It has been believed for many years, indeed centuries, that the Channel between Great Britain and Continental Europe could be crossed only by boat. This belief has come to an end, albeit—at least for the time being—at a price which does not allow huge financial investments to be turned into a profit. The belief that in the legal field differences between English or Anglo-American common law and French and German—or, rather, Romanistic and Germanistic—legal systems are unbridgeable (or should I say “un-chunnelable”?) is even more widespread. That is the subject of this article: to show that differences between legal systems may, as a result of the European Union, be less unbridgeable than before, at least in certain areas of the law.

This article addresses the problem of democratic legitimacy posed by the executive branch's use of delegated legislative powers. After some remarks on the need for delegated legislation and the problem of legitimation the study identifies in a comparative perspective three approaches of ensuring that delegated legislation carries sufficient democratic legitimation. A first means of democratic legitimation is parliamentary predetermination of the executive role. German law proves that the proper legislature under the Damocles sword of unconstitutionality is in many cases well able to prescribe for the executive a substantive programme of delegated legislation. A second technique of democratic legitimation is that parliament in some way participates in the rule-making procedure. German and British law show that by means of subsequent approval the proper legislature assumes political responsibility for subordinate legislation beyond the original empowerment. The US Supreme Court, however, considers the legislative veto to be unconstitutional. Therefore, American law developed a third approach to solve the problem of democratic legitimacy. American experience makes clear that the democratic legitimation of secondary legislation can also be secured by means of comprehensively involving the public in the delegated legislative process. The author assesses the different models for legitimation and explains that the different approaches suggest valuable solutions to each country's problems.

On 26 March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition launched ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ on the territory of the Republic of Yemen following a request by that country's beleaguered government. Although it received no prior fiat from the UN Security Council and took place amidst a civil war, the intervention met with approval from numerous States, with only few critical sounds. Closer scrutiny nonetheless reveals that the self-defence justification, which is primarily relied upon, does not provide a convincing legal basis for the operation. Moreover, the intervention is problematical from the perspective of the intervention by invitation doctrine and undeniably exposes its indeterminacy and proneness to abuse.

It was Robert Nozick who, distinguishing the classical liberal ‘night-watchman State’ which protected citizens against violence and enforced contracts on their behalf, conjured instead the ‘ultra-minimal State’1 in which the task of the State is confined to the monopolization of violence rather than the actual provision of security (unless paid for by citizens by choice). On the face of it, it seems that Western governments are increasingly keen to move towards this model of the ultra-minimal State and to allow even the provision of force to be assumed by private enterprise on a contractual model in which the rich or the desperate may choose to avail themselves of fortifications at the going rate while the rest take their chances in life. The ultra-minimal State is left with a residual steering2 policy role in which the parameters of contractual engagement for protection can be set. In short, it appears that nothing is sacrosanct in the onward march of the principles of neo-liberalism. Even the ultimate bastions of establishment—Her Majesty's armed forces—are not immune from processes of commodification and marketization that have previously been applied to core functions such as policing3 and imprisonment.4

Analyses related to the Covid-19 pandemic have mainly addressed measures adopted in response to this event without paying attention to provisions included in the 2005 International Health Regulations which require States to develop predefined core capacities to prevent, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease. The legal architecture related to these obligations has, however, various shortcomings and States have largely failed to implement the required measures. Only recently has some practice been developed by the WHO to address these deficiencies, and further action is still required to finally implement this (neglected) cornerstone of the global health system.

While the rights of domestic workers are expanding in international law, including through the adoption of the ILO Domestic Workers Convention in 2011, migrant domestic workers remain particularly vulnerable to employment-related abuse and exploitation. This article explores the intersection of the employment law and migration law regimes applicable to migrant domestic workers in the United Kingdom, France and Ireland. The article suggests that the precarious immigration status of many migrant domestic workers renders employment protections, such as they exist in each jurisdiction, largely illusory in practice for this group of workers. The labour standards contained in the Domestic Workers Convention, together with the recommendations of the UN Committee on Migrant Workers on the features of an appropriate immigration regime for migrant domestic workers, are identified as providing an alternative normative model for national regulatory frameworks.

The purpose of this article is to consider the scope of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as set out in the Treaty on European Union. Pursuant to Article 46 TEU, the ECJ has virtually no competence over foreign policy and security matters—although some limited scope for judicial supervision may be derived from the combined effect of this provision with Article 47 TEU, which prevents encroachment by EU law on Community competence, with respect both to reviewing the choice of legal basis and to determining any violations of EC policy-making procedures. It is submitted that the absence of judicial control over the exercise of powers by the Union and its Member States in this area of potentially sensitive action does not guarantee the preservation of the institutional balance established by the EU Treaty. It may also prove incompatible for individuals to have a legal remedy in the event of a breach of directly effective CFSP provisions.

Following the last update in this Quarterly,1 the European Union (EU) has been quite active in agreeing new measures relating to cross-border policing and criminal law. First of all, the Tampere European Council meeting in October 1999 agreed a list of measures to be adopted to develop the EU's ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, particularly as regards criminal procedure. Here the European Council requested the Council to agree a work programme on mutual recognition in criminal matters within a year, and to establish an EU organisation facilitating cross-border prosecutions (Eurojust) within 2 years. Following agreement in the meantime on a Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters after 5 years’ negotiations,2 the work programme was duly adopted in November 2000, setting out a list of twenty-four measures which the Council should agree in the medium-term to facilitate cross-border investigations, prosecutions, and enforcement of judgments.3 Several Member States then began to implement this plan, tabling two versions of a proposed Decision to set up Eurojust and also making proposals for ‘Framework Decisions’ to harmonise national laws as regards enforcement of other Member States’ orders to freeze assets and evidence and enforcement of judgments imposing financial penalties.4

The Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the best interests principle codified in Article 3 in particular, is playing an increasingly significant role in decisions involving the admission or removal of a child from a host State. This article examines the extent to which the best interest principle may provide an independent source of international protection. That protection may, for instance, proscribe the removal of a child from a host State notwithstanding that the child is ineligible for protection as a refugee or protection under the more traditional non-refoulement obligations in international human rights law.

This memorandum is submitted in response to a request from the Foreign Affairs Committee in connection with its hearings on the NATO intervention in Kosovo in March 1999. The memorandum addresses the following issues of international law:

(1) Was the resort to force by NATO consistent with international law? and

(2) Were the means employed by NATO, once the decision to use force had been taken, consistent with international law?

While lacking the raw excitement of the live “penalty shoot-out” that was the announcement of the decision of the House of Lords in Reg. v. Bow Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet,1 the initial impression of the decision in Reg. v. Bow Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)2 was of a solid majority support for the position that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity in the United Kingdom in respect of the criminal acts he is alleged to have committed. Even as Lord Browne-Wilkinson attempted to explain the intricacies of the decision, the matter of immunity appeared settled and of secondary consideration to the “new” requirement of double criminality which alone, it seemed, had resulted in the considerable reduction in the list of crimes for which Pinochet could be extradited to Spain. Closer examination of the reasoning of their Lordships, however, quickly dispels that impression and reveals a range of opinions across a wide spectrum. What agreement there was between their Lordships on the matter of Pinochet's immunity from jurisdiction is diverse and often contradictory. In particular, the Lordships who formed the majority were equally divided on the question as to whether Pinochet was acting within his official capacity when carrying out the acts of which he is accused. Given that immunity rationae materiae appears to be available only in respect of official acts, it is difficult to see how the six could have agreed on the fact that Pinochet was not entitled to such immunity. Indeed, given the fact that Lord Goff (dissenting) was of the opinion that the alleged acts were performed in the course of Pinochet's functions as head of state, there was in fact a majority in favour of the prima facie existence of immunity rationae materiae.

An increasing trend in private international law cases decided by courts in the United Kingdom has been to refer to the European Convention on Human Rights and, in particular, to Article 6. This article will examine the impact of this provision on private international law. The article will go on to examine why the impact has been so limited and will put forward a new approach that takes human rights more seriously, using human rights law to identify problems and the flexibility inherent in private international law concepts to solve them.

This article seeks to explore the way in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has interpreted and applied the principle of democracy. It examines first the democratization process upon which the EU has embarked since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and how that transformation was a positive reaction to those voices arguing that the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. Next, it is argued that the CJEU has understood the principle of democracy in a way which is respectful of the two sources of democratic legitimacy at EU level, namely the Member States and the peoples of Europe. Accordingly, that understanding of the principle of democracy is illustrated by some relevant examples taken from the case law of the CJEU and the European General Court (‘EGC’). Those examples show that the CJEU has strived to protect the prerogatives of the European Parliament, the only political institution of the EU whose members have, since 1979, been elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. Yet, they also show that the principle of democracy is not limited to protecting parliamentary prerogatives. That principle, like all EU constitutional principles, pervades the whole of EU law and, as such, must be read in light of societal changes. As democracy within the EU is not limited to the participation by the European Parliament in the legislative process but also encompasses other forms of governance, in particular rule-making by administrative agencies and the achievement of consensus by social partners, it is for the EU judiciary to make sure that those other forms of governance remain as democratic as possible. This can be achieved, inter alia, by making sure that they enjoy sufficient representation or are subject to parliamentary control. Furthermore, the CJEU and the EGC also take into account new mechanisms which seek to strengthen the principle of democracy, such as the principle of transparency. In so doing, they aim to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU by providing sufficient means for EU citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Finally, it is contended that the principle of democracy, as interpreted by the CJEU, draws inspiration from national democracies. In so doing, the CJEU strives to place national and supranational democracies in a mutually reinforcing relationship.