Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-t5tsf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-02T23:22:08.144Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Centralization and Decentralization in the United Nations Economic and Social Activities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Get access

Extract

The sixteenth session of the General Assembly on December 19, 1961, adopted two complementary resolutions, one on the “Decentralization of the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations and Strengthening of the Regional Economic Commissions” and the other on “Planning for Economic Development.” The latter, inter alia, recommended the establishment of regional development and planning institutes “closely linked to the respective regional economic commissions.” As in many national administrations, the forces for centralization and for decentralization of the administration of the United Nations programs in the economic and social fields will no doubt continue to operate in the years to come. But the adoption of the resolutions referred to above tips the scale in favor of decentralization. It means recognition of the ascendancy of forces which have become increasingly apparent in the world organization, particularly since the recent strides towards universality of membership.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1962

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 General Assembly Resolution 1709 (XVI), December 19, 1961.

2 General Assembly Resolution 1708 (XVI), December 19, 1961.

3 Institutes are to be established in Latin America, Asia, and Africa on the initiative of and in association with the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), respectively.

4 General Assembly Resolution 1710 (XVI), December 19, 1961.

5 The functions or the terms of reference of each organ give it its global character. Except for the General Assembly which comprises all Members, other UN organs arc of limited membership. The Charter does not envisage UN regional bodies. The only reference to “regional arrangements or agencies” is contained in Chapter VIII and concerns “matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 52).

6 Article 68 provides that the Council “shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promoton of human rights and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.” The General Assembly in its Resolution 1155 (XII), November 26, 1957, urging the Economic and Social Council to establish ECA referred to Article 68 as a basis for Council action.

7 The terms of reference of each commission defined the geographical area which constitutes its region, it being understood that its work is limited to the area which is said to be within its geographical scope. This concept differs from that governing membership; e.g., the United States is a member of ECE, ECAFE, and ECLA but outside the geographical scope of any of these commissions. On the initiative of the General Assembly [Resolutions 120 (II), October 31, 1947, and 199 (III), December 4, 1948] ECOSOC established [ECOSOC Resolution 107 (VI), March 8, 1948] an ad hoc Committee on the Proposed Economic Commission for the Middle East which recommended the establishment of such a commission (Document E/1360). After the creation of Israel and its membership in the UN, the Arab countries several times requested postponement of the consideration of this question by the Council. It has not been raised since 1951 (see Document A/1884, paragraph 432).

8 A/4132/Add.1, p. 9.

9 Hereafter reference is to the terms of reference of ECA since they represent the most recent formulation of the ECOSOC views regarding the status of a regional commission (see terms of reference: ECA Document E/CN.14/111, ECE Document E/ECE/395, ECAFE Document E/CN.11/539, ECLA Document E/CN.12/544).

10 The commissions are regularly informed by the Secretariat of the decisions and policies established by the General Assembly and by ECOSOC and its functional commissions.

11 In a few cases [e.g. Latin American Common Market and development of die Lower Mekong River Basin, ECOSOC Resolution 679 (XXVI), July 10, 1958] the Council endorsed specific activities, but several Council members stated that such endorsement should not be considered a precedent lest the many other activities not specifically endorsed be regarded as less desirable or as not having the equally strong support of the Council.

12 The membership of the regional commissions was broadened by provisions for associate membership and by the participation of governments in a consultative capacity. In the latter capacity any member of the United Nations can participate in the work of any regional commissions, thus limiting the danger of regional exclusivity or parochialism.

13 It is noteworthy that Gordon, David L. of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in a paper entitled “Regional Approaches to Economic Development,” prepared for delivery at the 1960 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 09 8–10, 1960Google Scholar, comes to the following conclusions:

The need for global consultation and institutions is in no way reduced by the trend of regionalism. On the contrary, in the absence of a strong framework of agreed purposes, regional arrangements might become merely instruments of international economic throat-cutting. Only if such a framework exists to discipline these destructive potentialities can regional approaches fulfil their promise of helping to tame the anarchic forces of nationalism and to bring the weight of less-developed countries to bear toward a better balance and accommodation with the industrial powers.

The UN uniquely provides such “a strong framework of agreed purposes.”

14 Similar provisions to paragraph 1(e) of the ECA terms of reference regarding technical assistance were added to ECAFE's and ECLA's terms of reference when the Council reviewed the work of these commissions in 1951. See Document E/1995/Add.1 and ECOSOC Resolution 414 (XIII), September 18–20, 1951.

15 E.g., Asia after World War II and Africa in the late 1950's.

16 David L. Gordon, op. cit., expresses the following views:

During the past decade the number of countries on the make, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, has grown by leaps and bounds, and their influence and fervor likewise. To these emerging countries the elaborate structure of global institutions and principles seems remote and often irrelevant to their needs.

He adds that

the idea of regional economic institutions is not, of course, a new one … but the current interest in regionalism is much deeper and more widespread, responding to the new situations and problems that have arisen out of the drastic reshaping of international relationships over the past 15 years.

17 The term is taken from A Handbook of Public Administration, United Nations, 1961Google Scholar, Document ST/TAO/M/16, paragraph 31.

18 Organization of the Secretariat, Document ST/SGB/124, p. 24–29.

19 General Assembly Resolution 627 (VII), December 21, 1952.

20 General Assembly Resolution 200 (III), December 4, 1948, and ECOSOC Resolution 51 (IV), 1947.

21 General Assembly Resolution 304 (IV), November 16, 1949, and ECOSOC Resolution 222 (IX), August 15, 1949. The latter resolution defined the objectives of the Program and the principles and the machinery through which it was to operate; see “The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for Economic Development of Under-developed Countries,” Document TAB/1/Rev.3, 1961, which includes a full legislative history.

22 David L. Gordon, op. cit., thinks that regional groupings may “have a useful role to play in the allocation and administration of development aid,” inter alia, “by transferring a part of the onus for dealing with aid requests from the donors to the recipient nations themselves. …” He goes so far as to express doubts as to whether the central machinery of the UN is free from suspicion on the part of recipients of aid. He says:

Even the UN and its specialized agencies, although their position in relation to less-developed countries differs substantially from that of individual aid-giving nations, suffer in some degree from this handicap. Inevitably they acquire most of their funds, their predilections and their personnel from the industrial countries and hence appear, to some extent, as agents of the latter.

23 The functions of resident representatives are described by Schaaf, C. Hart in “The Role of Resident Representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board,” International Organization, Autumn 1960 (Vol. 14, No. 4), pp. 548562CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 A recent study gives an extensive account of the working of these complex field activities. See Sharp, Walter R., Field Administration in the United Nations System: The Conduct of International Economic and Social Programs, published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1961), p. xiv, 570Google Scholar.

25 Early in 1955 the two departments were merged into the Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

26 Dicument E/1710, p. 45.

26 Document E/1717, p. 15.

28 Document E/1674, p. 20.

29 Dcoument E/1576; the Secretary-General's statement is quoted there from Document E/CN./11-AC.12/2; see also “Technical Assistance for Economic Development,” May 1949, UN publication Sales No.: 1949.II.B.1, p. 52.

30 At the time, the network of resident representatives in the field was almost non-existent.

31 Projects organized for the benefit of more than one country.

32 Organization of the Secretariat–Report of the Secretary-General's Survey Group,” 11 15, 1955 No. 55–27697Google Scholar.

33 Document A/3041.

34 Document A/3050, paragraph 7.

35 Document A/3103, paragraph 26.

36 In April 1958, ECLA in a resolution expressed the hope that “the decentralization of the Technical Assistance Administration be established on a permanent basis” (Document E/3091, p. 1617)Google Scholar.

37 Document A/4070, paragraph 46. The General Assembly acted on the proposal of the Secretary General (Document A/C.5/752). The merger was proposed for the first time by the Advisory Committee in 1954 (Document A/2688, paragraph 225).

38 Document ST/SGB/115.

39 General Assembly Resolution 1094 (XI) February 27, 1957, ECOSOC Resolution 694 (XXVI), August 31, 1958; see “Five-Year Perspective, 1960–1964,” Document E/3347/Rev.1.

40 ECOSOC Resolution 793 (XXX), August 4, 1960.

41 General Assembly Resolution 1518 (XV), December 15, 1960.

42 Document E/3522; annexes IV to VII contain the commissions' views and recommendations.

43 ECOSOC Resolutions 823 (XXXII), July 21, 1961, and 856 (XXXII), August 4, 1961; see also TAC resolution contained in paragraph 129 of Document E/3547. Establishment of technical assistance units in the regional commissons was authorized.

44 Document A/4776. The report of the committee was based on extensive study and on hearings of the Secretary-General and senior Secretariat officials. Part V of the report was unanimously agreed to by the committee, except for paragraphs 124 and 133 dealing with certain far-reaching financial aspects of decentralization (on this matter Professor L. M. Goodrich formulated his views in more moderate terms in paragraph 135). The committee was constituted as follows: G. Georges-Picot, former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Economic and Social Affairs and former Permanent Representative of France to the UN, Chairman; F. Urrutia, former Permanent Representative of Colombia to the UN, Rapporteur; A. A. Fomin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet Union (later replaced by A. Roshchin, alternate representative of the Soviet Union to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly); O. Loutfi, Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the UN, now UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs; Sir Harold Parker, member of the International Civil Service Advisory Board; A. Quaison-Sackey, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the UN; C. S. Venkatachar, High Commissioner of India to Canada; and H. B. Wells, President of the University of Indiana (later replaced by L. M. Goodrich, Professor of International Organization and Administration, Columbia University).

45 Document A/4794.

46 Document A/4911.

47 In addition to the report of the committee of experts (Document A/4776) and the Secretary-General's comments (Document A/4794), the General Assembly received a note by the Secretary-General, previously submitted to ECOSOC (Document E/3522), and a report prepared in response to General Assembly Resolution 1518 (XV), December 15, i960 (Document A/4911).

48 General Assembly Resolution 1709 (XVI), January 4, 1962.

49 “Status of projects approved by the Governing Council, as of 28 February 1962,” SF/Reports, Series A, No. 18.

50 See footnote 52 below.

51 E.g. from a regional office the cost of a trip to a country in the same region usually amounts to a few hundred United States dollars or less; from Headquarters it is usually more, and sometimes much more, than a thousand dollars.

52 It is interesting that the United Nations in A Handbook, of Public Administration, which gives “current concepts and practice with special reference to developing countries,” in a section on “Decentralization of Operations” states:

As soon as substantive policies and administrative organization and methods are well established at the centre, local transactions should be conducted outside ministry and as close to the citizen clíentèle as possible. One way in which ministries can accomplish this is by the devolution of functions to lower levels of government … at the same time seeing to it that powers and financing are granted to them corresponding to the functions assigned. Another approach is by the geographical deconcentration of certain functions of the ministry to regional and area offices. The performance of a great volume of day-to-day operations can be delegated to such centres under standards and methods devised by the ministry and subject to its supervision, control and inspection.

Ideas similar in substance are expressed in an article by Professor Oskar Lange with reference to decentralization of the economic administration in Poland. Lange discusses centralization and decentralization and emphasizes the consequences of the time factor for information to reach the center from the branches and vice versa. In reference to the Stalinist period in Poland he says: When at the end of the Six-Year Plan serious difficulties arose in economic management, attempts were made to remedy the situation by greater centralization. As a result, not only was there no improvement, but, on the contrary, the number of uncontrolled processes grew. …” See Polish Perspectives, 11 1961 (Vol. IV, No. 11), Warsaw, p. 25Google Scholar.

53 In the early years after establishment of the United Nations, the majority in global organs seemed often to support views of the more advanced countries while in ECAFE and ECLA the majority was clearly of the less developed countries. After considerable expansion of the UN membership, the majority in the global organs, as in ECAFE, ECLA, and ECA, is in the hands of the underdeveloped countries.

54 General Assembly Resolution 1384 (XIV), November 20, 1959 and ECOSOC Resolution 806 (XXX), December 29, 1960.

55 In implementation of General Assembly Resolution 1709 (XVI), January 4, 1962, administrative reform and procedures for a decentralized pattern of operations are being worked out and will be considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (Spring 1962). At their annual sessions in 1962, further to Resolution 1709 (XVI), the regional commissions reaffirmed their earlier position (see ECA Document E/3586, ECLA Document E/3581, ECAFE Document E/3599, ECE Document E/3584). ECOSOC (Summer 1962) and the General Assembly (Autumn 1962) will again consider the implementation of the policy of decentralization.