Only six of the small states of Western or Western oriented Europe participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. They were Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Norway, Luxembourg, and, after a struggle between the Soviet Union and its wartime allies, Denmark. Their participation followed, for the most part, the model of the “honorable, independent, disinterested small state”: sober, responsible, speaking mainly when spoken to, but assiduously seeking out ways to make their voices heard in the alleviation of international conflict. True, they were there as part of the winning coalition in World War II and shared the hopes and expectations of the larger Western powers concerning the role of the United Nations. But they joined similar countries outside Europe, particularly Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, in helping to shape a UN Charter which in certain ways differed from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The role of the General Assembly was, for example, enlarged, thus modifying the special position of the Great Powers, and the scope of the United Nations in economic and social fields was expanded. The influence of the small states in Europe stemmed from the desire of the major Western allies, particularly the United States, to ensure the success of the enterprise by concessions to those whose participation would be necessary to make it a worthwhile undertaking.

According to press reports from Beirut, Lebanon, on August 11 and 18, 1959, representatives of nine Arab states—all the members of the Arab League except Tunisia—were preparing a lengthy reply to the suggestion of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the UN, that the Palestine refugees being sheltered by various Arab countries be economically integrated into these countries. Spokesmen for the Arab states declared at the end of a tenday conference that they would unanimously support the refugees' demand to return to their homes in what had become the state of Israel; this was tantamount to rejection of Mr. Hammarskjold's proposal to spend $1.5–$2 billion within the next five years to create productive jobs for about one million refugees living in Arab lands. Although the Secretary-General had asserted that economic integration would not prejudice any rights of the refugees, the Arabs interpreted the plan to mean that the refugees would be permanently resettled among them. Apparently the only part of Mr. Hammarskjold's report that was acceptable to the Arabs was that calling for the continued existence of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the organization administering the relief program for refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic.

The oratory of the General Assembly and the Security Council and the resolutions adopted by these organs are the most obvious activities of the United Nations in the field of human rights and the features usually studied. They alone, however, give little indication of the effectiveness and the effects of the UN's actions. To investigate this one needs to go beyond New York to the national capitals. How do governments whose policies are severely criticized in the UN respond? On one level the questions can be simply answered. The alternatives are reasonably clear. They include token and substantive compliance, indifference, and defiance. But how is one alternative chosen over the others and does what goes on in New York have any impact on the political dynamics within the national framework? This article is an attempt to investigate a limited aspect of this question. It is an analysis of both the reactions within the parliaments of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa to UN actions concerning these territories and the possible importance of these reactions in parliamentary elections.

What constitutes “sovereign statehood”? Elaborate answers can be given under international law, under theories of international relations, under jurisprudence, and under general political philosophy. But from the point of view of African countries the empirical answer is perhaps the simplest. These countries know that it was not when they assumed control of their domestic affairs that they ceased to be colonies. As a matter of experience, many of them found that the ultimate expression of sovereignty was not direct rule internally but direct diplomatic relations with other countries abroad. The very process of attaining independence might, in their case, be reduced to a single catch phrase—“from foreign rule to foreign relations.” In other words, an African colony was said to have attained independence when it had moved from the status of being under foreign rule to the status of conducting foreign relations with full authority.

An examination of the past relationships between nuclear proliferation and American security policy substantiates several propositions. First, the political relationship between the United States and each new nuclear weapon state was not fundamentally transformed as a result of nuclear proliferation. Second, with the exception of the Soviet Union, no new nuclear state significantly affected U.S. defense programs or policies. Third, American interest in bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations has been confined to the Soviet Union. Fourth, a conventional conflict involving a nonnuclear ally prompted the United States to intervene in ways it otherwise might not have in order to forestall the use of nuclear weapons.

In all respects, however, the relationship between nuclear proliferation and American security policy is changing. The intensification of the superpower rivalry and specific developments in their nuclear weapons and doctrines, the decline of American power more generally, and the characteristics of nuclear threshold states all serve to stimulate nuclear proliferation. It will be increasingly difficult in the future for American security policy to be as insulated from this process as it has been in the past.

The press reported that on September 30, 1961, the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) formally came into being with seventeen out of a possible twenty member nations having. deposited their instruments of ratification of the OECD convention. At the time of the entry into force of the convention, the following nations had deposited their ratifications: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg shortly afterwards joined the organization. The OECD convention required members to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, nondiscriminatory basis in accord with international obligations. At the first meeting of the organization in Paris on September 30, 1961, Mr. Donald Fleming, Canadian Finance Minister, was elected chairman of the Ministerial Council, and Mr. Gunnar Lange, Swedish Commerce Minister, and Mr. Charles Arliotis, Greek Minister of Coordination, vice-chairmen. Mr. Thorkil Kristensen, the former Secretary-General of OEEC, was named Secretary-General of the new organization, and Mr. Charles Adair (United States) and Mr. Jean Cottier (France) were designated deputy Secretaries-General.

The major hypothesis of this article is that attendance at interparliamentary group meetings by members of Congress between 1949 and 1970 modified their attitudes toward foreign policy. Interviews with a sample of congressional delegates, analysis of roll call data, and documentary records were used to test this hypothesis. Changes after attendance at an initial meeting were small. However, when party, ideology, and degree of previous isolationism or internationalism were controlled the changes were much more significant. Predictions formulated on the basis of cognitive dissonance theory were remarkably accurate, thus suggesting that cognitive consistency explanations may help to account for the behavior observed.

During the last two years, the major organs of the United Nations have shown an increasing tendency to attempt the solution of international problems through the employment of special bodies and committees, rather than trying directly to resolve the myriad problems of each dispute. The General Assembly has established special groups on the Balkans, Korea and Palestine and has turned a number of questions over to its Interim Committee, while both the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council have often worked through ad hoc bodies. The Security Council has also delegated its powers under the Charter on a number of occasions. While retaining general supervision, and requiring that final results be subject to its approval, the Security Council in the case of Indonesia, Palestine and Greece, for example, has created sub-groups possessing a wide latitude of action operating under rather general instructions. Since this procedure enables a subordinate group to concentrate on the problem in hand – and since the creation of such a group may well be undertaken as a means of circumventing the Council's unanimity principle in voting – a study of the subsidiary commissions is of some interest. The United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan is a good case in point.

The Agreement for the Establishment of the Caribbean Organization, Article V (2), stated that the agreement would enter into force on signature of a joint declaration to that effect by the signatory governments following deposit of instruments of approval or acceptance by the signatory governments and after the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Commission had received notification from not less than six of the prospective members of the Organization. It was announced in February 1961 that the Secretary-General had received formal notification from six prospective members, who had accepted the obligations imposed by the Statute of the Caribbean Organization and elected to become members. These were: France for the departments of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique; Surinam; the Netherlands Antilles; British Guiana; Puerto Rico; and the Virgin Islands of the United States. The government of the British Virgin Islands later notified the Secretary-General of its intention to join the Organization and became a member on May 31, 1962.

Information from four audits, or audit-like reviews, of international relief programs in the Nigerian-Biafran war sheds considerable light on the financial sources, scope, timing of flows, and cost-efficiency associated with that complex operation. Beyond their intrinsic interest, which is heightened by two of the documents remaining unpublished, such economic data bear heavily on many political aspects of the relief effort. For example, they permit examination of the relationship, and partial disjunction, between dominance in contributions (which was mainly governmental and particularly American) and leadership in administration (which was chiefly continental European and private). They also facilitate an assessment of the massive or token proportions of these endeavors, their capacity to anticipate rather than just respond tardily to predictable catastrophes, and the extent of their entanglement in the domestic and international power fields that characterized the Nigerian conflict. For all their rather divergent modi operandi, the leading role in the relief process of the two private umbrella organizations is clearly apparent; but so too is the limited ambit of even such comparatively massive relief work within the context of an on-going civil war.

On March 27, 1964, Secretary-General U Thant announced that the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) had become operational. This announcement occurred only a few days after the initial Canadian units landed in Cyprus soon to be joined by the forces from other contributing countries. The operation, initiated under the executive direction of the Secretary-General and at the request of the Security Council, thus became another in a series of peacekeeping efforts by the United Nations. One year later the Secretary-General was able to report that during the first year of operation UNFICYP had achieved “very creditable results” but that major difficulties still remained with respect to achieving a stable and enduring peace.

Development planning has become a routine activity for large numbers of corporations as well as for public authorities at various levels, particularly national governments. The time has come to make an attempt to create a framework for all these activities at the highest, that is, the world, level. Several of the most important arguments in favor of the construction of such a world “indicative” development plan1 will thus be discussed in this introductory section.

The title of this article may promise too much. First, this article will limit itself only to the problems of Socialist states in universal, worldwide organizations, not in all kinds of international organizations, as the title implies. Second, the wording of the title may incorrectly suggest that the unique economic, social, and ideological characteristics of the Socialist system determine the nature of Socialist participation in international organizations. In fact, however, Socialist states act much as other states in their relations with international organizations. Third, the title and content of the article may imply that all Socialist states behave identically in regard to international organizations. It seems necessary, therefore, to emphasize that treating the Socialist states as a group is merely a recognition of the greater community of interests and higher degree of cohesion within the group than between members of the group and states outside it. There remain, however, different viewpoints on some issues among members of the group. Membership in the group may be formal, e.g., participation in a caucusing group, or informal, e.g., sharing in a feeling of responsibility for the welfare of the Socialist world. A formulation of the general attitudes of the Socialist group consists in setting forth policies which result from similar or common economic and social systems, ideology, interdependence, and, last but not least, dangers. In the author's opinion the relevance of establishing and recognizing diese common attitudes despite individual deviations cannot be denied.

On May 22, 1958, the Lebanese representative at the United Nations presented a letter to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to consider a

complaint by Lebanon in respect to a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger themaintenance of international peace and security.

How do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory of burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote cooperation in a variety of defense, military, and security issue areas. Using a computational model, we show that DCA partners’ defense spending depends on the network structure of their agreements. In bilateral terms, DCAs increase defense spending by committing states to defense activities and allowing partners to reciprocally punish free riding. However, as a state's local network of defense partnerships grows more densely connected, with many transitive “friend of a friend” relations, DCAs have the countervailing effect of reducing defense spending. The more deeply integrated states are in bilateral defense networks, the less they spend on defense. We distinguish two potential mechanisms behind this effect—one based on efficiency improvements, the other on free riding. An empirical analysis using multilevel inferential network models points more to efficiency than to free riding. Defense networks reduce defense spending, and they do so by allowing countries to produce security more efficiently.

In this article we address two questions pertinent to the debate on the relationship between industrial restructuring and the new protectionism. First, does the appearance of industry-specific trade barriers necessarily indicate an attempt to preserve those traditional sectors in which advanced capitalist states no longer enjoy a comparative advantage? Second, are all advanced capitalist states equally susceptible to protectionist pressures or will neomercantilist states, given their established capacity for sectoral intervention, find such pressures easier to resist than their liberal counterparts? After analyzing recent changes in textile technology and in the pattern of international competition in the textile industry, we examine the response of two states—the relatively liberal Canadian state and the neomercantilist French state—to this complex set of changes. The textile case indicates that it is a mistake to assume that states have but two options: protect or adjust. Links may be established between hightechnology and traditional industries that make it possible for inputs from the former to restore the competitive position of the latter. If such links are forged, then states may use trade barriers to allow producers time to adjust. French and Canadian textile policies reveal the conditions under which such states, although constrained by established policy networks, are nevertheless induced to respond in similar fashions to contemporary changes in the world economy.

A popular view holds that foreign policy hawks have an advantage at bringing about rapprochement with international adversaries. This idea is rooted in domestic politics: voters respond more favorably to efforts at reconciliation when their own leader has a hawkish rather than a dovish reputation. Yet, domestic reactions are only part of the equation—to succeed, rapprochement must also evoke a favorable response by the adversary. In this research note, we argue that hawks who make conciliatory gestures may face international liabilities that could offset their domestic advantages. Foreign audiences should view doves who make overtures as more sincere and should therefore be more willing to support cooperation with foreign doves than with foreign hawks. We field a pair of survey experiments to examine whether Americans respond differently when foreign hawks versus foreign doves deliver the olive branch. We find that foreign doves fare better at eliciting cooperation because they are deemed more sincere, though the prospect of military vulnerability limits how willing Americans are to respond positively even to a dove who makes a gesture. Thus, while past research has shown that hawks are better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement, our findings suggest that they have a harder time eliciting a favorable response from the adversary.

The postwar increase in the number and scope of intergovernmental organizations has meant that many fields hitherto subject to national regulation, or to bilateral agreements, are now regulated by a multilateral convention. There are other fields, however, which appear to be as yet unready, for international control. The economic regulation of international air transport is a case in point. Although air navigation principles have been internationalized since 1919, and a respectable amount of technical co-operation on safety rules has been achieved, rights to engage in air commerce between the territories of two or more states continue to be determined largely by bilateral agreements