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United Nations Technical Assistance: Soviet and East European Participation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Robert Loring Allen
Affiliation:
associate professor of economics at the University of Virginia. This article is based upon a detailed research study, which is a part of a systematic inquiry into Soviet foreign economic relations being conducted at the University's Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs.
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Extract

United Nations technical assistance is unique in many ways. Its popularity is attested by pledges and contributions from eighty-two nations, some of which are not members of the UN. Its success is indicated by increasing contributions from all nations of the world and increasing requests for assistance from underdeveloped countries. Most significant of all, the UN technical assistance program is the only setting where the Soviet Union, its constituent republics, and the eastern European countries in its orbit cooperate widi western powers in economic activities not specifically and directly for their own national purposes. Nowhere else can one find delegates from the United States, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and many other nations wrestling not with high politics and ways to advance their power position, but, rather, with the practical problems of irrigation in Iran, statistical research in India, and malaria control in Ceylon.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1957

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References

1 General Assembly Resolution 200 (III), December 4. 1948. and Document E/1174. The “regular” program is financed from the UN budget and by assessments from members of the specialized agencies and is quite small relative to the “expanded” program, which is financed solely by voluntary contribuions to the UN for the specific purpose of technical assistance, Economic and Social Council Resolution 222 (IX), August 15, 1949, and General Assembly Resolution 304 (IV), November 16, 1949, established the expanded program.

2 The annual reports of TAB to TAC contain a wealth of statistical and descriptive data and are the principal source of information on the expanded program. The latest is Economic and Social Council Official Records (24th session), Supplement 5. Asher, Robert E., Kotschnig, Walter M., Brown, William Adams Jr, and Associates, The United Nations and Economic and Social Co-operation, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1957, p. 435493Google Scholar, is an interesting and useful discussion of UN technical assistance problems.

3 In Document E/TAC/60 these costs are estimated at $75 million annually.

4 General Assembly Official Records (II th session), Second Committee, 390th meeting, 11 29, 1956, p. 18Google Scholar.

5 The Official Records of ECOSOC and TAC are replete with argumentation by Soviet and east European delegates concerning the evils of western economic imperialism and subjugation of peoples through “technical assistance”.

6 Document E/TAC/SR.15.

7 It was not possible for the Soviet Union and eastern Europe to avoid some financial support if they wished to remain members of the UN, since the General Assembly allocated funds from the UN budget for technical assistance purposes.

8 For a detailed description of Soviet behavior in ECOSOC, see Rubinstein, Alvin Z., “Soviet Policy Toward Under-developed Areas in the Economic and Social Council,” International Organization, IX, p. 232242Google Scholar.

9 Document E/CN.1/Sub.3/SR.15.

10 Economic and Social Council Official Records (9th session), 310th meeting, 07 26, 1949. P. 397Google Scholar.

11 Economic and Social Council Official Records (9th session), Supplement 1.

12 General Assembly Resolution 304 (IV), November 16, 1949, was passed unanimously.

13 Economic and Social Council Official Records (1st to 16th sessions).

14 Economic and Social Council Official Records (16th session), 725th meeting, 07 15, 1953, p. 142Google Scholar.

15 See the author's “Soviet Russia and Under-developed Countries: Trade and Aid,” The World Today, May 1957, p. 207–219, for a more complete discussion of the change in Soviet foreign economic policy and its consequences.

16 General Assembly Resolution 304 (IV), November 16, 1949.

17 For a detailed description of the SUNFED episode see Rubinstein, cited above, p. 242–243.

18 Approximate dollar equivalents were calculated on the basis of quotations of official rates in October 1957.

19 The data in this section were compiled from the annual TAB reports, other official reports, and the Official Records of TAB, TAC, and ECOSOC.

20 The Soviet Union and eastern Europe do not need, as do many contributors, to contribute in their own currencies. The Soviet Union has very large gold reserves and both the Soviet Union and eastern Europe have an opportunity to earn convertible currencies in their foreign trade. The contribution of these countries to the UN budget is in United States dollars.

21 The assessment of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe in UNTAA, which is a proportion of the UN budget, is higher than for the expanded program. These countries, however, are not all members of all of the specialized agencies.

22 On the basis of the present expanded program budget and the share contributed by the Soviet Union and eastern Europe to the UN budget, their contribution to the expanded program would be $6.13 million.

23 The Soviet credit program should not be confused with an aid program. The Soviet Union has made small gifts, such as hospital beds, motor buses, and demonstration equipment. These, however, do not constitute an aid program.

24 For a more complete study of Soviet and eastern European trade and credit activities, see the author's “Soviet and East European Foreign Credit Program,” American Slavic and East European Review, December 1957.

25 The Soviet Union has also loaned the countries within its orbit $7 billion through bilateral transactions (Pravda, 07 14, 1957)Google Scholar. Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China have been the principal recipients.

26 General Assembly Official Records (IIth session), Second Committee, 390th meeting, 11 29, 1956, p. 17Google Scholar.

27 General Assembly Official Records (IIth session), Second Committee, 394th meeting, 12 5, 1956, P. 39Google Scholar.

28 For its Statistical Research Institute, India ordered a Soviet electronic computor costing over $700,000 in 1955. Both the 1955 and 1956 delivery deadlines have passed and the Soviet Union now promises delivery before the end of 1957.

29 Country programming was first introduced in 1954, in accordance with Economic and Social Council Resolution 542 BII (XVIII), July 29, 1954.

30 Special or “bonus” projects have been used to work out difficult currency problems since the inception of the expanded program. Originally they were a bonus to the participating organizations but with the introduction of country programming in 1954 they became a bonus to a country.

31 TAC Resolution, November 30, 1953; Document E/2810.

32 General Assembly Resolution 304 which established the expanded program specified that its activities not be “accompanied by any considerations of a political nature”.

33 Economic and Social Council Official Records (23d session); and TAC, 1956Google Scholar.

34 The United States had also become displeased over the Soviet-Indian-UNESCO talks which led to plans and heavy expenditures on the Western Higher Institute of Technology in Bombay. Not only had there been bilateral negotiations on this project which the United States felt were illegal, but the Soviet Union had been claiming the project as a Soviet project and had planned to provide India with bilateral assistance on the project.

35 Economic and Social Council Resolution 623 BII (XXII), August 9, 1956.

36 The data for this section are from the annual reports of TAB to TAC, official records of TAB, and reports of participating organizations to TAB, as well as information compiled by the Office of International Organizations, United States Department of State.

37 The figure represents obligations. A fine distinction exists between obligations and expenditures. Obligations include expenditures and funds which will certainly become expenditures within at least two quarters. Forward contractual commitments, on the other hand, are not firm. They may never become obligations or they may become obligations in a radically different amount an indeterminate time later.

38 Thirty-five percent of the funds was spent by UNTAA and thirty percent by UNESCO. These agencies spend less than forty percent of all expanded program funds.

39 Economic and Social Council Resolution 623 BIII 5d (XXII), Augusts 1956.