sea. Proposals at the LOS Conference pertaining to access to archipelagic waters focus on new rights for island nations and on safeguards for navigation interests. The specific issues at stake in the territorial sea and in straits concern innocent passage for warships, coastal authority to deny innocent passage, clarification of the concept of innocent passage, and the scope and content of a claimed special right of transit for straits. Beyond the territorial sea the most important navigation issues relate to the extent of coastal authority other than control of resources. Controls over vessel source pollution are at issue as well as the relationship of navigation to resource measures. Assessment of the various interests at stake and of the trends in consideration of proposed treaty arrangements on the above issues suggests that, in general, navigation uses of the ocean will not suffer unduly in the LOS treaty expected to emerge in 1977. However, proposals to create a new zone, called the economic zone, which would be subtracted from the high seas, pose a possible long-term threat to navigation interests.

Those organs of the United Nations which do not include all Member States pose a challenging problem: How should such select bodies be constituted? There is no easy solution in view of the diversity of national policies, even between countries of a particular region, ideology, or stage of development. This paper presents a series of case studies illustrating some of the principles invoked and the nature of the accommodations arrived at by the General Assembly in dealing with the problem, especially in setting up its own subsidiary organs. On the basis of this evidence an assessment is made of the significance of recent changes in the structure of these nonplenary organs and the resulting impact on the balance of decision-making power in the Organization.

A food regime not dominated by one or a few entities, without governmental policies separating national markets, and with free access to information would result in a single, integrated global food market. Such a hypothetical market would contribute more than the current system to efficiency and stability, although it would not necessarily be superior from an equity standpoint. Such a global food market does not exist. This is primarily because government regulation separates individual national markets. Residual international markets, shaped by the domestic and trade policies of major buyers and sellers, exist for major commodities. In the international grain market the United States is preponderant, but American policies in recent years have prevented the US from playing a dominating role. Furthermore, futures trading provides an open reference price. Consequently, the international grain market more nearly approximates “ideal” market features than many other international markets. An expansion of public markets and futures trading, by the United States and other countries, could enhance the effectiveness of international food markets in serving goals of efficiency, stability and security of access.

South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa and Liberia v. South Africa): On October 2, 1962, the International Court of Justice held the first of the public hearings on the preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, raised by the government of the Republic of South Africa in these cases. After opening the sitting and briefly recalling the stages in the written proceedings covered since the institution of the cases on November 4, 1960, the President of the Court proceeded to the installation of the two judges ad hoc designated by the parties in accordance with Article 31, paragraphs 3 and 5, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The two judges ad hoc were Sir Louis Mbanefo, Chief Justice of the High Court, Eastern Region of Nigeria, designated by Ethiopia and Liberia acting in concert, and the Honorable Jacques Theodore van Wyk, Judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, designated by the government of the Republic of South Africa. The President announced that Judge Córdova was prevented by his health from sitting in the present proceedings.

This article seeks to list and briefly analyze the different ways and forms whereby contemporary international organizations participate in the making of new rules of public international law.

Eight generalizations are extracted from two partially competing perspectives (Johan Galtung's “feudal interaction” and Jorge Dominguez's “international fragmentation”) on center-periphery interaction patterns. Seven of these generalizations are tested by examining head of state, governmental and ministerial visits to and from the Arab world between 1946 and 1975. Neither perspective is fully supported or disconfirmed by the data. Dominguez's emphases on limited resources and local problems, however, which lead in turn to relatively high intra-subsystemic interaction between peripheral actors and changing center-periphery patterns, appear to provide a more accurate analytical base than does the static model, with its emphasis on high levels of asymmetry and concentration, advanced by Galtung. Further tests of the two perspectives will be necessary in order to assess fully the geographical scope and the type of interaction patterns covered by these diachronic findings.

Shipping is characterized by a high degree of mobility and flexibility based on free access to the world's oceans and multilateral participation in carriage of sea-borne trade. Recently, technological and institutional developments have tended to create conditions in which bilateral shipping agreements may become dominant. A major step in this direction was the 1974 UNCTAD Convention on a code of conduct for liner conferences. Efforts to protect the marine environment from ship-originated oil pollution may work in the same direction depending on how they are implemented. Under any circumstances, implementation of pollution control standards under the 1973 IMCO convention will be costly and freight rates arc certain to rise. Unless international pollution control standards are rigidly fixed and binding, discriminatory treatment and bilateral agreements are likely. But such standards would be futile unless there is also freedom of innocent passage–a matter for the Law of the Sea Conference.

While there is increasing recognition of the role of race in shaping global politics, the extent to which the construction and operation of international order is entangled with race remains underexplored. In this article, I argue for the centrality of race and racialization in understanding the constitution of international order by theorizing the constitutive connections between race and international order and showing how the two can be examined as intertwined. I do this, first, by articulating conceptualizations of both international order and race that center on processes of regulation and regularization. Second, I bring these together to suggest that race be understood as a form of order that functions to reproduce a historically emergent form of hierarchy and domination across a range of spaces and contexts. Third, I operationalize these conceptualizations by outlining and historicizing some of the key features of this racialized and racializing international order, specifically coloniality, the racial state, and racial capitalism, and thereby illustrate important aspects of the persistence of this order. Centering race in the study of international order, I suggest, helps us better understand how racializing hierarchies and racialized inequalities persist in the present and are reproduced through structures and practices of international order.

International monetary arrangements in effect since the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 underwent major changes in the early 1970s, most notably from the norm and practice of “fixed” exchange rates to a new mixed regime in which major rates are now flexible. The outcome strongly reflected the external monetary behavior of the U.S. government, which changed dramatically with the “Nixon shocks” of August 1971 and again with a second devaluation of the dollar in February 1973. Since then the U.S. has officially advocated the once-heretical policy of exchange-rate flexibility.

For many centuries, conquest was commonplace, and its attractiveness was central to the character of international politics. Why has it declined? Existing theories cannot explain why powerful countries no longer conquer states with easily extractable wealth. We develop an explanation based on the relationship between a potential conqueror's economic productivity and its ability to profit from conquest. Productivity has opposing effects on conquest's profitability: it raises the opportunity cost of each asset diverted to conquest, but also reduces the quantity of assets required for conquest. The net effect is determined by the composition of investment in innovation. We document that since at least 1950 investment has been predominantly aimed at civilian, not military innovations, so that rising productivity should reduce conquest's net profitability. Using cost analyses of comparable wars, we estimate bounds on the profitability of conquering the oil and gas reserves of the Persian Gulf, a very tempting target, for the United States and Iraq, two potential conquerors of widely differing productivity. Though both mechanisms operate, we find that the net effect of higher productivity is to reduce the profits from conquest. Moreover, this net effect is large enough to render conquest generally unprofitable for contemporary high-productivity states.

The second session of the Executive Committee of the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization was convened in Geneva on August 25, 1948. Among the items discussed were 1) a report of the work of the secretariat and its information activities, 2) relations with the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the International Court of Justice, 3) financial and staff regulations for the permanent Organization, 4) a report by the secretariat on the Havana resolution relating to economic development and reconstruction, and 5) representation of the Interim Commission on the Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Agreements. Consultations were held with the Secretariat of the United Nations and Registry of the International Court of Justice in connection with the preparation of agreements bringing the ITO into relationship with these two organizations.

Little work has been done—on either a conceptual or an empirical level—in assessing the way in which national political support operates in the context of the regional integration scheme. The purpose of this study is to describe and explain patterns of national support for one regional integration scheme, the Andean Pact. It is suggested here that foreign policy behavior toward a regional integration scheme is not a simple, unidimensional type of behavior, but rather is a complex set of activities and attitudes directed toward specific programs of the regional integration scheme in the pursuit of specific economic development goals and limited by the constraints of resources. The policies of member governments toward the Andean Pact are clearly designed to satisfy national goals and needs. Although some governments have been willing to acquiesce in certain areas of national interest on occasion, by and large the Andean Pact members have consistently sought to further national interests through support of the Andean Pact as a whole.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) devoted its major efforts from the endof July 1965 until April 1968 to negotiating the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, spending little time on other arms control measures in the sessions throughout this period. In May 1968 the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly presented the draft treaty to the First (Political and Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy debate and acceptance of several amendments to meet the wishes of nonnuclear states the Treaty reached its final form on May 21, 1968, and was “commended” in General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968.

According to press reports from Beirut, Lebanon, on August 11 and 18, 1959, representatives of nine Arab states—all the members of the Arab League except Tunisia—were preparing a lengthy reply to the suggestion of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the UN, that the Palestine refugees being sheltered by various Arab countries be economically integrated into these countries. Spokesmen for the Arab states declared at the end of a tenday conference that they would unanimously support the refugees' demand to return to their homes in what had become the state of Israel; this was tantamount to rejection of Mr. Hammarskjold's proposal to spend $1.5–$2 billion within the next five years to create productive jobs for about one million refugees living in Arab lands. Although the Secretary-General had asserted that economic integration would not prejudice any rights of the refugees, the Arabs interpreted the plan to mean that the refugees would be permanently resettled among them. Apparently the only part of Mr. Hammarskjold's report that was acceptable to the Arabs was that calling for the continued existence of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the organization administering the relief program for refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic.