Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T22:37:56.688Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Problems and Trends in the Composition of Nonplenary UN Organs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Catherine Senf Manno
Catherine Senf Manno
Affiliation:
recently an adviser to the government of Thailand under Food and Agriculture Organization auspices, obtained her doctorate in international relations and organization from The American University in June 1964.
Get access

Extract

Those organs of the United Nations which do not include all Member States pose a challenging problem: How should such select bodies be constituted? There is no easy solution in view of the diversity of national policies, even between countries of a particular region, ideology, or stage of development. This paper presents a series of case studies illustrating some of the principles invoked and the nature of the accommodations arrived at by the General Assembly in dealing with the problem, especially in setting up its own subsidiary organs. On the basis of this evidence an assessment is made of the significance of recent changes in the structure of these nonplenary organs and the resulting impact on the balance of decision-making power in the Organization.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , Winter 1965 , pp. 37 - 55
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1965

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 UN Document A/AC.113/30.

2 See Joseph, Nogee, “The Diplomacy of Disarmament,” International Conciliation, 01 1960 (No. 526), pp. 235–303Google Scholar; “Issues Before the Fifteenth General Assembly,” International Conciliation, September 1960 (No. 529), pp. 9–35Google Scholar; and “Urgent Need for Progress on Vital Disarmament Issues,” United Nations Review, December 1962 (Vol. 9, No. 12), pp. 9–11, 44–53.Google Scholar

3 The categories in Soviet usage are “the Socialist countries, the non-aligned countries, and the members of Western military alliances.” (The New York Times, June 16, 1961, p. 2.)Google Scholar The Latin American states do not fit well into this classification, and Soviet representatives have conceded that they should not be charged off entirely against the Western quota.

4 Uniterd Nations Review, December 1962 (Vol. 9, No. 12), p. 50.Google Scholar

5 See General Assembly Resolutions 1348 (XIII), December, 13, 1958; 1472 (XIV), December 12, 1959; 1721 (XVI), December 20, 1961; 1802 (XVII), December 14, 1962; 1884 (XVIII), October 17, 1963; and 1962 and 1963 (XVIII), December 13, 1963.

6 General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), December 13, 1958.

7 See General Assembly Resolutions 822 (IX), December 11, 1954; 923 (X), December 9, 1955; 1219 (XII), December 14, 1957; 1317 (XIII), December 12, 1958; 1424 (XIV), December 5, 1959; 1521 (XV), December 15, 1960; 1706 (XVI), December 19, 1961; 1826 (XVII), December 18, 1962; and 1936 and 1945 (XVIII), December 11, 1963. See also UN Document E/GONF.46/L.28, Annex A, p. 94.

8 General Assembly Resolution 520 (VI), January 12, 1952.

9 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings, International Development Association, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958.

10 General Assembly Resolution 1521 (XV), December 15, 1960.

11 UN Document E/3514.

12 General Assembly Resolution 1706 (XVI), December 19, 1961.

13 UN Document E/CONF.46/L.28, Annex A, p. 94.

14 See General Assembly Resolutions 1707 (XVI), December 19, 1960; 1785 (XVII), December 8, 1962; and 1897 (XVIII), November 11, 1963. See also “Issues Before the Eighteenth General Assembly,” International Conciliation, September 1963 (No. 544) p. 148Google Scholar; and UN Document E/C0NF.46/L.28 and Add. 1.

15 General Assembly Resolution 1785 (XVII), December 8, 1962.

16 General Assembly Resolution 1897 (XVIII), November 11, 1963.

17 See Sidney, Weintraub, “After the U. N. Trade Conference: Lessons and Portents,” Foreign Affairs, 10 1964 (Vol. 43, No. 1), pp. 37–50.Google Scholar

18 UN Document E/CONF.46/L.28, Annex A, pp. 128–139.

19 See General Assembly Resolutions 1810 (XVII), December 17, 1962, and 1970 (XVIII), December 16, 1963; and Schurman, C. W. A., “The Final Stage of Colonialism,” United Nations Review, 07 1961 (Vol. 8, No. 7), pp. 20–22.Google Scholar

20 See General Assembly Resolutions 895 (IX), December 4, 1954: 1103 (XI), December 18, 1956; 1647 (XVI), November 6, 1961; and 1815 (XVII), December 18, 1962.

21 For a critical evaluation of the Commission's work by representatives of different legal systems, see the report on the 56th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law in The American Journal of International Law, July 1962 (Vol. 56, No. 3), pp. 762–768.Google Scholar

22 General Assembly Resolution 1923 (XVIII), December 5, 1963.

23 For background, see Singer, J. David, Financing International Organization: The U. N. Budget Process (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Stoessinger, John G. and others, Financing the United Nations System (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1964).Google Scholar

24 General Assembly Official Records (19th session), Supplement No. 1, p. 30.

25 Holcombe, Arthur N., Organizing for Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York: New York University Press, 1959), pp. 50–116.Google Scholar

26 General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII), December 17, 1963.

27 See Senf Manno, Catherine, “Weighted Voting in the United Nations General Assembly: A Study of Feasibility and Methods” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1964).Google Scholar

28 Stuart Mill, John, On Liberty and Considerations of Representative Government, ed. McCallum, R. B. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948), p. 263.Google Scholar