How do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory of burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote cooperation in a variety of defense, military, and security issue areas. Using a computational model, we show that DCA partners’ defense spending depends on the network structure of their agreements. In bilateral terms, DCAs increase defense spending by committing states to defense activities and allowing partners to reciprocally punish free riding. However, as a state's local network of defense partnerships grows more densely connected, with many transitive “friend of a friend” relations, DCAs have the countervailing effect of reducing defense spending. The more deeply integrated states are in bilateral defense networks, the less they spend on defense. We distinguish two potential mechanisms behind this effect—one based on efficiency improvements, the other on free riding. An empirical analysis using multilevel inferential network models points more to efficiency than to free riding. Defense networks reduce defense spending, and they do so by allowing countries to produce security more efficiently.

A popular view holds that foreign policy hawks have an advantage at bringing about rapprochement with international adversaries. This idea is rooted in domestic politics: voters respond more favorably to efforts at reconciliation when their own leader has a hawkish rather than a dovish reputation. Yet, domestic reactions are only part of the equation—to succeed, rapprochement must also evoke a favorable response by the adversary. In this research note, we argue that hawks who make conciliatory gestures may face international liabilities that could offset their domestic advantages. Foreign audiences should view doves who make overtures as more sincere and should therefore be more willing to support cooperation with foreign doves than with foreign hawks. We field a pair of survey experiments to examine whether Americans respond differently when foreign hawks versus foreign doves deliver the olive branch. We find that foreign doves fare better at eliciting cooperation because they are deemed more sincere, though the prospect of military vulnerability limits how willing Americans are to respond positively even to a dove who makes a gesture. Thus, while past research has shown that hawks are better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement, our findings suggest that they have a harder time eliciting a favorable response from the adversary.

The great hope for United Nations peace forces is that they may become a ready means of pacifying small wars in underdeveloped areas—civil wars and border quarrels which inevitably will flare up out of the tensions of national development—in order to keep violence and the issues behind it from spreading beyond local bounds. The nightmare of Vietnam as well as the recent eruption in the Middle East bear out the awful truth that a conflict without great international significance, if unsolved and uncontrolled too long, can easily become a stake in big-power politics, producing even at best a rising level of international tension and at worst a terrifying increase in the level of violence. Crucial to the preservation of peace, then, is the settlement of small conflicts before they get bigger. This is not because the danger to peace comes, as it did in the 1930's, from an aggressor with an insatiable appetite which has to be stopped before it gets too strong but because each of the Great Powers, the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and, increasingly, the People's Republic of China, is concerned that the others may take advantage of local conflict to extend their influence into the disturbed area. Therefore, even disputes of no great concern to any of them are indirectly a concern to all. The strengths of the Great Powers are so delicately balanced, the stakes of the competition so great, and the war potential of each so fearful that none is willing to allow another any new advantage.

One of the most intriguing aspects of postwar Japan is a reversal of economic roles in which consumers serve producers rather than vice versa. By acquiescing to “consumer unfriendly” price and distribution systems, Japanese consumers have subsidized Japanese industry and Western consumers as well. Although much of the recent theorizing about Japanese production and consumption has focused on Japanese consumers as end users, it has seldom addressed the question of how Japanese producers that pay more than others for factor inputs remain competitive in world markets. This article uses the case of nuclear fuel price insensitivity, derived from security concerns, to explore how this behavior is institutionalized through regulatory policy in the larger Japanese economic culture.

During the last five years the United States has been an active participant in the work of the United Nations. During this period the most vital international issues have come before various organs of the United Nations, have been discussed, and in various ways have been acted upon. The question naturally arises what has been the impact of the United Nations on the foreign policy of the United States?

The fourteenth General Conference, held in Paris in November 1966, marked the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The thirteenth General Conference (Paris, 1964), anticipating this occasion, was fully aware of the need for self-evaluation, self-criticism, and renewed self-definition. It passed a special resolution concerning the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary which authorized the Director-General to take appropriate measures to ensure wide publicity of the constitutional principles and actual achievements of UNESCO; to stimulate discussion at different levels of the relevance and effectiveness of the previous and present work of the Organization; and to give thought to the future orientation of the program of UNESCO. Six months prior to the fourteenth General Conference the Director-General convened in Bellagio, Italy, a round table of “wise men” from different geographical regions of the world. Here free and full discussion focused on UNESCO, its limitations, and potential in the perspective of the total setting in which it has to operate. The deliberations of these men, it was hoped, would be of use to the grand ensemble of national delegates at the forthcoming anniversary session.

The literature on integration has expanded tremendously during the last decade. This growing interest in the problems and processes of integration is particularly marked in two areas, studies of international regional integration and studies of national integration. On the whole, these efforts have been carried out with very little reference to each other. What is striking, nonetheless, is the similarity of much of the material and the relevance of work in one area for conceptualization and theory building in the other. As one who has been concerned primarily with national political integration I would like to delineate some of the major similarities and differences between the foci of national and regional integration studies, to suggest the utility of thinking in terms of a common conceptualization of political integration, and to discuss the relevance of some aspects of the work on national integration for regional theory and research.

In recent years considerable concern has been expressed in the United States over the changing composition of the United Nations membership and the failure of the one-state, one-vote formula in the General Assembly to reflect the actual power and significance of the different United Nations Members. “Malapportionment” as such is frequently not the issue here, for whether one looks at population, wealth, or budget assessments the United Nations General Assembly has always been “malapportioned.” And, at least in terms of population, the United Nations is no more malapportioned now than it was in 1945. Rather than a concern with a new situation, the growing emphasis on this issue is often a reflection of the fear that malapportionment will now operate to the disadvantage of the United States; that is, the ”overrepresented” states of today may not be as closely associated with the United States as the ”overrepresented” states of the past.

In 1968, just ten years after the ill-fated West Indies Federation had been established, Caribbean regional integration was re-launched with the creation of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA). By 1974, the twelve Commonwealth Caribbean member countries had adhered to the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) which had evolved out of CARIFTA. This progress in the evolution of Caribbean integration stopped with the failure to adopt the Draft Agreement on Foreign Investment and Development of Technology, and since that time regional negotiations have been undermined by conflicts over intraregional trade and bilateral arrangements at the expense of regional cooperation. Analysis of the politics of regional negotiations in the Caribbean provides an interesting example of the process of integration among developing countries.

Messrs. Laitin and Lustick make a useful advance in conceptualizing the components of leadership skill. It is quite obvious that such a venerable but often ill-conceived topic cannot be exhausted, even conceptually, within the space of a short article. I should like here to make three qualifying remarks, which are intended not to detract from the advance made by the two authors but to situate their contribution within a somewhat wider perspective. These remarks are directed toward the impact or consequences of leadership. They concern: (1) the relationship of leadership skill to leadership effectiveness; (2) pathological leadership, producing negative outcomes; and (3) the Tolstoyan question about the extent to which “A king is the slave of history,” i.e., whether political leadership does have room for maneuver and can significantly affect outcomes.

Ninth World Health Assembly The ninth Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) met in Geneva from May 8 to 25, 1956 and elected Professor J. Parisot (France) president. The Assembly appointed a special committee to study means of enabling inactive members to reassume their rights and fulfill their obligations, with particular emphasis on a method of settling arrears of contributions. The committee report, which was adopted by the Assembly, provided that contributions should be paid in full for the years during which such countries had participated actively in the work of WHO, while for other years a token payment of 5 percent of the amount assessed would be required. Three newly independent countries, Morocco, the Sudan and Tunisia were admitted to WHO as full members and the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were admitted as Associates.

The fifteenth annual report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, covering the fiscal year July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960, was presented to the Board of Governors on September 27, 1960. The report noted that the year under review had clearly marked the beginning of a period of change in international economic relations, especially with regard to the less developed countries where new needs were emerging and new institutions and techniques to meet them were beginning to take definite shape. Although the external accounts of these countries had benefited from a substantial increase in the volume of their exports, their terms of trade had not shown a similar recovery, and their external public debt had increased. The Bank's lending for the year under review was slightly below the rate of each of the previous two years; it had made 31 loans totaling. $658.7 million as compared to 30 loans totaling $703 million in the previous year. Asia and the Middle East, sharing $273 million in loans between them, received the largest portion, while Africa received $183 million, Latin America $134 million, and Europe only $69 million. Lending operations continued to concentrate on basic facilities, with transportation loans amounting to $245 million, electric power loans to $208 million, and industrial loans to $146 million, while agricultural loans rose to $60 million, the highest sum in recent years. Net earnings, exclusive of receipts from loan commissions, came to $59.5 million, an increase of $13 million over the previous year; disbursements fell to $544 million, less than the $583 million of the preceding year.

The concept of a “regime” is frequently used to describe and explain behavior in international political economy. Peter Cowhey and Edward Long, attempting to test theories of surplus capacity and hegemonic decline, advanced a version of a regime governing international trade in automobiles which was fundamentally liberal from 1966 to 1975, but then collapsed into protectionism. Their diagnosis is mistaken, however, because the trade regime for autos was neither as liberal as they assert during the 1950s and 1960s, nor as protectionist as they believe it has become in the 1980s. The discussion focuses on a new definition of the auto trade regime based on four fundamental rules that have persisted since the 1950s. By examining data on auto imports since 1955 on a region-by-region basis, it becomes clear that the trade expansion of the postwar years was not based on a global liberalization of the trade regime, but on carefully managed regional arrangements that favored imports within the region, or extra-regional imports that did not threaten domestic producers. The flurry of restraints on Japanese imports in recent years is not a collapse into protectionism, but a reinforcement of the fundamental regime rules. The auto industry case illustrates the tendency of analysts to underestimate protectionist elements in industry trade regimes and to overestimate the amount of changes that take place in their fundamental rules.

A valuable source of data for the international organization researcher is interviews with delegates sent by their governments to participate in international conferences and meetings. With the appearance of many newly independent states in the 1960s and early 1970s, the size of international conferences and the workload of the individual delegate have grown to such an extent that it has become difficult to tap this resource effectively.

Parallels between the demands of the developing countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and earlier demands of American agrarian populists suggest that the NIEO reflects the characteristic grievances of commodity-producing societies (agraria) vis-a-vis their industrial counterparts (industria). Such grievances arise when modernization produces growing interaction and interdependence that threaten the autonomy of agraria. Conflict between agraria's ideal of independence and the reality of interdependence raises political consciousness, enhances group identity, leads to protests and proposals for reform, and stimulates efforts to withdraw from the dependency relationship. Both American agrarian populism and the NIEO movement protested the existing distribution of wealth and power, adverse terms of trade, an “excessive” middleman's share, a monetary system dominated by industria, limited access to credit, and the burden of debt. Proposed solutions were also parallel, partly because they responded to similar grievances, partly because they have arisen in a similar political context. A central problem of late 19th century American politics and contemporary world politics has been the restoration of political order under circumstances where the scope of political and social interaction has vastly expanded but where power within the political system is still widely dispersed. The proposals of both populist movements sought to deal with this problem by restoring local control and weakening supralocal forces.

In analyzing the future of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), it is useful to assess both the centrifugal and centripetal forces affecting regional economic integration. Centrifugal forces include the existing structure of production in Eastern Europe; problems of coordination; and inefficient price systems, among others. Centripetal forces include the worldwide energy crisis; Western inflation and recession; the growing importance of trade blocs; and numerous other factors contributing to the increasing hard-currency indebtedness of the Eastern European countries. Many of these external events have increased the attractiveness for CMEA countries of intrabloc economic relations and provided a momentum for CMEA integration. Analysis of the various forces leads to the conclusion that Soviet economic policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe will remain crucial in determining the direction and speed of economic integration. Soviet economic involvement with Eastern Europe seems to have been costly for the USSR during the past decade and so it is not obvious that the USSR will attempt to push integration much further than it now stands.

The growth of international cooperation in the South Pacific region has been one of the remarkable developments in regional collaboration in the post-war era. During the past twelve years, three multilateral arrangements have come into existence bearing upon South Pacific affairs. These are the six-power South Pacific Commission (SPC), the three-power Australian—New Zealand—United States Mutual Security Treaty (known as ANZUS), and the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty Organization (SEATO).

In view of recent proposals to grant the International Monetary Fund new instruments to press countries to adjust balance of payments disequilibria, the question arises of the efficacy of such means of pressure. An analysis of the Fund's power shows, inter alia, that conditions attached to currency purchases by deficit countries can only influence the techniques of adjustment but not the length of the adjustment period, that it is normally not possible for the Fund to expose individual surplus countries to inflationary or expansionary pressures, that the scarce currency clause is unworkable in present monetary conditions, and that the Fund's system of charges and remunerations cannot be used to exert financial pressure on countries in imbalance. The general avoidance of sanctions by the Fund's Executive Directors suggests that it would only be useful to make additional pressures available to the Fund, as contemplated by the Committee of Twenty, if the authority to take decisions on sanctions were transferred to a separate judicial or quasi-judicial body.

The sixteenth session of the General Assembly on December 19, 1961, adopted two complementary resolutions, one on the “Decentralization of the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations and Strengthening of the Regional Economic Commissions” and the other on “Planning for Economic Development.” The latter, inter alia, recommended the establishment of regional development and planning institutes “closely linked to the respective regional economic commissions.” As in many national administrations, the forces for centralization and for decentralization of the administration of the United Nations programs in the economic and social fields will no doubt continue to operate in the years to come. But the adoption of the resolutions referred to above tips the scale in favor of decentralization. It means recognition of the ascendancy of forces which have become increasingly apparent in the world organization, particularly since the recent strides towards universality of membership.