How do emerging technologies affect nuclear stability? In this paper, we use a quasi-experimental cyber-nuclear wargame with 580 players to explore three hypotheses about emerging technologies and nuclear stability: (1) technological uncertainty leads to preemption and escalation; (2) technological uncertainty leads to restraint; and (3) technological certainty leads to escalation through aggressive counterforce campaigns. The wargames suggest that uncertainty and fear about cyber vulnerabilities create no immediate incentives for preemptive nuclear use. The greater danger to strategic stability lies in how overconfidence in cyber exploits incentivizes more aggressive counterforce campaigns and, secondarily, how vulnerabilities encourage predelegation or automation. Both of these effects suggest worrisome relationships between cyber exploits and inadvertent nuclear use on one hand and cyber vulnerabilities and accidental nuclear use on the other hand. Together, these findings reveal the complicated relationship between pathways to escalation and strategic stability, highlighting the role that confidence and perhaps-misplaced certainty—versus uncertainty and fear—play in strategic stability.

Six years have passed since the conflict between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir was put on the agenda of the Security Council. The United Nations has tried incessantly to bring it to a final and peaceful settlement but with no success. The issue continues to evade its efforts, which have been limited to mediation, and still rests finally with the parties in dispute, the governments of India and Pakistan.

This article describes and explains a previously overlooked empirical pattern in state revenue collection. As late as 1913, central governments in the West collected similar levels of per capita revenue as the rest of the world, despite ruling richer societies and experiencing a long history of fiscal innovation. Western revenue levels permanently diverged only in the following half-century. We identify the twentieth-century great revenue divergence by constructing a new panel data set of central government revenue with broad spatial and temporal coverage. To explain the pattern, we argue that sustainably high levels of revenue extraction require societal demand for an activist state, and a supply of effective bureaucratic institutions. Neither factor in isolation is sufficient. We formalize this insight in a game-theoretic model. The government can choose among low-effort, legibility-intensive, and crony-favoring strategies for raising revenues. Empirically, our theory accounts for low revenue intake in periods of low demand (the nineteenth-century West) or low bureaucratic capacity (twentieth-century former colonies), and for eventual revenue spikes in the West.

United Nations technical assistance is unique in many ways. Its popularity is attested by pledges and contributions from eighty-two nations, some of which are not members of the UN. Its success is indicated by increasing contributions from all nations of the world and increasing requests for assistance from underdeveloped countries. Most significant of all, the UN technical assistance program is the only setting where the Soviet Union, its constituent republics, and the eastern European countries in its orbit cooperate widi western powers in economic activities not specifically and directly for their own national purposes. Nowhere else can one find delegates from the United States, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and many other nations wrestling not with high politics and ways to advance their power position, but, rather, with the practical problems of irrigation in Iran, statistical research in India, and malaria control in Ceylon.

In the past few decades we have been improving our understanding of the weather system and exploring ways to modify it. Over sixty countries have experimented with modifying the weather. The new technology of weather and climate modification will raise important political problems which will demand new responses from the international community. Whether states will be able to establish the cooperative measures necessary to develop and manage new technology depends upon whether there are sufficient incentives to do so. This article analyzes the historical patterns of international cooperation in meteorology, and then plots against several time horizons projected developments and capabilities in weather modification technology and the potential problems emerging from using the technology. It derives a tentative picture of the responsibilities demanded, compares the likely responses with those needed, and assesses whether they will be adequate for the problems projected.

As this is being written, representatives of the thirty-three nations that are signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have just met again in Geneva. Their deliberations, though usually given minor notice in the press, are important. About four-fifths of the world's international trade is carried on by the countries participating in GATT.

In the present climate of opinion it is customary to view the attitudes and actions of the USSR in the United Nations — as elsewhere — as dictated only by malice and evil.

Since the gravest issues of peace and war may hinge upon the assessment which is made of the Soviet attitude, it is essential to seek an understanding of the ideas and forces which have shaped it. We have, therefore, attempted in the first place to assess the Soviet position as Moscow may see it, in some instances deliberately giving the benefit of the doubt, where doubt plausibly enters in, to the Soviet side; but the elements of explanation which have inevitably intruded themselves reflect the western frame of reference. The word “may” is in italic since this is necessarily an essay in interpretation; Soviet pronouncements obviously cover only part of the story and have their strong propaganda implications and limitations.

Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria): On October 16, 1957, Israel filed an application instituting proceedings against the People's Republic of Bulgaria regarding an aerial incident which occurred on July 27, 1955. The application recalled that on that date an aircraft belonging to an Israeli airline company was shot down on Bulgarian territory by the Bulgarian Security Forces, fifty-one passengers and seven crew members being killed. The government of Israel requested the Court to declare Bulgarian responsibility under international law for the damage caused and to determine the amount of compensation.

It may be unthinkable, even unimaginable, that the United Nations could itself become a true “community” in the near future. It is not unthinkable that the UN may be pushing the present disarray a little closer to that goal. The popular press abounds with loose references to the “world community,” but men who have thought deeply and hardheadedly about this prospect have also hinted in that direction, using various terms for the same thing. To quote only two, Lincoln P. Bloomfield calmly mentions “the universal society of which the United Nations is the forerunner” and Richard N. Gardner believes that a “genuine world community is waiting to be born. …”

The purpose of this research is to examine the conditions for successful United Nations elective officeholding through an interregional comparison of three types of variables. Previous studies have primarily emphasized two types of determinants. Some have suggested that behavior in the United Nations is controlled by the environment of international politics, while others have attempted to link a nation state's level of socioeconomic development to elective officeholding success. This research suggests that the legislative variable may be the most useful predictor of elective officeholding. The legislative dimension is based upon the premise that the political processes in the Organization represent a quasi-legislative system. An examination of the three types of variables led to the conclusion that legislative behavior is the most consistent predictor of elective officeholding success across regions. This finding does not negate the salience of environmental interactions or nation state attributes, but it does suggest that nation state participation in the political processes of the Organization appears to be the best predictor of officeholding success.

The Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) held its fourteenth session in Rome from August 21 through September 15, 1962, under the presidency of Dr. E. Ortona (Italy). The Assembly adopted measures to assure that the development and use of supersonic civil aircraft would not be detrimental either to the public or to international civil aviation. The ICAO Council was to work toward international agreement on the operational characteristics of critical importance in insuring that supersonic aircraft could fit into the same environment as subsonic aircraft, and also on the problems of noise near airfields, sonic boom, and radiation hazards. A second object of Council concern would be the assessment of the operating requirements of the supersonic aircraft, so that international agreement could also be reached on the ground facilities and services required and the places where these would have to be installed.

The development of regional organizations and collective defense arrangements of a regional nature has been one of the principal features of international relations since 1945. The literature on the subject has already become voluminous. This bibliography is designed to provide a key to some of the principal writings on the subject found in the more generally available periodicals and other sources in the English and French languages. An effort has been made to index the basic documents establishing the different regional arrangements together with materials giving reliable summaries of what has been done in each area and throwing light on organizational and political issues.

It is generally recognized that the last decade or so witnessed a proliferation of studies dealing with different aspects of regional integration. While most of them discussed the origin and history of various international organizations, some, especially those of a more recent vintage, ventured into the thicket of theory building in an effort to engage eventually in some kind of comparative analysis.

When I reported to a colleague that I was writing a chapter on the relationship between the Atlantic Community and the United Nations, the response was immediate, emphatic, and somewhat disconcerting. “What do you propose to say?” he snorted. “Actually the two things are quite separate and distinct. There really is no relationship between them at all.”

The First All-African People's Conference, a nongovernmental assembly attended by more than 300 political and trade union leaders representing 200 million Africans in 28 countries plus observers from Canada, China, Denmark, India, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, took place in Accra, Ghana, from December 8 to 13, 1958. The conference was called by a preparatory committee composed of representatives from eight independent states (Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic); the 28 dependent and independent African countries participating were: Angola, Basutoland, Belgian Congo, Cameroons, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Occidental Afrique, Senegal, Sierre Leone, South Africa, South West Africa, Tanganyika, Togoland, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zanzibar. Mr. Tom Mboya, general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor, was reported to have been designated chairman of the conference by the preparatory committee.

Seven Commonwealth countries – the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, and pakistan – are now members of the United Nations. As this widely representative international organization celebrates its fifth anniversary, it is worth considering how the members of an older well-tried international association, the General Assembly in dealing with international political issues. Broadly speaking, the questions of significance are: How far is the fact of membership in the commonwealth recognized within the United Nations, e. g. in elections to its organs? How do Commonwealth countries act when one of their own members is under attack, as South Africa has been over South West Africa, or in the even more difficult circumstances when two of their members openly air a dispute in the international forum, as over the position of Indians in South Africa, or over Jammu and Kashmir? How do they act in relation to issues of general international concern like Indonesia and Palestine? And lastly, how far do the countries of the Commonwealth retain their traditionally intimate collaboration within this larger and more formal organization? Is there any pattern here which will help to explain what kind of international association the Commonwealth now is, as well as what role its members play in the United Nations?

Ten years have passed since the initial publication of Emery Reves's international best-seller, The Anatomy of Peace, and the rapid growth of numerous organizations which took up the cry for world government at the dawn of the Atomic Era. Open conflict in Korea in 1950, following several years of severe international tension, seemed to lend some grim support to early world federalist warnings that the world would either “federate or disintegrate” within the span of a few years. But the international atmosphere has improved somewhat in recent years, and the world has not conformed with the early federalist prediction. Indeed, world federalists themselves are still very much alive and active on this still unfederated planet—not only in the United States, but in more than a score of other non-communist countries as well.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is not a diplomatic conference, or a parliament, or an executive organ, although it smacks of all three. Among international, governmental, deliberative bodies it is sui generis. As such, it engages in discussing quasi diplomatic issues, chiefly economic and social in nature, in recommending policy actions by governments, in trying to plan and coordinate interagency programs in the economic and social domain, and in innovating and supervising programs under UN sponsorship.

Too much emphasis has been placed on formal state policies and on ties between individual firms to explain Japanese economic behavior and impediments to imports in Japanese markets. We need to look instead at informal governance by trade associations. In so doing, the concept of relational contracting should be applied not just to dyadic relationships between individual firms but also to relationships between entire industries. Whole industries engage in relational contracting to ensure the stability of both prices and supplies. These industry agreements stabilize Japanese markets but at the same time keep imports out of them. This informal governance complements state policies to support uncompetitive industries. These agreements are more likely to occur and succeed between selling and buying industries that each are relatively concentrated, when upstream products are standardized, when upstream goods constitute a smaller share of downstream production costs, when these sectors have not experienced previous conflicts that undermine cooperation, and when the Ministry of International Trade and Industry wants a domestic supply of its products.