The research reported in this article seeks to understand how and why individuals are appointed to serve as executive heads of international organizations. A simple statement of the behavioral rule used in selection of executive heads is developed in the form of an executive head appointment function. The type of data available for the analysis of the appointment of executive heads in international organizations is identified, and an empirical examination of changes in emphasis in the selection of executive heads is reported. The executive head appointment function utilized in the study views appointment as an executive head as a function of six factors (three organizational, one national, and two personal). Discriminant function analysis is used to determine if the function would distinguish between individuals appointed during the period 1945–57 and those appointed from 1958–70 as executive heads in UN treaty-based organizations. It is possible to distinguish, on the basis of the specified executive head appointment function, between executive heads appointed during the two halves of the time period under study. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the emphasis involved in the selection of executive heads has changed over time in UN treaty-based organizations.

When I reported to a colleague that I was writing a chapter on the relationship between the Atlantic Community and the United Nations, the response was immediate, emphatic, and somewhat disconcerting. “What do you propose to say?” he snorted. “Actually the two things are quite separate and distinct. There really is no relationship between them at all.”

The First All-African People's Conference, a nongovernmental assembly attended by more than 300 political and trade union leaders representing 200 million Africans in 28 countries plus observers from Canada, China, Denmark, India, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, took place in Accra, Ghana, from December 8 to 13, 1958. The conference was called by a preparatory committee composed of representatives from eight independent states (Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic); the 28 dependent and independent African countries participating were: Angola, Basutoland, Belgian Congo, Cameroons, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Occidental Afrique, Senegal, Sierre Leone, South Africa, South West Africa, Tanganyika, Togoland, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zanzibar. Mr. Tom Mboya, general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor, was reported to have been designated chairman of the conference by the preparatory committee.

It may be unthinkable, even unimaginable, that the United Nations could itself become a true “community” in the near future. It is not unthinkable that the UN may be pushing the present disarray a little closer to that goal. The popular press abounds with loose references to the “world community,” but men who have thought deeply and hardheadedly about this prospect have also hinted in that direction, using various terms for the same thing. To quote only two, Lincoln P. Bloomfield calmly mentions “the universal society of which the United Nations is the forerunner” and Richard N. Gardner believes that a “genuine world community is waiting to be born. …”

A distinguishing feature of the modern state is the broad scope of social welfare provision. This remarkable expansion of public assistance was characterized by huge spatial and temporal disparities. What explains the uneven expansion in the reach of social welfare? We argue that social welfare expansion depends in part on the ability of the governed to compel the state to provide rewards in return for military service—and crucially, that marginalized groups faced greater barriers to obtaining those rewards. In colonial states, subjects faced a bargaining disadvantage relative to citizens living in the colony and were less likely to win concessions from the state for their wartime sacrifices. We test this argument using a difference-in-differences research design and a rich data set of local spending before and after World War I in colonial Algeria. Our results reveal that social welfare spending expanded less in communes where the French subject share of the population was greater. This paper contributes to the state-building literature by highlighting the differential ability of the governed to bargain with the state in the aftermath of conflict.

Although rebel groups are players on the international stage, little is known about their financial strategies at this scale. Existing research suggests that rebels succeed in cross-border trade by using informal networks that evade state authority. Yet rebels face a critical challenge: they operate in a normative environment that values state recognition and penalizes their illegitimate status. New evidence reveals that rebels can overcome this barrier and better connect to global economies not by evading the state but by infiltrating its institutions. Drawing on unprecedented data—the internal records of armed groups and their trading partners—I examine how rebels use state agencies in conflict zones to manufacture a legal cover for wartime trade. By using state agencies to provide false certification, rebels can place the stamp of state on their trade deals. This strategy of legal appropriation is a fundamentally different model of how conflict markets skirt sanctions and connect to global buyers. I develop a framework for how this strategy works that traces how international sovereignty norms and sanctions regimes create incentives for rebels, firms, and bureaucrats to coordinate around this legal veneer across the supply chain. The framework and evidence contribute theoretical and policy understandings for rebel governance, state building and fragmentation, and illicit global markets.

Words spoken and actions taken at the United Nations echo around the world, and have very great impact on the hundreds of millions of individuals whose opinions, collectively, make up world opinion. World opinion, in its turn, has a distinct and traceable impact on diplomacy and international relations. Many consider it the only real weapon the UN possesses.

Barring the global catastrophe envisioned by the Club of Rome, poverty will prove a more intractable problem than low productivity in the Third World. Much greater attention will have to be paid to the distribution of income, jobs, and foodgrains in the future if increases in production are to actually reduce hunger. The failure of many countries to manage their food supplies adequately and to provide basic food security to their populations is explained both by an urban bias in planning and by the sheer administrative complications and costs of stabilizing the foodgrains markets. For many countries dependency was politically easier. Major efforts to increase basic food production are essential in most developing countries, but the political adjustments associated with that decision may be difficult. The institutional patterns required to induce an agricultural revolution will challenge existing patterns of power and social stratification.

As events since October 1973 have again underscored, security of supply and price of energy resources have enormous strategic and economic implications for any industrialized country. Nevertheless, trade in energy resources between Canada and the United States has not always been closely managed by the central governments that are responsible for national security and economic development. In fact, the energy trade involves a wide variety of actors that continually seek transnational contacts and alliances of opportunity to further their own self-interest almost as if the national border did not exist.

Some of the current spate of writing about outer space is so highly imaginative as to discourage serious students of international organization and law from pursuing detailed studies of very real problems which now confront the UN. Antarctic possibilities are only slightly less fabulous and some of the problems there raised may be even more immediate. There are those who are troubled by the difficulty of mastering a new massive subject matter some of which is shrouded in unfamiliar scientific terminology and some of which is imprisoned in official security classifications. Actually these difficulties are no greater here than elsewhere. A study of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) like Codding's required familiarity with pulse radionavigation systems as well as voting procedures; the political and legal delegates to the recent Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea were also required to deal with hydrography and ichthyology. The dark shadow of secret archives clouds the crystal ball for many a student of international relations who wishes to edge up on the contemporaneous scene. When charged with inadequacies, the present writers will not “take the Fifth” but will plead guilty.

The permanent neutrality of Austria is not rooted in ancient traditions as is its model, the permanent neutrality of Switzerland. It was established as late as 1955 and may, therefore, give rise to the question of why, in an age of collective self-defense, such a seemingly outdated decision was taken.

The 147th session of the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization (ILO) was held in Geneva from November 15 to 18, 1960. With respect to the operational programs of the International Labor Office, the Governing Body decided: 1) to include the question of technical assistance in the agenda of the 45th session of the International Labor Conference, to be held in June 1961; and 2) to merge the Manpower and Employment Committee and the Technical Assistance Committee into a single Committee on Operational Programs, in order to coordinate better the operational activities of ILO.

Two stand-by arrangements were announced by the International Monetary Fund on September 23, 1960, one with the government of El Salvador, authorizing drawings up to the equivalent of $11.25 million for a period of six months in order to strengthen El Salvador's international reserve position prior to the marketing season for the country's cotton and coffee crops, and the other to Haiti, making available the equivalent of $6 million for a one-year period, in support of Haitian currency convertibility. El Salvador had made similar arrangements with the Fund in previous years and had repurchased in full any drawings made under these arrangements. The arrangement with Haiti was to become effective on October 1, 1960, at the expiration of Haiti's current $4-million agreement with the Fund established a year previously in connection with a stabilization program.

The first part of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly met at UN Headquarters from September 20 through December 20, 1960, when it was adjourned. The second part of the session was to open on March 7, 1961. At the opening plenary meeting, Mr. Frederick R. Boland (Ireland) was elected President of the session, having obtained 46 votes out of a possible 80. At the same meeting, the Assembly's 864th, the following fourteen countries were admitted to membership in the UN: the Republic of Cameroun, the Togolese Republic, the Malagasy Republic, the Republic of Somalia, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), the Republic of Dahomey, the Republic of the Niger, the Republic of Upper Volta, the Republic of the Ivory Coast, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), the Republic of Gabon, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of Cyprus. At the 876th plenary meeting, the Republics of Senegal and Mali were admitted to membership, as was the Federation of Nigeria at the 893 d meeting, thereby bringing the total membership of the UN to 99. A special report of the Security Council on the subject of the admission to membership of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, considered by the Assembly at its 954th meeting, noted the failure of the Council to recommend Mauritania for admission; the Assembly decided to postpone indefinitely further consideration of the question. At its 895th plenary meeting, the Assembly adopted by a vote of 42 to 34, with 22 abstentions, the recomementation contained in the report of the General Committee that the Assembly reject the request of the Soviet Union for the inclusion in its agenda of the question of the representation of China in the UN, and decided not to consider at its fifteenth session any proposals to exclude the representatives of the government of the Republic of China (Nationalist) or to seat representatives of the government of the People's Republic of China (Communist). With regard to the representation in the UN of the Congo (Leopoldville), the General Assembly, at its 924th meeting, adopted by 53 votes to 24, with 19 abstentions, the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in its report; the Assembly thereby accepted the credentials issued by the head of state (President Joseph Kasavubu) and communicated by him to the President of the Assembly.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced on September 9, 1960, its first loan to Israel, in the amount of $27.5 million to help build and equip a new sheltered deep-water port at Ashdod, on the Mediterranean Sea. The Bank's loan was to cover all the foreign exchange requirements and part of the local currency costs of die first stage of the project, scheduled to be completed early in 1965; diis stage was to include the construction of about two miles of breakwaters, dredging the port area to proper depths for ocean-going ships, extension of piers to a length adequate for the accommodation of five ships at once, construction of a track and roadway within the port area and rail links outside it to a building quarry, construction of transit sheds, paved open storage areas, port utilities, and auxiliary structures, and the supply of some harbor craft, cranes, and cargo-handling equipment. Amortization on the loan, which was for a term of 25 years and bore interest at the rate of 5¾ percent per annum, was to begin in August 1965.

Listed below is the membership of United Nations bodies for 1966. Unless otherwise noted, membership expires on December 31 of the year indicated in parentheses. Where names of individuals are listed, the members serve in their personal capacities and not as representatives of states; their nationalities are given for information only.

Little is known about the impact of international organizations. Neither a rudimentary theory of IGO impact exists nor are there sufficient case studies to develop meaningful generalizations. To answer the question whether they make a difference, the effect of intergovernmental organization (IGO) policies must be evaluated.

Like a chronic sore that never quite cripples, hurts most of the time, and sometimes becomes dangerously inflamed, the issue of China in the United Nations has plagued United States policy for almost twenty years.

Terrorists attack civilian targets but there is variation in how many civilians they kill. Terrorists may deliberately harm civilians, or they may adopt a less bloody approach, demolishing businesses, transit systems, and other civilian property while employing tactics to avert civilian casualties. One such tactic is to warn civilians before an attack, allowing them to flee the area. With warnings as an example, this study considers why terrorists might adopt casualty-aversion tactics. An analysis of 12,235 bombings by 131 terrorist groups in the years 1970 to 2016 finds that warnings are most common when terrorists fight democracies and when they lack territorial strongholds. Ideological factors such as religion are not significant predictors of warnings. These findings suggest a need to revisit the claim that religion incentivizes indiscriminate terrorism. They also suggest a strategic logic behind casualty-aversion tactics. Terrorists fighting democracies may spare civilians to appear legitimate in citizens’ eyes. Terrorists without strongholds may spare civilians because they rely on the state's population for support. At first glance, my findings appear to contradict civil war literature arguing that militants with strongholds use violence more discriminately. However, terrorism occurs in areas of state control. Militants with strongholds can use indiscriminate terrorism against state-governed civilians without alienating their own supporters elsewhere.